Author Topic: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline  (Read 16193 times)

Offline Logan Hartke

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Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #25 on: December 04, 2013, 10:49:31 AM »
I'll do what I can, but I'm no expert.  I don't know if anyone knows the answer to some of your questions with certainty.

What was the field performance of a Ju-87 with a 2200lber?
From what I've read, even with excessively heavy bomb loads takeoff performance of the Stuka was surprisingly good.  The only thing negative that I've EVER read about the Stuka's field performance was that the spats sometimes got in the way in muddy conditions.

Rough field or prepared strip?
I don't know.  I would assume semi-prepared.  That's what most fields were at the time, especially for the Stuka.

What was it's range with said weapon?
Depends on the variant, but the Stuka's range was never too impressive.  That's one reason it always operated so close to the front lines.  The Ju 87R and D were better, though.

What was it's kinetic performance compared with oh say a P-40C/E, Spitfire V, Hurricane II or Fulmar (any of which it could be expected to encounter)?
What do you mean "kinetic performance"?  The Stuka was vulnerable to any enemy fighters under any circumstances.  I'd get worried for a Stuka if there were enemy Bristol Bulldogs over the target area.  In the right hands, it was still very much dangerous in its own right, but the Stuka was quite vulnerable to enemy fighters.  That having been said, Stukas successfully penetrated British fighter cover and anti-aircraft fire to attack the HMS Illustrious in Malta's Grand Harbour.

Could Marat match a Royal Sovereign with say 2 C class cruisers, a Leander and assorted destroyers in terms of AA firepower? I'll leave the Didos at home.
I've never read of AA fire preventing Stukas from attacking a target.  The combined fire of HMS Warspite, Valiant, Nubian, Dainty, Greyhound, Griffin, Jervis and Illustrious didn't prevent the Stukas from knocking out the Illustrious and removing it from the Mediterranean.  In fact, while the Illustrious was under repair in Valletta, one of the British anti-aircraft gunners even noted that the Stukas successfully carried out attacks on the Illustrious diving through a "curtain of steel" (his words) and with a Fulmar on its tail.  Not only that, but they carried 1000 kg bombs during that attack, so they had range enough to reach Malta with it.

As for the Didos, it's a good thing you're going to leave them at home, they might get hurt!  When the Dido had a run in with Stukas, the Stukas beat the crap out of it!


HMS Dido being bombed by German aircraft in the Mediterranean off Crete, May 1941


What was left of the "B" turret.

Wrong, quite possibly but not nearly completely. The Ju-87 should not go playing in the Med.
I think you really need to get this book, Empty Handed.  You really don't have enough respect for the Stuka.  When the Stukas were operating in the Med, it was enemy surface ships that didn't go playing without adequate air cover.  Crete showed that.



The short version is that the Stuka was murder for enemy ships.  It was absolutely deadly.  It could carry one of the heaviest bomb loads of any dive bomber in its time.  Its range was short--inadequate by Pacific standards, but certainly adequate for European operations.  It was, however, VERY vulnerable to enemy fighters.  Theater air superiority could certainly curtail Stuka operations and make losses unsustainable, but it really took total air dominance to ensure the safety of naval surface forces.  That was true off Norway, in the English Channel, in the Med, in the Baltic, and in the Black Sea.

Admiral Cunningham is widely considered to be one of Britain's finest admirals.  I'll let his words regarding the Stuka hopefully illustrate the point more eloquently than I ever could.

Quote
"We opened up with every AA gun we had as one by on the Stukas peeled off into their dives, concentrating the whole venom of their attack upon the Illustrious.  At times she became almost completely hidden in a forest of great bomb splashes.  One was too interested in this new form of dive-bombing attack really to be frightened, and there was no doubt we were watching complete experts.  Formed roughly in a large circle over the fleet they peeled off one by one when reaching the attacking position.  We could not but admire the skill and precision of it all.  The attacks were pressed home to point-blank range, and as they pulled out of their dives some of them were seen to fly along the flight-deck of the Illustrious below the level of her funnel."


