Another thing, that I was completely unaware of until I read it today, was that UK intelligence (or those who received it) tended to "mirror" foreign services on their own force structures. Specifically when the UK became aware of the Mitsubishi G3M Nell (and following G4M Betty), they assumed it was an Imperial Japanese Army Air Service medium bomber along the lines of the RAFs Whitley and Wellington, rather than the extreme, long range heavy bomber, with torpedo capability, designed to attrite the US fleet as it set forth from Pearl Harbour to Japanese waters in the event of a war, that it really was.
Based on this "mirroring", if Coastal Command was part of the FAA, the UK may have had a different view of the role of the Nell and 'possibly' may have realised that Japan had a very long range anti shipping capability at their disposal and 'possibly' may have determined that battleships could not, ever, be used against Japan without air cover, based on the RAF (which the FAA and Coastal Command had so recently been a part of) belief that "the bomber will always get through". A lot of assumptions and suppositions but far more likely to have occurred had the Admiralty been looking at Japanese capability through the prism of their own, sea power centric, biases.
We then have a possibility of the RN pushing for a long range land based fighter to support the fleet within range of Japanese airpower, or an earlier evolution of the Light Fleet Carrier to get more fighter cover for the fleet to allow the battleships to do their job. Bit of a stretch I know but then again, butterfly effect.