Trade, Tariffs, and Trump

[apophenia]

Of necessity, the opening posts of this thread will mainly be of a political/economic nature. Profiles and descriptions of alternative procurements begin in Part 4. Forum members less interested in politics and economic policy may wish to jump directly to Part 4.

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Opening Moves in the Trump Tariff War with Canada - Part 1

On 10 Feb 2025, US President Donald Trump's flurry of executive orders imposed his threatened 25% tariff on imported Canadian steel and aluminum. This action contravened the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement - a revised free trade treaty brought about at Trump's own insistance during his first administration. Under USCMA section 232, ending exemptions to tariffs required 6 months of negotiations. Under Chapter 31 (Dispute Settlement), Canada could challenge the US for not abiding by the terms of USCMA. But that treaty is scheduled for joint review in 2026 anyway. This was just Trump's first move.

Instead, under incoming Prime Minister Mark Carney, is was decided to simply countervail that 25% tariff. However, special US Trade Negotiation Envoy Chrystia Freeland announced that these tariffs would also extend to all manufactured goods imported from the US which contained a majority of components (by weight) composed of steel and aluminum. At the same time, countervailing duties imposed an effective export-ban to the US of select, strategic mining/smelting products - including: iron ore, alumina, cobalt, nickel, graphite, indium, and lithium. [1]

Simultaneously, was an announcement of revised Public Services and Procurement Canada rules which prohibited procurement contract winners from passing on their new 25% penalties on equipment (or components) made primarily from US steel or aluminum. As was anticipated, one result was hoards of Sparks Street law firms filing suit on behalf of their American corporate clients. However, this outcome had already been anticipated by the Government of Canada (GoC). Ottawa issued a Article XV 6-month notice to withdraw from the World Trade Organization. [2] In the meantime, remaining WTO authority in Canada would be subject to approval by Canada's Supreme Court. [3]

Tariff War Consequences - Intended and Otherwise

With most avenues for legal suits tied off, the GoC instituted its policies for softening the economic damage done to the Canadian economy. As expected, the steepest falls were in the automotive and aerospace sectors. Ottawa expected both sectors to return to core competencies as quickly as possible: Completely cross-border supply-train reliant industries were on their own. In aerospace, Ottawa would focus on supporting MRO, smaller airframers (from Viking to Volatus), and component-makers for existing Canadian aircraft types. Firms reliant on the US market - from CAE to Héroux-Devtek - would take a major hit on lost exports. But the big losers were Montréal-area airframers Airbus Canada (A220 airliner) and Bombardier (Challenger and Global series bizjets) who would receive no bailouts from Ottawa. [4]

The tit-for-tat tariff war resulted in many standing order contracts had become non-compliant under new Public Services and Procurement Canada rules. With so much of modern aerospace dependant upon machined steel and aluminum components, this industry would be hit hardest of all. This would prove doubly true for military procurement contracts held with the Department of National Defence. Not only were many planned import procurements now non-compliant (due to 'unfair' trade practices), US-owned subsidiaries in Canada - like GDLS-C and Colt Canada - were also struggling.

(To be continued ...)

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[1] These countervails would be followed, incrementally, by similar duties on US-destined export chemicals (with potash/KCl being covered by both mineral and chemical rulings) as well as lumber and other forestry by-products.

[2] This would be the last act of Canada's supposedly 'Permanent Mission' to the World Trade Organization before it was formally withdrawn from Geneva.

[3] At the same time, Cabinet readied a Bill which tied any legal action resulting from trade disputes to a successful USCMA Chapter 31 dispute settlement. But Canada's Chapter 31 submission would only be submitted when the US Administration had demonstrated good faith by reversing its contravention of USCMA section 232 and withdrawing its illegal tariffs.

[4] However, both airframers would receive support packages from the Gouvernement du Québec. Overall, the effect was as predicted. Canadian aerospace and defence industry earnings had sat at -4.34% in 2024. By the middle of 2026, they had dropped to -26.75%.