Cheers,

Logan

Offline Queeg

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Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #26 on: December 04, 2013, 12:40:35 PM »
A few more thoughts for the debate then  ........  :)
 

My comments haven't really been to advocate the Stuka as a superweapon, rather the Rudel post was meant as a comment to what a very (very) skilled man could do with a capable weapon system, some luck and a heck of a lot of determination. There's a reason that his book was recommended reading for new A10 crews ....

In general I think the Stuka has gotten a bit of a bad rep as fighter bait mainly through the German tactical misuse when employed without aircover.

There are many reason for this repeated misuse but here's a couple of main ones in my view;

- The Poland/Low Countries and France campaign saw Stukas pitted against poor opposition, bad air defence and a scattered and demoralised enemy.
- The vast spaces in Russia allowed for deployments where there was often no fighter opposition and in the initial stages when there was it was poor.
- When the Stuka was used in a maritime role in the early war period shipboard AA fire was in it's infancy, poorly directed and sparse.
- The effective (read Me109) German fighter cover had a short range and loiter time leading to difficulties in supporting bombing operations.

So you get success which tend to have the victor overlooking any inadequacies and leads to more misuse. When adequate fighter opposition showed up there was a missmatch and subsequent heavy loss ...

My comments on poor naval AA outfit aren't just aimed at the RN though. The early German heavy fleet wasn't any better. Witness the difficulty in the Bismarks crews in hitting slow flying Stringbags and the inadequate depression ability of many secondary DP mountings. The comments on "diving through a curtain of fire" are all relative. Heavy AA fire in the early war was nothing compared to the state of the art barrage the late US fleet would put up during 44-45 against the suicide attacks. 

As I mentioned my Grandfather served on the Illustrious and he felt it was only a matter of time before they got hit, not if. He also mentioned that during their Pacific deployment all the British fleet got extra AA guns and even then it was only the armoured flight deck that saved them when they got hit. He witnessed US AA fire and when they first saw it all his shipmates were very impressed with the volume and effectiveness. Even with this at their disposal though the US fleet still suffered significant losses.

As for the Stuka itself, later marks had around 1000km operation range, earlier models much less. There was an extended range 'R" model but it's bombload was significantly reduced to be able to carry the extra tankage. The Ju87G which I was thinking of when I made my 2000lb comment could carry this at range and with full crew. The 87B Rudel used to sink the Murat had the radio op and gear removed to save weight. 

As for the Brit ships (average AA suite notwithstanding) remember the Sovereign was essentially a WW1 ship with most of it's armour belt designed to defeat low angle horizontal fire. From Jane's "The forecastle deck was 1 inch (25 mm) thick, while the upper deck was 1–1.5 inches (25–38 mm) in thickness. The main deck was 2 inches (51 mm) thick over the magazines and machinery spaces and one inch elsewhere, except for the 2-inch-thick slope that met the bottom of the main belt. The middle deck was one inch thick over 'Y' magazine, but increased to two to four inches over the steering machinery." It's possible you might get penetration with only a 500lb AP bomb let alone anything bigger.

In summary,

Ships (British, German, Japanese) are vulnerable to well coordinated (bombers with fighter cover) or to uncontested air attack.
All bombers (sic Stukas) are very vulnerable to fighters if unsupported with their own fighter cover.

Does this mean Stukas would wipe the Med clean of Allied shipping - of course not. It doesn't even guarantee that a strike would sink the Sovereign. What it does though is give them a fighting chance and with enough threat to put some pause into the Admiralty when considering the deployment of it heavy units.

cheers
Brent
 
« Last Edit: December 04, 2013, 12:42:53 PM by Queeg »

Offline Logan Hartke

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Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #27 on: December 04, 2013, 01:05:02 PM »
Agree completely with Queeg's comments.  I, likewise, am not saying that one Stuka is going to sink a Royal Navy battleship.  There were instances of whole squadrons of Stukas making attacks on capital ships without scoring a single hit.  As Brent points out, however, they wouldn't have to sink a ship to make the Royal Navy think twice about operating within sight of a hostile enemy shore without air superiority.  One Stuka getting a solid hit with a 1000 kg bomb would mot likely send even the heaviest capital ship running, even temporarily.  As Rudel showed, if you get particularly lucky with that single bomb, you can even do decidedly more than that.

