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Senkaku Sentinels - Air War over the East China Sea

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apophenia:
Evan: Interesting idea. That would give the JSDF a mix of cruise missiles - hypersonic gliders and surface-hugging subsonics. The trip-up would be that "persuade the US government" part  ;)

My non-whif sense is that the Japanese are quite determined to free themselves from FMS constraints where possible. I'm not clear on the exact history but US refusal to sell the F-22 to Japan was one of the straws. There is also a sense that the JSDF knows what capabilities it requires in the East China Sea and, increasingly, the US is unable to provide such missile types. Hence the current emphasis on supersonics with a future push for hypersonics, whereas US imports such as the JSM and LRASM were as seen more as 'needs must' purchases. (Had the F-35 been capable of accommodating the ASM-3 Kai, I wonder if Japan would have ever considered buying the JSM?)

Since the '70s, Japan has pretty much followed its own course on developing air- and surface-launched missiles. Within the JSDF, the conclusion appears to be that this has given them a technological lead - eg: SSM-1B (Type 88) and ASM-1C (Type 90). The Japanese consider both of their domestic products superior to the US Harpoons which they replaced ... while the US is just now beginning to replace the Harpoons themselves.

apophenia:
Senkaku Sentinels - Part 8: Lessons Learned from the Senkakus Incident

In light of Japanese Self-Defence Force reviews, it was decided that there would be no direct replacement of the spent A-16AJ Baipā (Pit Viper) force. One conclusion was that much of the Baipās' success was attributable to Chinese opponents confusing these aircraft with manned F-2A fighters. As soon as it became clear to the PLAAF and PLA-Navy that they were facing unmanned strike aircraft, Chinese counter tactics improved to the detriment of the A-16AJ fleet. It was judged unlikely that this element of surprise could be recaptured. Future JASDF UCAVs remained undetermined but, in all likelihood, they would need to be both smaller and stealthier - the favoured approach being the US 'Loyal Wingman' concept. [1]

By the end of 2023, the leading candidate for a 'Loyal Wingman'-type A-16AJ replacement was Boeing Australia's new Airpower Teaming System (ATS). [2] To control these smaller UCAVs in flight, two manned aircraft types were considered. These 'Aniki' ('Big Brother') control aircraft were the 2-seat Mitsubishi F-2B and the multi-seat Kawasaki EP-1. The first option would give the Mitsubishi trainers a fully operational role - with the F-2B's 'back-seater' controlling a pair of UCAVs. The second option used the new, 7-seat AEW&C variant of Kawasaki's P-1 patrol aircraft. Each Kawasaki EP-1 would be able to control up to eight 'Loyal Wingman' simultaneously. The two control aircraft options were not considered mutually exclusive.

In the meantime, all efforts would be made to speed up the development and deployment of a domestic stealth fighter - the Mitsubishi F-3 (aka F-X). These future fighters are generally viewed as air-superiority types - and they will act in that role. However, the F-3 has also been designed for the stealthy, internal carriage of anti-shipping missiles. That internal bay has been scaled for the ASM-3 Kai but, doubtless, future missile developments will also be tailored to the interior space available in the stealthy F-3.

Performance reviews also whittled down the range of Japanese anti-shipping missiles somewhat. Many successful anti-shipping missiles types were eliminated by attrition during the Senkakus Incident - including the ASM-1, ASM-1C, and ASM-2. Production of the ASM-3 Kai was to be completed before continuing with the improved ASM-3C variant and its extended-range derivative, the ASM-3ER. Further orders were also placed for the subsonic AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (which became the de facto replacement for the ASM-2). The less utile AGM-184A Joint Strike Missile was retained primarily to arm any future 'Loyal Wingman' type drone but also for its potential use by JASDF F-35s. Future emphasis was now on the domestic Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM, to ultimately replace the AGM-158C) and Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP, as replacement for the ASM-3 Kai and ASM-3C). [3]

Analysing Beijing's Motives - Strategic Strike or Supply-Chain Upsets

In the aftermath of battle in the East China Sea, it was still not entirely clear what Beijing's motivations had been. Less than half of the PLA-Navy's East Sea Fleet was committed against the Senkakus - the rest of that Chinese fleet had gone south. Losses were taken on both sides in the fighting around and above the Senkakus but, by most measures, the Japanese Self-Defence Force had prevailed. Japan still held the Senkakus and were now better-prepared to defend these islands. By contrast, Chinese losses seemed to gain Beijing very little. Rather than focusing their full might on taking the Senkaku Islands, Beijing seemed to be distracted by other ambitions.

Some analysts thought that Xi Jinping was simply sabre-rattling to distract his own population from a slump in the PRC economy. There had been a post-Covid 'bounce' in China's domestic economy - indeed, exports to the US actually grew at first (despite US trade sanctions). But supply-chain concerns had prompted efforts to 'decouple' the US economy from that of the PRC. Ironically, it was US supplier countries like Taiwan which led the way in 'decoupling'. Japan followed suit for its own economic reasons. However, as Chinese growth and productivity slowed, it became increasingly obvious to the Chinese population that PRC debt was growing rapidly. The Chinese economy was actually performing well compared to many other countries. But Xi's government could paper over that growing debt for only so long. Inflation had begun to eat into the savings of the aging Chinese citizenry.

