French submarines for the Canadian navy, perhaps:
https://youtu.be/lKSKWI40fI0?si=XEUHgqkjXlSHKt4u
Sure, in whif-world, we could see potential French AIP boats in RCN service. And there is a host of other plausible options for the Directorate of Naval Requirements to ponder. Let's go through those:
- ES = S-80
Plus: AIP adaptation; but Navantia has experienced weight-control issues.
- FR =
Shortfin Barracuda - the AIP variant of France's
Suffren class nuke boat.
- JP = 29SS
Taigei class: Included for completeness (Japan has already declined submission).
- NO/DE =
Typ 212CD: Pitched to Canada by Boris Pistorius (but he is now yesterday's man).
- ROK = KSS-III: With potential overseas build (unlikely under NSS but easy access to CFB Esquimalt).
- SE = A26
Blekinge class: A reminder the RCN needs to update its probable deployments file.
How to rank those? I'll go in order of increasing likelihood of acceptance:
6 - 29SS
Taigei class: Not actually an AIP type (unlike its []iSoryu[/i] class predecessor).
5 - S-80
Plus: AIP adaptation; but Navantia has experienced weight-control issues.
4 - A26
Blekinge class: NDHQ has ego issues buying anything from smaller countries.
-- Note: Other than Ops & Ex with the USN; Canada's only current deployment is the Baltic.
3 - KSS-III: Totally unfamiliar supplier (whose greatest advantage is rapid production time).
-- Note: Seaspan has ROK yard connections but cannot even meet its existing schedules.
2 -
Typ 212CD: Promising but Canada probably missed the boat for NO/DE cooperation.
1 -
Shortfin Barracuda: Canada has an option of coat-tailling on Dutch
Orka order.
Buying
Orka-type boats would connect DND/PSPC with Damen with whom they have established relationships. Still, the irony is that Canada would be buying AIP submarines from a country which does not even recognise our claims to the NWP. (And I'd put money on it having been an interloping French boat whose conning tower got a .303-inch sized dent in its conning tower courtesy of the Canadian Rangers!)
The Dreaded Real WorldOn the RW side, two key questions emerge on the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. The first is: How serious is the GoC about fulfilling this CPSP 'requirement'? The second is: How does a CAD 100 Billion SSK purchase fit into current Canadian fiscal realities? [1]
On Question 1, note that the RCN has been actively lobbying for
Victoria class replacements since at least April 2023. But it took until mid-Sept 2024 for the GoC to issue an RFI (mistakenly called an RfP on the GoC website). That RFI called for "heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles[,] and long-range precision land attack missiles". And, of course, all of the preferred weapons on that list have since been torpedoed by Trump (sorry, couldn't resist). [2]
--
https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender-opportunities/tender-notice/ws4772162365-doc4779172331On Question 2, even prior to Trump's tariff offensive, Canada had a USD 0.70 dollar (it is now USD 0.69). Obviously the full economic effects of those tariffs have yet to be felt. Indeed, a better comparison might the CAD-EUR exchange rates - the CAD was worth €0.6695 on 31 Dec but only €0.6386 on 14 March 2025.
Carney's placeholder government is being referring to as a 'wartime Cabinet'. That pretty much sums up the current mood of most of the Canadian population. However, no amount of bellicose 'elbows up' attitude is going to reinflate that sagging economy. So, that means that we need to focus on military procurement priorities which genuinely bolster Canadian foreign policy goals (including increased trade with European partners). Personally, I fail to see how any of the RCN's current procurement priorities - including SSKs - serve any but US foreign policy goals. However, that said, I am more than prepared to entertain opposing viewpoints.
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[1] Even in April 2023, RCN lobbyist acknowledged that their implausibly-low CAD 60 Billion estimates would likely end up being CAD 100 Billion.
[2] On a rather OT rant, I'd say that the name Canadian Patrol Submarine
Project reveals the lack of gravitas within Canadian military procurement. In current practice, we progress from 'Project' - which involves anything from a random whim expressed within the Puzzle Palace all the way through to orders issued. Then it becomes a 'Program' which, in turn, extends from its Definition phase all the way through to final disposal. A bureaucracy incapable of ordering its terminology more clearly is unlikely to excel at its labours
