Right the Wrongs!

[Weaver]

Here's a wrong to right: give the He.177 four separate engines as the designer actually wanted to do.

[jcf]

Moderator hat on ...
Interesting stuff guys, but let's dial back on the political aspects please. Thanks.  :)
... OK moderator hat off.

As to the F.1 vs. F-104, the timeline makes it unlikely as the F.1 prototype didn't fly until 1967 with
first deliveries of the initial F.1C interceptors six  years later. The F.1A attack variant was an early
seventies development that entered service in the mid to late 70s. The Germans received their first
F-104Gs in 1961 and went fully operational in 1963, four years before the F.1 flew, and ten years before
the attack variant.

So, without the 104 there is a decade deep hole to fill, start filling.

[elmayerle]

Well, the obvious alternate for the Marinefleiger is the Buccaneer, which PantherG has supplied markings for.  I'm thinking they'd use the same spec. as the SAAF with the rocket engines for expediting "quick reaction" takeoffs.  As a later mod, the RAF bulged weapons bay door gets added for increased range.  For the Luftwaffe, the Super Tiger is definitely an option as would be a production P.1121 if Hawker had gone ahead with it (methinks a production P.1121 with a reheated Medway would be an excellent strike aircraft).

[Daryl J.]

"Fin F" becoming a euphamism amongst Tornado crew for having a skin full of beer.....

Or, in other words, in future generations restored Tornadoes will be sponsored, rather than by Red Bull Energy Drinks, by Johnnie Walker?   

[upnorth]

Moderator hat on ...
Interesting stuff guys, but let's dial back on the political aspects please. Thanks.  :)
... OK moderator hat off.

As to the F.1 vs. F-104, the timeline makes it unlikely as the F.1 prototype didn't fly until 1967 with
first deliveries of the initial F.1C interceptors six  years later. The F.1A attack variant was an early
seventies development that entered service in the mid to late 70s. The Germans received their first
F-104Gs in 1961 and went fully operational in 1963, four years before the F.1 flew, and ten years before
the attack variant.

So, without the 104 there is a decade deep hole to fill, start filling.

OK, how about a wider audience for the F-8 Crusader in lieu of the F-104?

[M.A.D]

The cancellation was by act of Congress, specifically a "crusade" led by the Hon. (sic) Les Aspin of Wisconsin who later criticized the Navy on the F-14, after a number of TF30-related crashes, of "buying a Turkey, not a Tomcat" and, of course, neglecting his role in neutering that fine design for so long.  That he went on to become William jefferson Clintons first SecDef is a definite crime and shame. At the very least, an afterburnging TF41 (Allison/RR had already demonstrated adequate capability in 1967) should have been pursued after cancelliing the F401.  Note, the F401 was more than just a navalized F100, it had a larger fan and greater power.  A fully developed F401 to the same tech as the latest F100 variants would probably deliver 35,000 lbt in full burner.  I should note, in an effort to be fair to Rep. Aspin, that the F401 didn't help its case when, within a week, two of the were brought back from the test stands at P&W-Florida in bushel baskets.  I know because I was there and the cancellation of the F401 got me laid off from there. 

Sheesh, over 35 years later and it's still a sore point with me.
[/quote]

Hey some great information and insight thanks elmayerle
I'm sorry to hear of your circumstances in relation to the cancelation of the F401!!
I too have a very tender and sore point re past employement ....... I'm still effected....... Am wrigting a book in the hope it will help 

M.A.D

[elmayerle]

Well, that was my longest period of unemployment, but not my only one by a long shot (it seems that being a designer in aerospace can be a very sporty situation).  I do feel that I've had my revenge; he's no longer around and I'm still working in aerospace and doing modestly well at it and, in the process, I've worked on a number of very interesting projects and with a number of interesting and colorful people.

[finsrin]

Late 1990's I righted a wrong by tracking down and ridding Boeing of two foreign spies.  Feels good to this day.

[Rickshaw]

Or even better Saab Draken sales!!
 
M.A.D

Fearing the wrath of the moderator, let me put simply, there was no way the Draken would either be sold or bought from the Swedes in light of their rather strict policies about potential purchasers and the sorts of government they might have and where these aircraft might be used.  The Australian experience over the 84mm Carl Gustav Rcl and the Vietnam War was not a good one and I have no reason to doubt the Swedes would have been as difficult over the supply of spare parts to any nation that bought their aircraft at that point in history and then found themselves involved in a conflict the Swedes did not approve of.

It was one of the major reasons why the Viggen was never a real contender for the Mirage replacement downunder.  Memories were long and the hurt hadn't faded.