[apophenia]

Side-Effects: Procurement Forestalled & Military Disengagement - Part 2

Along with legal threats, the Government of Canada (GoC) also received counter-claims of non-compliance to contracts from various potential suppliers. The first was from Lockheed Martin on behalf of the now-frozen Future Fighter Capability Project. But the GoC already regarded the FFCP contract in arrears and the purchase (and, thus, delivery) of F-35s to Canada was considered 'frozen'. Since this 'frozen' contract and its delivery schedue was, effectively, in limbo, the Supreme Court refused to hear submissions from LM's legal representatives. This claim/counter-claim dance established a pattern in planned procurements from US military suppliers.

Lockheed Martin's attempted legal actions, pushed forward a scheduled debate in the House of Commons on a proposed Canadian withdrawal from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). A planned CAD38.6 billion modernisation of NORAD had already been frozen and, now, more than 300 x Canadian personnel in Colorado Springs (including civilian employees and families) were ordered to return to Canada within a fortnight. Another 650 Canadian NORAD personnel at home were ordered to restrict communications with their US counterparts. [1]

Shortly after the NORAD 'returns', more RCAF personnel were called home. This included seconded RCAF members lodging with USN and USAF units as well as instructor and trainee pilots taking part in the so-called Bridge FLIT on USAF T-38 Talons at Sheppard AFB in Texas. The latter withdrawal would have gone all but unnoticed in the US but Washington was not all that happy with Canada's threat to restrict American military access to the Canadian Arctic should the NORAD agreement be officially terminated. [2] And there was more to come.

The Trump Administration continued issuing threats to NATO members spending less than 5% of their GDP on defence procurement. Canada - which spent 1.29% of a promised 2% GDP on defence in 2024 - was in the middle of those crosshairs. Plans had been put in place to raise that number to 1.7% by 2029-30 but there was simply no widespread Canadian political support to actually raise defence spending to 2% quickly ... let alone to spend 5% of Canada's rather substantial GDP. [3] (If anything, Trump's tariffs had made average Canadians even more reluctant to spend on defence.)

Rather than respond directly to US 5% spending demands, the GoC struck another House of Commons All-Parties committee to consider the ramifications (and potential benefits) of Canada withdrawing from NATO. When this official review of Canada's continued membership in the alliance was announced, the expected volley of threats and derisive comments sallied forth from officialdom in Washington, DC. At the same time, however, Ottawa announced its signing on with a new defensive agreement among NB-8 nations. Canada would sign on to BALTS - the Baltic Agreement on Logistics and Tactical Support - as a 'partner force' rather than as an official component of Canada's NATO membership. Nonetheless, membership in BALTS was seen as helping to secure the originally-NATO Canadian deployments to Latvia. Within BALTS, Canadian Armed Forces personnel would later also deploy to Sweden.

Establishing a 'partner' relationship outside of NATO was also the approach used when Canada joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). [4] Signing on for JEF was intended to make better use of the RCN's newly-commissioned Protecteur class JSS - which would act as a 'mothership' and AOR for RCN flottila's deploying to the Baltic. This meshed with Halifax class FFHs deployed to bolster a Polish initiative to increase Baltic Sea patrols. There, Canada was also able to leverage its Arctic Autonomous Underwater Vehicle experience, using ISE Explorer class AUVs to monitor Baltic undersea cables. [5]

The GoC was sending mixed messages on military commitment ... and that was quite intentional.

(To be continued ...)

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[1] Further orders followed which eliminated all airshow appearances as well as combined air exercises by the RCAF and USAF. Similarly, the Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard were to cancel all scheduled exercises and cooperative operations conducted with the US Navy and US Coast Guard.

[2] With Canadian Armed Forces participation in NORAD reduced to an absolute minimum, Ottawa never needed to proceed with a notice to withdraw from the pact. A similar approach would be taken to Trump's demands for NATO members to spend 5% of their GDP on defence procurement.

[3] See: The Fiscal Implications of Meeting the NATO Military Spending Target, PBO, Ottawa, 30 Oct 2024.
-- https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2425-020-S--fiscal-implications-meeting-nato-military-spending-target--repercussions-financieres-atteinte-cible-depenses-militaires-fixee-otan

[4] Ottawa regarded membership in BALTS as part-and-parcel of joining the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. However, a full commitment to JEF had to wait until British PM Keir Starmer had exhausted all hope of establishing a 'special relationship' with Donald Trump. A looming Canadian constitutional crisis regarding the Monarchy was averted when lengthy delays in fixing a date made clear that this proposed "second state visit" would never occur. Shortly thereafter, Canada joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force.

