‘The Christmas Air Battle of 66’
Written by - M.A.D
Edited by – GTX
Profiles by - coops213
It is 2 March 1965. Following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku, U.S President Lyndon Johnson orders Operation Rolling Thunder, to commence. This is a massive bombing campaign of Hanoi and Haiphong. The offensive destroys much of the remaining economic and industrial capacity of North Vietnam.
But whilst this massive and powerful bombing campaign leaves almost all of Hanoi and Haiphong in ruins, it has two major consequences, which the United States is not banking on.
Instead of cowering, the North Vietnamese see and in fact, declare this massive U.S bombing campaign to be a war of aggression against its population. They subsequently strengthen their resolve to fight, rather than the envisaged capitulation.
This resolve by the North Vietnamese is spurred on greatly by this massive bombing action’s effect on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), who see the U.S military action as the long advocated threat and the United States’ primary reason for being in Vietnam – to attack and destroy the Chinese Communist regime.
This suspicion by the PRC is fuelled further by the ever deterioration of relations and ideology between itself and the Soviet Union.
The PLA advisors in North Vietnam are thus given the green light by their political leaders to encourage the North Vietnamese to up their resolve and to counter the American lead aggression by answering force with force.
To this end, the PLAAF secretly transfer two Harbin H-5 (IL-28 ‘Beagle’) Bomber Regiment’s (consisting of forty-eight aircraft in total) as "a gift of the PRC to the hard pressed people of North Vietnam". Although wearing NVAF marking’s, U.S intelligence was more than certain that these were both crewed and maintained by the PLAAF. These H-5’s join the already small NVAF force of an estimated ten Soviet-built IL-28 ‘Beagles’ already in service.
U.S intelligence was taken completely off guard when on 29 May 1965, an estimated two Regiment’s of H-5/IL-28’s carried out a strike against Quang Tri city in South Vietnam.
The USAF and VNAF interceptors were very slow in responding to this first NVAF cross-boarder air strike. Before the interception could occur, the ‘Beagles’ were safe back across the North Vietnamese boarder and airspace.
Following this action, President Johnson ignored the recommendations of his military advisors and orders the attack and destroy the NVAF bomber force and the bases they operated from.
However, the North Vietnamese had already predicted that this is what any smart military strategist would do to eliminate the threat, and had thus already organised to quickly fly its force of ‘Beagles’ to the sanctuary and safety of the PRC, whenever a massed American bomber force was detected.
The political ramification’s of this open North Vietnamese offensive capability was felt through the allies who were supporting the Americans in the Vietnam War. After more American B-52 strikes against North Vietnamese targets, the PRC becoming more and more concerned by the American willingness to use these strategic and potential nuclear bomb carrying bombers - especially combined with the misconstrued confusion of American political attempts to establish improved dialect with the PRC. As a result, they now saw the need to send their own clear message of resolve to the American administration, and their military.
Thus, on the 8 August 1965 a flight of the latest Harbin H-6 (Tu-16 ‘Badger’) medium bomber, again in NVAF markings, made a deliberate show of force, by flying towards the South Vietnamese boarder, before turning around after USAF and VNAF fighters scrambled, only to land at a NVAF air base knowing all too well that they would be photographed by US reconnaissance aircraft.
Alarm bells now began to ring in the Pentagon about the presence of such capable and longer-range bombers. The Johnson administration, through its National Security Adviser, Robert McNamara, commenced negotiations with its allies to provide a broader assistance to meeting the new North Vietnamese threat of offensive air operations. These negotiations lead to the request of the Australian government to share the responsibility and burden to defend the South and the safety of allied troops against air attack.
This request was heeded with the result that at a press conference, on 12 September 1965, the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister announced that the Australian Government was to commit a Squadron of RAAF’s the brand new Mirage IIIO’s for combat deployment to South Vietnam, to help stem the threat of North Vietnamese bomber force. The Minister for External Affairs made it clear though, that these aircraft were to used only in the defence of South Vietnamese air space and not take part in offensive operations over North Vietnam.
Only a day latter though, the Australian Government intentions were in trouble, with the French Ambassador contacting the Australian Minister for External Affairs to state very clearly that the French Government is against the use of their Mirage III fighter design being used in combat in IndoChina. He reiterated his Government’s concerns by categorically threatening the spare parts and manufacturing expertise in the license production of the Dassault Mirage III design in Australia by the Government Aircraft Factory (GAF).
The Australian Government took this seriously, having already experienced similar political problem with the likes of the Australian Army’s Swedish designed and supplied 84mm Carl Gustav Antitank Weapons System and ammunition, as well as the Swiss Pilatus Porter liaison and observation aircraft. With the new Mirage IIIO series of fighter/bombers they were not only concerned with its now ability to meet its commitment and promise to its main strategic ally, but its primary means of defending Australia.
The Selection of the French designed and built Dassault Mirage IIIO series of supersonic fighter-bomber was one of the most important and expensive lynch pins of Australia’s defence. It was also of technological significance to Australia’s continuing aerospace industry, with GAF manufacturing the airframe and wings, whilst the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) manufactured the SNECMA Atar engine. Too much time and money had been sunk into the program, just to cancel the entire program for the sake of one Squadron’s deployment in the eyes of the Australian Government and RAAF.
Embarrassing as it may be, it now looked as though the Australian Government would end up with egg on its face, by having to renounce its commitment to its ally, the United States.
To overcome this predicament, initially the RAAF considered the deployment of its older CA-27 Sabre and the CA-28 Sabre Dingo aircraft to South Vietnam to meet its pledge. But at the last minute a Royal Australian Navy Fleet Air Arm (RAN FAA) Captain, who was back in Australia after a combat tour of Vietnam as an exchange-pilot with the United States Marine Corp, came up with a seemingly simple solution:
The RAN FAA Captain had flown Chance-Vought F-8E Crusader in both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. His now seemingly simple suggestion was that the RAAF should use an in-country U.S fighter, which negated the political issue with France, and also the expense issue of maintenance and serviceability, as this could easily be handled by the Americans already in place (though obviously supplemented by RAAF maintainers).
However this suggestion was not warmly received by all with a rift within the RAAF ranks as to the using of a naval fighter designed for carrier-based operations like the Crusader!
It did not take long though to prove the cost and operational effectiveness of the F-8E Crusader over other more expensive types like the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II that the RAAF was truly hoping and pushing for. The winning factor for the selection of the F-8E Crusader, over other interim designs (such as the F-102, F-104 and even EE Lightning), was the fact that the Australian Government and RAN were in agreement of the need for a more capable fighter-bomber in the near future to equip HMAS Melbourne.
Up until now, the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk was the preferred candidate to replace the de Havilland Venom fighters. However, it was recognised that as a small and light carrier-based attack bomber, its fighter capability was limited and a compromise within the RAN. Also due to the experiences of modern warfare, the RAN knew it needed a fast and modern carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft. With the possibility to sway the argument in favour of the F-8E, the RAN FAA now leapt on the idea.
From the Australian Government’s point of view, things were even simpler as using the Crusader in Vietnam was a practical and financially smart proposition in a bigger picture.
After further political discussion between the United States and Australia, it was announced that the Australian Government would lease sixteen single-seat F-8E Crusader’s from the US Navy and the outright purchase of four new-built two-seat TF-8A trainers. The TF-8As being of use back in Australia for the conversion training of RAAF pilots and for evaluation of the type by the RAN aboard its aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.