The only countries I could see Drakens being sold to, where they weren't, is Norway or Switzerland. 

[Weaver]

Or even better Saab Draken sales!!
 
M.A.D

Fearing the wrath of the moderator, let me put simply, there was no way the Draken would either be sold or bought from the Swedes in light of their rather strict policies about potential purchasers and the sorts of government they might have and where these aircraft might be used.  The Australian experience over the 84mm Carl Gustav Rcl and the Vietnam War was not a good one and I have no reason to doubt the Swedes would have been as difficult over the supply of spare parts to any nation that bought their aircraft at that point in history and then found themselves involved in a conflict the Swedes did not approve of.

It was one of the major reasons why the Viggen was never a real contender for the Mirage replacement downunder.  Memories were long and the hurt hadn't faded.

The only countries I could see Drakens being sold to, where they weren't, is Norway or Switzerland.

All true, but in a whiff world, you could "right the wrong" by giving Sweden a more accomodating and consistent export policy.

I wonder if that's another factor why India chose the Jaguar over the Viggen? (Not that I'm complaining....)

Sweden was clearly able to export to some NATO countries, given the Draken sale to Denmark, so it's not too much of a stretch to see them exported on a similar basis to Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands or Germany. Germany's internal and external restrictions at the time would have made it very unlikely they could have got into an "immoral" war of any sort.

Another historic limitation on SAAB exports has been production capacity and delivery dates. SAAB's factory is small and the Flygvapnet have been generally unwilling to give up early production slots for export orders (unlike, for example, the situation in France). This has resulted in the factory being "maxed out" by domestic demand for extended periods of time, during which potential export customers couldn't get competetive delivery dates. The Danish Draken order went through the factory after the bulk of domestic orders had been satisfied and before Viggen production started. For the kind of numbers Germany would have needed, licence production would have been a must.


Completely different tack: how about the Lightning as a Starfighter substitute for the Luftwaffe? After all, they wanted the Sr.177 and the Lightning was the nearest thing to it that ever actually got built. It'd be ideally suited to their interceptor requirement and with an order of that size, ther'd be little trouble funding customer-specific mods.

I've always though that many British aircraft of the period (Hunter, Lightning, Buccaneer and Harrier) were in many ways better suited to German requirements than British ones....

[kitnut617]

I've always though that many British aircraft of the period (Hunter, Lightning, Buccaneer and Harrier) were in many ways better suited to German requirements than British ones....

But at that time, that's where the Brits were --- in Germany, right !

[Daryl J.]

Five letters/numbers and a dash:   CF-105   :-*

[upnorth]

Five letters/numbers and a dash:   CF-105   :-*

The first wrongs you have to right with the Arrow are the myths that have built up around it; after that you can actually start righting the things that really were wrong with it.

Start at the top and get Crawford Gordon out of the picture early. He  had good track record for project management, but it didn't show in how he handled the Arrow.

By most accounts, he was pretty much a "My way or the highway" sort as far as the Arrow was concerned and didn't pay a lot of heed to what the test pilots suggested for improvements.

As for righting the actual aircraft, start with that ridiculous canopy design and go from there.

[jcf]

No worries Brian, discussions of a particular country's international policies are not the same as personalised comments about domestic politics.

I do find the assumption that eliminating the bribery aspect of corrupt politicians and sales-by-any-means
businessmen would result in nobody buying an F-104 amusing. Because if one removes the emotion
and looks at what was actually available in the period, rather than proposals and prototypes, and the 104s actual record you'll see that it aint' the dog so often claimed.
So it's likely that sales would still have been made and it's also possible that development of the CL-1200
concept would have been accelerated.

[jcf]

Airframe design and test issues were the least of the Arrow's problems, developing a new airframe,
new engine, new electronic systems etc., all at the same time without the tax base to support such
an undertaking is a classic example of hubris. They needed to pick two and then actively recruit 
US/UK partners to fill in the holes. The insistence on making it an 'all-Canadian' project made
success doubtful.

[Weaver]

I know the Orenda was good, but it might have made more economic sense to pick the Olympus for the Arrow, given that Britain was developing similar engines for the TSR.2 (yes, I know that the timeframes wern't neatly in sync, but still...).

I think the huge sticking point on both programs though would be the electronics. The Damian Burke book is really revealing about just how much the RAF was pushing the state of the art with TSR.2, and I have the impression that much the same attitude applied to the Astra system on the CF-105. It might have been smarter to accept a lower-capability system in the first instance (Hughes FCS and Falcons for the Arrow) in order to get the airframes into production, knowing that a full spec system could be retrofitted once it was mature. After all, neither airframe was short of space...

[Daryl J.]