Empty Handed's comment a couple of weeks ago implied that Royal Navy capital ships could safely operate within sight of German ground forces.  Not even counting the threat that heavy field artillery would pose to such an effort, I would agree with Greg that the potential of nearby Stukas would quickly disavow the Royal Navy of any such notions.  Indeed, as I pointed out earlier, operations off Norway, the English Channel, and Crete did just that for the Royal Navy.  They were even chagrined at times by their comrades for their unwillingness to operate within range of enemy Stukas without sufficient air cover.

Again, I'm not saying it would happen that way, but it's certainly plausible enough that if someone writes that into their alternate history timeline, I can't find enough fault with it to warrant raising an objection.

Cheers,

Logan

Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #28 on: December 04, 2013, 07:51:13 PM »
Again and again the BB in the canal thing was tongue in cheek. Sheesh. Although I don't think a handful of Panzer IVs that have just driven 1000+ miles are gonna be a massive issue for one. The heavy artillery you mention is probably a week or two behind. Not to mention what one may consider heavy on land is considered light at sea.

Quote
You really don't have enough respect for the Stuka

WTF! I'm not bloody well required to! It's an inferior design. Anything's a threat if there's enough of them.

One Stuka getting one hit on one capital ship is not disavowing anybody of anything. What are these bombs, nuclear?!!!  If that were true, what the hell was the RN still doing in the Med by Dec '42. Surely they would have run home to Scapa by then? Your contention is laughable!

The RN took it's licks and carried on regardless. They lost a lot of ships but somehow always found more. They stayed the course, fought the good fight. Determination and courage won the Med. An obsolete dive-bomber lost.

nemo me impune lacessit






Offline Logan Hartke

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Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #29 on: December 05, 2013, 12:00:51 AM »
By December of '42, most of the Stukageschwader were on the Russian front.  There never were enough to go around.  This was in no small part due to its vulnerability to enemy fighters, a fact illustrated on November 11, 1942 when USAAF P-40Fs mauled 15 Stukas in the Med.

As for the RN, they absolutely took their licks and carried on.  That's why they won the war.  The Italian and German navies in WWII, in contrast, were scared back to their home ports after taking a few losses and never seriously challenged the RN again.  It's been that very willingness to carry on with the mission despite losses that made the Royal Navy the formidable force in history that it has been.  It knows that you're going to get your nose bloodied, but you have to stay with it if you want to win.


HMS Orion the morning after on May 30th 1941.

That having been said, the Stukageschwader gave them those licks.  For example, the Royal Navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers used in the Battle of Dunkirk (8 sunk, 23 damaged and out of service), primary to the Stuka.  In many ways, their Mediterranean experience was even more sobering.  Not only were the HMS Illustrious, Warspite, Orion, and Ajax so heavily battered that they had to be sent to the US for repairs, but the Royal Navy outright lost at least the cruisers HMS Southampton, Gloucester, and Fiji to Stukas.  Add many more Allied destroyers to that and you can see that Stukas represented quite the threat to the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean.

So, if they were that dangerous, why was the Royal Navy operating throughout that period?  Well, for a few reasons.  First, the Stukas were short-ranged.  If you were in the middle of the Med or at either end, Stuka's didn't represent much of a problem.  If you got close to Crete or Sicily, well, that was a different matter altogether.  Second, there were never enough Stukas to go around.  You can think of certain campaigns as "Stuka seasons".  They would come out at certain times and beat the ever-living daylights out of all the ships in an area, then go off to spearhead the next campaign.  Last--and most importantly--the Royal Navy didn't have a choice.  To cede Malta or Crete without a fight would be to cede effective Royal Navy presence in an entire region of the Mediterranean.  Doing that would cut British forces in half and allow the Germans and Italians to resupply their forces in North Africa unhindered.