Others analysts believed that the Senkaku Incident and related activities further south were simply Beijing's opening moves against Taiwan. In this argument, previously successful PRC 'cabbage tactics' from their South China Sea expansion were now being applied against Taiwan. This interpretation challenged previous models which suggested that the PRC would be content with causing chaos on Taiwan until its beleaguered citizens demanded their island's 'reunification' with the mainland. But that earlier model could not account for Beijing risking direct military actions in the Spring of 2023.

If China's gains in the Spring of 2023 were modest territorially, they were certainly in line with 'salami slicing' techniques employed in the past. So, what were Xi's gains in his 2023 'Zaochun' (Early Spring) campaign? In the Senkakus, the Chinese gained little more than harsh experience. Beijing had tested Japanese mettle and discovered that the Suga Government was more that willing to fight to curb any major PRC encroachments. Moreover, the Japanese Self-Defence Force had acquitted itself well in combat. With more focus, the PLA was more than capable of taking the Senkaku Islands ... but Beijing now knew that it must be prepared to take serious losses to gain whatever value the Senkakus represented to China. So, was the Senkaku Incident simply a feint to draw attention away from PLA moves against Taiwan?

Tackling Taiwan - Feints, Strategems, and Deadly Force

It is worth reviewing the PRC's Spring 2023 actions against Taiwan. Increasingly bellicose language from Beijing included direct threats of war if Taiwan was not 'brought back into the fold'. Such threats were in line with Xi's objective of causing chaos on Taiwan until the populace succumbs. But Xi Jinping had also set himself a timeline ... and a faltering PRC economy had established a timeframe of its own. Did Xi now see a limited war as a welcome distraction for his own population? The scale of the Spring 2023 operations suggest that China was simply testing the waters - at least to begin with.

Warning signs appeared in mid-April 2023 when mainland services were cut off to Taiwan's Kinmen Island. [4] That was followed by a reaffirmation of China's intention to enforce its February 2021 'Maritime Police Law'. Under that law, PRC jurisdiction was extended to the 'First Island Chain' - including both the Senkakus, Taiwan, and the islands of the South China Sea. Under Article 21 of the 'Maritime Police Law', the Haijing was enjoined to act against foreign military or government vessels operating in waters under the PRC's jurisdiction - that is, any waters claimed by Beijing. Article 47 entitles the Haijing to use deadly force against foreign vessels without warning. Much of this violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - to which the People's Republic is a signatory - but Article 47 was also a recipe for disaster. With so many conflicting territorial claims in the region, violence became a near certainty. It didn't take long.

On 27 April, armed clashes occurred in the Taiwan Strait between Haijing ships and a flotilla of Taiwan Coast Guard patrol cutters. [5] Exchanges between PLA-N and Taiwan Navy vessels followed but, for the most part, PLAAF aircraft stayed outside of Taiwan's immediate airspace. The major exception came without warning. Escorted by Shenyang J-11 Flankers, PLAAF Xian JH-7A 'Flying Leopard' struck at Taiwan's Taiping Dao (aka Itu Aba) - the largest of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Several helicopters and at least one ROCAF C-130 were destroyed on the apron at Taiping Island Airport (RCSP). Obviously, the ROC Marines' FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS were a wholly inadequate air defence for the island.

As the landing craft of the People's Liberation Army Marine Corps (PLAMC) raced for shore, Taiping Dao's defences were pummeled with ship-to-shore missiles. [6] Despite this, the Taiwanese Marine Corps defenders were able to inflict heavy casualties on the PLAMC as they came ashore. However, the outcome was a foregone conclusion and the fighting comparatively brief. Before sunset, Taiping Dao (and nearby Zhongzhou Reef) were completely under PRC control. And that was Beijing's total territorial gain for the Spring 2023 fighting - 46 hectares of dry land and some submerged rocks. Yet Xi Jinping seemed pleased with the outcome and Beijing insisted that the PLA had prevailed in the conflict.

'The Future is Unwritten' - 'Reunification' with Taiwan by Other Means?

It remains unclear what Xi's ultimate goal was in the Spring of 2023. Perhaps Beijing's objective was simply to test the resolve of the United States and its regional allies. Or was the PRC Politburo simply pursuing   'reunification' with Taiwan by causing chaos? Certainly the people of Taiwan were now living in more fear than ever. It is possible that the West will never know the true intentions behind the 2023 'Zaochun' (Early Spring) campaign.

The real question for the immediate future is: How will the United States and its allies prepare for further armed aggression from the People's Republic of China? 'Unwritten' or not, the future is now upon us.