Another serious problem:   The Hawker Hurricane never appeared in Spats!   

Edit:   I'm thoroughly enjoying the history lessons from those who were either there or are in the know!    The above just had to be tossed in as an aside for the sake of levity.       And, Bill, if I can make it to Seattle again this year, I'd love to hear a summary of *that* story.    :)

[Rickshaw]

No worries Brian, discussions of a particular country's international policies are not the same as personalised comments about domestic politics.

I do find the assumption that eliminating the bribery aspect of corrupt politicians and sales-by-any-means
businessmen would result in nobody buying an F-104 amusing. Because if one removes the emotion
and looks at what was actually available in the period, rather than proposals and prototypes, and the 104s actual record you'll see that it aint' the dog so often claimed.
So it's likely that sales would still have been made and it's also possible that development of the CL-1200
concept would have been accelerated.

I agree.  I think the F-104 as a fighter-bomber comes in for a lot of unnecessary stick.  Down low, it was a rock-steady strike aircraft.  While the load wasn't big, it wasn't any worse than many other similar sized aircraft.  It's small wing was ideal for low-level flying.   Up high, it really wasn't meant to be a fighter, it was an interceptor and as such it went fast, really fast, in a straight line and got to the enemy really, really, quickly, which is what interceptors are meant to do.  The F-104S was the penultimate version, armed with Aspide BVR missiles.   I've always liked the lines of the F-104, particularly the TF-104.

The Luftwaffe's problem was of course, going from F-84s to F-104s without an intermediate step and expecting conscript pilots to fly the thing in bad weather and low down.  A recipe for disaster.

[Rickshaw]

I know the Orenda was good, but it might have made more economic sense to pick the Olympus for the Arrow, given that Britain was developing similar engines for the TSR.2 (yes, I know that the timeframes wern't neatly in sync, but still...).

I think the huge sticking point on both programs though would be the electronics. The Damian Burke book is really revealing about just how much the RAF was pushing the state of the art with TSR.2, and I have the impression that much the same attitude applied to the Astra system on the CF-105. It might have been smarter to accept a lower-capability system in the first instance (Hughes FCS and Falcons for the Arrow) in order to get the airframes into production, knowing that a full spec system could be retrofitted once it was mature. After all, neither airframe was short of space...

Well, truth be known, everybody was pushing the envelope in that time period.  Not even the Hughes stuff was really up to speed at the time.  The big difference was of course, the US could throw money at resources at the problems they faced and the smaller players such as the UK and Canada didn't, so while their projects went under, because of the technical problems, the US soldiered on and fixed theirs.   You're right about the TSR.2, I've long questioned the electronics in that project.  To me, it's obvious it came just at the wrong time when they were about to change over from valves to transistors.

[GTX_Admin]

The Luftwaffe's problem was of course, going from F-84s to F-104s without an intermediate step and expecting conscript pilots to fly the thing in bad weather and low down.  A recipe for disaster.

Actually, the Luftwaffe's F-104 problem was lack of emphasis given to training.  This was resolved following Johannes "Macki" Steinhoff's action to resolve the issue.

[jcf]

Yep, their loss rate for F-84s is actually far worse than that for the F-104.

Brian, the F-104 was actually conceived as an air superiority day-fighter, rather than a straight
line interceptor and was designed to be very maneuverable at high-speed and medium to
high-altitudes, which it was, and evidently it was still biting other fighters, including F-16s, on the
butt by the time it was finally retired by the Italians, an event that was not greeted with enthusiasm
by the Italian pilots.
The original concept also had a guns only armament, Sidewinders were added to the design in 1956
by request of the Air Force which caused a major schedule slip that delayed entry into service until 1958.
The lightweight 104 was a completely unsolicited design that was outside of the mainstream of USA
planning in the 50s, so by the time the F-104As got into service they didn't know what to do with
them as they didn't fit the ADC interceptor concepts that had come to dominate, with the immediate
result that orders were severely curtailed.

[Volkodav]

The Luftwaffe's problem was of course, going from F-84s to F-104s without an intermediate step and expecting conscript pilots to fly the thing in bad weather and low down.  A recipe for disaster.

Actually, the Luftwaffe's F-104 problem was lack of emphasis given to training.  This was resolved following Johannes "Macki" Steinhoff's action to resolve the issue.

Still would have prefered the evolution of the superior Grumman F11F-1F Super Tiger, the F-104 was good but the Tiger could have been so much better had it acheived those all important sales that it was denied by the bribery scandal.

Back on topic another wrong that needed some righting comes to mind is the cancellation of the Vickers V-1000 and associated VC7 in 1955, yet another short sighted decission that denied the UK aircraft business the opportunity to remain competative.