Photograph taken by a German airman recording the sinking of Gloucester off the coast of Crete, 22 May 1941

To lose Malta was to lose the central Mediterranean.  To lose the central Mediterranean was to lose North Africa.  To lose North Africa was to lose the Western Front's only ground theater against the Germans.  To lose that was to jeopardize the relationship with the Soviet Union.  To lose the Soviet Union was to lose the war.  Something as seemingly minor as a few squadrons on a little rock or a couple of cruisers in an otherwise unimportant stretch of sea was potentially crucial to the whole war.

So, knowing full well that they would lose ships and hundreds of sailors, the Royal Navy had to operate close to shore under the very noses of the Luftwaffe on more than one occasion.  The Stukas made them pay dearly for it, but it was the Royal Navy's willingness to accept these losses and carry on fighting time and time again that allowed the Allies to keep fighting through the dark days of WWII until they were ready to start driving the Axis back.


http://worldwariipodcast.net/wordpress/2012/11/episode-64-the-royal-navy-mediterranean-sea-1940/

I really would encourage people to listen to this podcast featuring Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, about the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean in 1940 from the history of WWII podcast.  He talks at length about Admiral Andrew Cunningham and the Royal Navy's understanding that naval operations will incur losses, but they're necessary to win.

Cheers,

Logan

Offline Queeg

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  • Lost but now foun .... nope - still lost!
Re: "Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted" Possible Story Timeline
« Reply #30 on: December 05, 2013, 12:42:37 AM »
Spot on Logan, nice pod cast btw.

For more discussion ........

There's a reason my own scenario has Malta falling to an early and committed Crete style combined arms assault, as it very well could have. Overall though the RN was a huge difference maker and for a long time the only bright spot in what was a near run campaign early on. The Kriegsmarine wasn't up to things in terms of equipment and numbers (the Uboat arm notwithstanding) and the Italians just weren't up to things.

It goes back to my comments on will - both political and military. This ties to the willingness to accept and take losses and on occaision to gamble with everything. One of the often underestimated British traits is will .... and a large dash of stubborn in the face of what seems like bad odds.

The Germans didn't really have the will in the Med. It wasn't seen as vital to them and they really got sucked into a commitment to support their allies incompetence. And once you committ you can't really withdraw and save any face plus handing territory over easily is not the tendency of any military. This has been ably demonstrated in most of the post war/modern "limited objective" conflicts ever since WWII. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan being classic exampls where the forces are committed to theatre but the political will limits objectives. It makes subsequent withdrawls as difficult as achieving clear and decisive victory, or at least victory as the public would understand it. Interestingly the Falklands campaign is an example of where political will carried the day, in the face of limited military capabilty and what were at times quite servere naval losses.

My own belief is that the Germans could have "won" in the Med if they had wanted to badly enough and early enough. They didn't and Russia once started was always Hitlers focus, necessarily as it was the conflict meat grinder that really lost the war for the Germans and enabled the Allies to win. What forces were committed by the Germans to the Med were always (until the end) just enough to cause problems and occasionally strong enough to deliver a bloody nose and cause pause, but never enough to win in a classic sense.


And it may also be of interest to see the nominal Armour piercing capabilities of Luftwaffe bombs:

AP bombs:
PD 500: 120 mm
PC 1000: 100 mm
PC 1400: 120 mm

SC series GP bombs:
SC 500: 40 mm

SD series semi-AP bombs:
SD 500: 90 mm
SD 1700: 70 mm


Just to finish, we haven't been discussing the big ships just being based in the middle of the canal for some time. For me any added vulnerability was implied by their use as close ground support gun units. Close to land in a contested theatre is the worst of scenarios for any navy. If it had been possible they would have just parked off Torbruk and withstood the air attacks while sweeping the perimeter clean of Rommel's useless and broken down PzIIIs and IVs. The naval gunfire support you see in Normandy and the Pacific is the product of a completely different tactical situation, virtually complete air superiority being but one ....
« Last Edit: December 05, 2013, 01:27:19 AM by Queeg »