[5] This monitoring role was rather different from the Persistent Maritime Surveillance approach used in Canada's Arctic waters. In the Baltic, Explorer AUVs were used both for active patrols along undersea cables as well 'hibernating' along those lines (to save battery life), 'reviving' only when certain  activities (such as anchor-dragging) was detected.

[apophenia]

Rapid Revision - New Realities in Military Procurement - Part 3

Although overall relations between the GoC and The Boeing Company had been poor for some time, DND had managed to push through a P-8A Poseidon purchase to fill its Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft (CMMA) requirement. More than CAD8 Billion was committed to buy up to 16 x Poseidon to replace in-service RCAF CP-140M Aurora patrol aircraft. But, within 6 months, DND was asking for another CAD5 Billion to cover the cost of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. [1] However, the GoC response to Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs would scupper both of these procurement plans. [2]

With multiple Project Management Offices at NDHQ thrown into turmoil, Parliament began planning for subsitutes and interim solutions to Canada's procurement issues. The first move was to separate the Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN) from shorter-term procurement planning. This would become the purview of a newly-established Standing Committee on Defence Procurement (DPAMD). [3] Within a climate of aggressive US tariffs and 'jokey' mentions of a '51st State', DPAMD proved much toothier than the NDDN of old. This was reflected in the DPAMD's priority recommendations for the CMMA programme and the AEW requirement.

Interim Solutions for Insoluable Problems

The new Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's first proclamation was that interim procurements were to be pursued on the most pressing issues. Interim procurement choices would be weighted on general requirement fit, overall cost (now assuming only 10 years of active service), deliverability (with speed of that delivery as a subset), reliability of supplier(s), and the percentage of 'Canadian-Content'. The first interim procurement project sought to fill in for both the Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft programme and the Airborne Early Warning aircraft project. However, with the CP-140M Aurora fleet having been recently upgraded, the order of priority for the AEW and CMMA would be reversed within the interim procurement plans.

Since procuring anything from Boeing was out of the question for the moment, the scope of the AEW requirement would also be scaled back. This approach resulted in what became DND's iCMMA-ISR project for an Interim Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft specialised in the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance role. A small procurement was planned and commonality with new maritime patrol airframes was highly valued. That was not quite as restrictive as it sounds, since the MPA requirement was now also to be divided between coastal (ie: East, West, and Arctic) and open-ocean patrol (ie: ensuring the sealanes between Eastern Canada and Iceland. [4]

(To be continued ...)

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[1] Just as the CMMA requirement had been written around the desired P-8A, RCAF AEW plans were also created around a related Boeing airframe - the E-7 Wedgetail.

[2] Canada's recent Defence Policy Update also covered proposed procurements of 88 x F-35A fighters, 9 x CC-330 Husky Multi-role Tanker Transports, and 11 x MQ-9B SkyGuardian UAS. Of these plans, only the underway delivery of Airbus A330-based CC-330s would be uneffected.

[3] Within Hansard and GoC documents, DPAMD stood for the (Standing Committee on) Defence Procurement/(Comité permanent des) achats de matériel de défense. Despite its reduced scope, DNND still stood for the (Standing Committee on) National Defence/(Comité permanent de la) défense nationale.

[4] Britain's RAF would retain responsibility for patrolling the rest of the so-called 'GIUK gap'.

[apophenia]

Interim ISR as the new AEW Procurement - Part 4

As DND's proposed CAD5B (USD 3.65B) AEW&C aircraft acquisition was folded into the new Interim Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (iCMMA-ISR) project, it was also simplified. With the future of air defence cooperation with the USAF in question, the NORAD component of the AEW&C requirement was quietly dropped. So too was a demand for 'interchangeable' with former 'Five Eyes' allies (originally written into the spec to favour the desired Boeing E-7A Wedgetail platform). This all but ensured the success of Saab's Bombardier Global 6000-based iCMMA-ISR submission.

