B-52 suffered regular, fatal, catastrophic structural failures when they started flying at low level, the bonded honeycomb B-58, with its much smaller wing did not. The B-58 proved much more suited to low level than the B-52, let alone the more difficult to fly B-47, was it perfect, no, but it was the best they had, better even than the too small FB-111.
There is another myth that the B-58 was subsonic at low altitude and subsonic when fitted with external stores, this was from erroneous testimony given by McNamara to Congress where he stated that it was his understanding that supersonic aircraft could not exceed the speed of sound with external stores fitted, therefore the B-58 was subsonic with same. This is wrong as the B-58 could fly at Mach 2+ with its centre pod and four B-61s and could dash at supersonic speeds at low level but more importantly it could cruise at 610kts at low level with a full war load, making it almost impossible to track, let alone intercept.
Another myth the book set straight was the accident rate of the B-58, given as 26 aircraft, over 22% of the fleet. Of the 26 aircraft lost, 7 were development aircraft lost before the type entered service, three were ground / taxiing accidents (one aircraft was actually repaired and not lost) which is actually 14% and considering the bleeding edge technology of the type pretty low.
