Author Topic: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline  (Read 7171 times)

Offline Queeg

  • Master armour builder
  • Lost but now foun .... nope - still lost!
Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #30 on: December 05, 2013, 12:42:37 AM »
Spot on Logan, nice pod cast btw.

For more discussion ........

There's a reason my own scenario has Malta falling to an early and committed Crete style combined arms assault, as it very well could have. Overall though the RN was a huge difference maker and for a long time the only bright spot in what was a near run campaign early on. The Kriegsmarine wasn't up to things in terms of equipment and numbers (the Uboat arm notwithstanding) and the Italians just weren't up to things.

It goes back to my comments on will - both political and military. This ties to the willingness to accept and take losses and on occaision to gamble with everything. One of the often underestimated British traits is will .... and a large dash of stubborn in the face of what seems like bad odds.

The Germans didn't really have the will in the Med. It wasn't seen as vital to them and they really got sucked into a commitment to support their allies incompetence. And once you committ you can't really withdraw and save any face plus handing territory over easily is not the tendency of any military. This has been ably demonstrated in most of the post war/modern "limited objective" conflicts ever since WWII. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan being classic exampls where the forces are committed to theatre but the political will limits objectives. It makes subsequent withdrawls as difficult as achieving clear and decisive victory, or at least victory as the public would understand it. Interestingly the Falklands campaign is an example of where political will carried the day, in the face of limited military capabilty and what were at times quite servere naval losses.

My own belief is that the Germans could have "won" in the Med if they had wanted to badly enough and early enough. They didn't and Russia once started was always Hitlers focus, necessarily as it was the conflict meat grinder that really lost the war for the Germans and enabled the Allies to win. What forces were committed by the Germans to the Med were always (until the end) just enough to cause problems and occasionally strong enough to deliver a bloody nose and cause pause, but never enough to win in a classic sense.


And it may also be of interest to see the nominal Armour piercing capabilities of Luftwaffe bombs:

AP bombs:
PD 500: 120 mm
PC 1000: 100 mm
PC 1400: 120 mm

SC series GP bombs:
SC 500: 40 mm

SD series semi-AP bombs:
SD 500: 90 mm
SD 1700: 70 mm


Just to finish, we haven't been discussing the big ships just being based in the middle of the canal for some time. For me any added vulnerability was implied by their use as close ground support gun units. Close to land in a contested theatre is the worst of scenarios for any navy. If it had been possible they would have just parked off Torbruk and withstood the air attacks while sweeping the perimeter clean of Rommel's useless and broken down PzIIIs and IVs. The naval gunfire support you see in Normandy and the Pacific is the product of a completely different tactical situation, virtually complete air superiority being but one ....
« Last Edit: December 05, 2013, 01:27:19 AM by Queeg »