[jcf]

The only Super Tiger sales 'lost' were those to the Japanese, as it was out of the running for the
Luftwaffe contract by 1958, which, following the cancellation of the SR.177, had come down to the
Mirage III and the F-104. The original contenders were the E-E Lightning, SR.177, Mirage III, Draken,
F-102, F-106, F11F-1F, F-104 and F-105.

Even without the bribery issues the Super Tiger faced an uphill battle as the lack of USN orders,
and limited production of the original Tiger, meant Grumman had a harder time meeting cost
targets, now if the Navy had gone for the Super Tiger, Grumman would have been in a more
competitive position and international sales more likely.

So perhaps no SR.177 cancellation and USN purchase of the Super Tiger ... 

[Volkodav]

So perhaps no SR.177 cancellation and USN purchase of the Super Tiger ... 

OR an RN/RAN/RCN/RNLN buy of the Super Tiger, but then that is a real fantasy.

[M.A.D]

Five letters/numbers and a dash:   CF-105   :-*

I agree!
Ideally……. the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow is recognised for its capability and technological potential by NATO Alliance as a whole! It is decided early by NATO members that it has been very unproductive to have individual member countries continuously competing against one another on nationalistic and export grounds, which has greatly effected NATO's commonality of its aircraft - hence ability to work and potentially fight as an efficient alliance. But the biggest problem is not this promising aircraft, but that of the major NATO player – the United States of America.
This issue becomes the responsibility of the first Supreme Commander of NATO , who also happens to be the 34th President of the United States of America – President Dwight D. Eisenhower
Eisenhower in his capacity of President, and his unquestionable experience and influence as the once Supreme Allied Commander Europe and later Chief of Staff of the Army puts him into a position of not just knowing, but completely understanding the integrate workings of how the U.S military think and acted. With this unquestionable experience and respect behind him, it does not take long for his Administration to convince the USAF, is of the benefits and productive measure of rationalisation. For some time Eisenhower, had been grievously concerned about the power of the growing and influential ‘Military Industrial Complex' beginning to steer the United States on a permanent and costly path of a massive standing military. This he clearly and sensibly viewed to the detriment of the American economy as a whole, especially if the scene was set for a potentially long and drawn-out showdown of East vs West ideologies – with the Korean War was still very clear and vivid in Eisenhower’s mind. 
Congress is formally warned and directed by the Eisenhower Administration to look past it's biased 'all American/buy American' attitude by both itself and the U.S. arms industry. It is sold to both Congress and the American people as an extension of the Marshall Plan, so as to rebuild the post-WWII European economies and industries to meet the Soviet threat.
Eisenhower's administration releases costing analyst comparing the estimated costs of the "go it alone "Weapon System 202A" or LRI/XF-108 program”, to that of a 'joint NATO' CF-105 Arrow program, so as to fraught U.S. aerospace industries campaign (lead by North American Aviation, who stands to lose the most with the axing of their XF-108 Rapier), which claimed that that America industry and workers would be the loser in such an agreement. But it is clear to the public (and realistically to the USAF) that with the total number of Arrow units acquired by NATO air forces verses that of the 'go it alone' XF-108 Rapier program (as the cost of the XF-108 was prohibitive and too complex for other air forces bar that of the USAF to buy, let alone operate), Congress and the USAF agree to become a leading partner of the Arrow consortium. But even Eisenhower had to give and take in this agreement deal. Yes the USAF would agree to join the Arrow Consortium. But it’s (USAF) Arrow’s would be powered by General Electric YJ93-GE-3AR engines and equipped with the Hughes AN/ASG-18 pulse-Doppler radar and Hughes GAR-9A air-to-air missiles, which it boosted as already being paid and developed by the American tax payers.
With this politically controversial undertaking by the United States, the British Government begins to see similar comparisons and values, especially when compared to one of their own combat aircraft development programs, then underway - the need for an English Electric Canberra replacement - which would eventually culminate into General Operational Requirement 339 (GOR.339) aka TRS.2.
But it was not all easy sailing for the Arrow Consortium. Immediately at the start of the Consortium taking up the work already individually carried out by Avro Canada, the issue of the CF-105’s powerplant had come to a head.  To satisfy and appease political (and manufacturing lobbyists Rolls Royce, Pratt & Whitney etc…… ) indifference, it was decided very early by the ‘Arrow Consortium’ to design the rear fuselage of the Arrow to be able to accommodate various nations / air forces specifications. For as the British/RAF, had a want for their Bristol Olympus engine, for which they had already spent large sums of money, time and resources to power the now defunct TRS.2.