( Fin )

_________________________________________

[1] In one fell swoop, those conclusions eliminated all existing domestic UCAV proposals from further consideration. The Mitsubishi XA-2 Mizuchi and Subaru AXS (along with its Kawasaki XASM-5 Kobanzame missile) withered on the vine.

[2] The 'attritable' nature of ATS fit very well within Japanese operational experience. In JASDF planning, 'Loyal Wingman' was viewed primarily as a mini-UCAV. However, there still was an option to procure reconnaissance packages as well. No details have been released about exactly how the Japanese intend to arm such unmanned strike aircraft.

[3] The Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) was to be powered by a high-speed scramjet engine. However, as the 'cruise missile' in the name suggest, the HCM will also have a longer range than is normal with scramjet-powered missiles. By contrast, the Hyper-Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) will have a solid-fuel rocket engine. Somewhat similar to one of the ASM-3 Kai modes, the HVGP will pop up to high altitude outside an opponent's air defence zone. Then, instead of diving and hugging the surface, the HVGP's warhead payload will separate from the booster body. The warhead section would then glide in a high-velocity dive to its intended target.

[4] Kinmen Island is only 2 km off the Chinese coast. In past 'heat ups', Kinmen has been heavily shelled from the mainland. However, with the 'normalization' of Taiwan-PRC relations in the early 21st Century, Kinmen came to rely upon mainland Fujian province for services - Jinjiang City for fresh water and Xiamen for telecommunication links. Prior to Xi's rise, there was even hope for developing a Free Economic Zone on Kinmen Island, in order to smooth trade dealings with the PRC. That fantasy has now evaporated as Kinmen Island waits for the PRC's next move.

[5] The first Penghu encounter between the Haijing and the Taiwan Coast Guard occurred just west of Qimei Island late on 27 April. By chance, the two flotilla's were led by the largest ships of the Haijing and the Taiwan Coast Guard - the Haixun 06 and Chiayi (CG5001), respectively. Fortunately, neither vessel was particularly heavily-armed. Haixun 06 fired on Chiayi ... but far beyond the effective range of its 37 mm gun.

[6] Details are sketchy regarding which missile types were used. One confirmed type is a previously-unseen land attack variant of the YJ-62A subsonic cruise missiles fired from Type 052C destroyers. These 'YJ-62G' missiles have a range of at least 280 km (the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence assessing its potential range being as great as 400 km).

elmayerle:

--- Quote from: apophenia on February 27, 2021, 05:45:30 AM ---Evan: Interesting idea. That would give the JSDF a mix of cruise missiles - hypersonic gliders and surface-hugging subsonics. The trip-up would be that "persuade the US government" part  ;)

My non-whif sense is that the Japanese are quite determined to free themselves from FMS constraints where possible. I'm not clear on the exact history but US refusal to sell the F-22 to Japan was one of the straws. There is also a sense that the JSDF knows what capabilities it requires in the East China Sea and, increasingly, the US is unable to provide such missile types. Hence the current emphasis on supersonics with a future push for hypersonics, whereas US imports such as the JSM and LRASM were as seen more as 'needs must' purchases. (Had the F-35 been capable of accommodating the ASM-3 Kai, I wonder if Japan would have ever considered buying the JSM?)

Since the '70s, Japan has pretty much followed its own course on developing air- and surface-launched missiles. Within the JSDF, the conclusion appears to be that this has given them a technological lead - eg: SSM-1B (Type 88) and ASM-1C (Type 90). The Japanese consider both of their domestic products superior to the US Harpoons which they replaced ... while the US is just now beginning to replace the Harpoons themselves.

--- End quote ---
OTOH, a lot of concepts developed by Northrop and its partners in the course of TSSAM development could be applied to indigenous japanese developments.  Too, if the purchase price was decent enough, it would at least let the USG getsome value for unused assets.  Considering that JASSM/AGM-158 was started only after TSSAM wsa killed and only has frontal aspect LO, I could see some definite interest in incorporating aspects of TSSAM into a new design.  Besides, if I understand what I"ve read correctl, JASSM-ER and LRASM use the same engine that TSSAM did but without the LO exhaust nzzole TSSAM used.

apophenia:
That makes sense - and I do like this 'missile mix' notion. The big question would be US willingness to release technology and FMS.

I note that both the AGM-137 and AGM-158A are roughly the same length - ie: too long to fit into the F-35 weapon bays. Would it be feasible to 'shave' about two feet off the TSSAM's total length without unduly compromising the design?

elmayerle:

--- Quote from: apophenia on February 28, 2021, 07:58:41 AM ---I note that both the AGM-137 and AGM-158A are roughly the same length - ie: too long to fit into the F-35 weapon bays. Would it be feasible to 'shave' about two feet off the TSSAM's total length without unduly compromising the design?

--- End quote ---
Well, considering that BGM-137B was, IIRC, a foot shorter than AGM-137A, I'd say it was possible to shorten the bird that much though you would have to be careful where you did the shortening.  OTOH, air-launched TSSAM was intended to be LO even as an externally carried store (which did complicate matters a bit) so that might not be as much of a problem as other missiles might be.

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