The USAF had from the beginning of agreeing to join the Consortium, had made waves about their General Electric YJ93, which they had contributed so much money and plans into, for not just the LRI/XF-108 Rapier, but also for their crown jewel – the soon to enter production North American B-70 Valkyrie supersonic strategic bomber.
Like the agreement with the powerplants of the Arrow, there would be two principle fire-control systems (radar) and weapons systems fitted to operational aircraft–
-   The Hughes AN/ASG-18 pulse-Doppler radar and 4 x Hughes GAR-9A air-to-air missiles   (USAF only)
-   RCA-Victor Astra fire-control system and 4 x Douglas Aim-7 Sparrow II  active guidance missiles (later the Aim-7 Sparrow II’s would be replaced by British Sky Flash missile)
And of course there was Avro Canada, who before all this had happened, had elected to risk so much and spent so much in specifically develop the Orenda Iroquois, for "Specification AIR 7-3" (the CF-105 Arrow). The potential was so great for the Orenda Iroquois engine, in the eyes of the fledgling Canadian aerospace industry, that it would have caused national outcry if it had been forced to be cancelled to appease the likes of the United States or Britain. Add to this was the public and government awareness that the French Government had tentatively been discussing the purchase of some 300 Orenda Iroquois  engines to power their new Dassault Mirage IV supersonic bomber, which was then in development   
So it came, that the CF-105 would come to be powered by three different engines types. A small price it was appreciated to get the Arrow into being, and becoming the prime interceptor of NATO.
Like all successful military combat aircraft designs, once in operational service, the excellent Arrow’s design capability came to be really appreciated. More roles were developed, to encompass the basic CF-105 design, including –
-   Reconnaissance (USAF, RAF, Luftwaffe and RCAF)
-   Strike Interdiction (RAF (replaced English Electric Canberra light bomber and GOR.339), Luftwaffe) – armed with 8 x internally stored 227kg (500 lb) or 4 x 454kg (1,000 lb) conventional bombs (or in the case of RAF Arrows up to 3 x  WE.177A tactical nuclear bombs) 
-   Air Defence Suppression  (USAF – with the vulnerability of the Republic F-105F/G Wild Wessel, and the end of F-105 production, the USAF desperately sorted a new and capable air defence suppression aircraft. The Arrow Consortium quickly proposed the adoption of a specialised suppression variant of the Arrow to the USAF in competition to a proposal of a specialised variant of the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II (the F-4G). But it was soon clear to the USAF, and the experienced Wild Wessel crews who would have to fly them over hostile North Vietnam, that the Wild Arrow, equipped with the AN/ALQ-99 airborne electronic warfare system was a far superior design to that of the competitive F-4G Wild Wessel proposal. The Arrow’s internal weapon bay allowed for the carriage of three AGM-78 Standard ARM’s internally, with minimum drag, equating even more to the Wild Arrow’s  greater range than that of the proposed F-4G Wild Wesel, external arrangement of only two AGM-78’s. It was also very evident that the inherent high performance of the CF-105 Arrow’s design meant that it could decide where and when it wanted to tangle with North Vietnamese MiG-21 Fishbed’s  (the fact that operational Wild Arrow’s needed no fighter escorts, and could leave North Vietnamese Fishbed pilots seemingly standing still, was a great physiological coup against North Vietnamese pilots and their air defence system alike (the North Vietnamese admitted to losing two of its precious Fishbed’s, when they crashed, after running out of fuel, whilst in continues full afterburner in pursuit of a Wild Arrow) .
In fact so incessant had the Soviet’s become with these attacks with immunity, that they  seriously considered deploying a Regiment of their state-of-the-art Mikoyan-Gurevich Ye-152P Flipper supersonic interceptors “, armed with the big and powerful Raduga K-9 (AA-4 Awl) and Molniya R-4 (AA-5 Ash) air-to-air missiles to once and for all “put a stop or at least a deterrent to such unchallenged missions” . But ideological concerns about the possibility of their state-of-the-art Mikoyan-Gurevich Ye-152P interceptor falling into the hands of the People’s Republic of China and the PLAAF – through overt or covert means, put a stop to this 

It should be appreciated that with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, once secret and closely guarded military and intelligence records clearly pointed to the speed, altitude and numerical numbers of the стрелка [Arrow], which along with the threat of the North American B-70 Valkyrie and the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, put the Soviet Military and political system into a frenzy. (The Wild Arrow’s capability and combat effectiveness over North Vietnam being emphasised in these reports!). In answer to these aircraft designs, spawned the likes of “the very expensive but imperatively needed for the defence of the Mat' Zovyot [Rodina]” interceptor designs like the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 and Ye-152P.


M.A.D