From a Canadian procurement perspective, having only one option was even worse than having too many. No-one doubted the excellent characteristics of the Saab GlobalEye as a submission for the AEW component of iCMMA-ISR (aka 'iCMMA-1'). However, it was the mandate of Public Services and Procurement Canada to oversee a fair and transparent cometition - not a single-sourcing contract award. From PSPC's point-of-view, a surprise last-minute 'iCMMA-1' submission by Marshall Aerospace Canada was a God-send. Now that Saab faced a rival candidate, a proper iCMMA-ISR/AEW competition could be run.

Project Dolphin Goes to the Great White North

As the name of the Marshall Dolphin submission suggests, this submission was derived from the Project Dolphin aircraft developed by QinetiQ and the Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group for the United Arab Emirates. Project Dolphin was based around the same Bombardier Global 6000 airframe as the Saab submission. The difficulty was that Project Dolphin was a Elint/Sigint platform rather than an early warning type. Thus, the challenge for Marshall Aerospace Canada and its 'Team Dolphin' partners was to convince DND and the RCAF that their submission could be quickly and successfully re-equipped for the AEW/ISR roles demanded for the iCMMA-ISR requirement.

Marshall Aerospace Canada saw value in having a Project Dolphin demonstrator aircraft appearing at the air shows in Canada. Once its parent firm and the 'Team Dolphin' partners were convinced, a Global 6000 conversion was flown over from Cambridge, UK. Such was the hast that this demonstrator wasn't even painted for its appearance at the Comox Armed Forces Day show. [1] However, the somewhat scruffy-looking demonstrator had served its purpose - generating a 'buzz' in the Canadian media (including Canada's aviation press) and amongst RCAF personnel. Had 'Team Dolphin' been presenting a true AEW/ISR platform, their air show appearances would have been a tough act to follow. But Saab proved up to the task.


Top: Team GlobalEye's Saab GlobalEye 'iCMMA-1' demonstrator based on a Bombardier Global 6000 bizjet. (Saab assumed that any winning submission would be based on new-production Global 6500 airframes.)

Bottom: Team Dolphin's 'iCMMA-1' demonstrator also based on a converted Bombardier Global 6000 bizjet. (The Marshall Dolphin submission was for an appropriately-equipped AEW platform but the Dolphin demonstrator was actually fitted-out for the SIGINT role.)

Saab GlobalEye - Demos and Curve-Balls

Playing catch up, 'Team GlobalEye' also dispatched a demonstrator airframe to Canada. As with the Project Dolphin, the Saab GlobalEye conversion was also initially unpainted. The key difference was that the GlobalEye demonstrator was a fully-functioning early warning platform ideally suited to the 'iCMMA-1' requirement. But 'Team GlobalEye' had another move to make in what was already an unfair fighter - they were offering immediate RCAF access to GlobalEye airframes. With that offer, 'Team GlobalEye' had effectively clinched the 'iCMMA-1' deal.

Deals and offers aside, the Saab GlobalEye AEW&C aircraft had merits of its own. Obviously, it was based upon a Canadian-made airframe - the Bombardier Global 6000. Mounted above that platform was a cabin-top Ericsson Erieye ER (Extended Range) AESA radar system (as well as other sensors and EW equipment). At altitude - even while still flying in Swedish airspace - the performance of the Erieye ER radar system was impressive. With it, GlobalEye could monitor Russian naval activity as far away as Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg [2] But, of course, most GlobalEye missions were actually flown well out over the Baltic Sea, extending the Erieye ER's surveillance range considerably further into Russian territory.

As a 'partner force' participating in BALTS (the Baltic Agreement on Logistics and Tactical Support), RCAF personnel had been exposed to Swedish Flygvapnet operations with the GlobalEye. Now the RCAF was being offered hands-on experience. In a nutshell, the 'Team GlobalEye' offer consisted of  components. The first was combined-crew training with Swedish personnel at Malmen AB (outside Linköping). The second was the loan of operational GlobalEye for RCAF use within BALTS. Those 'loaners' would then be replaced by new GlobalEye conversions specifically tailored to meet iCMMA-ISR specifications. Such terms proved impossible to resist. The 'loaner' GlobalEyes entered RCAF service as their new Saab CE-260A Sentinelle multi-mission ISR type. [3]

(To be continued ...)

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[1] After its Comox appearance, C-GEWA flew on to Southport for the Manitoba Air Show. Upon its return to YXX, the demonstrator would be rolled into the paint shop of another Abbotsford-based 'Team Dolphin' partner - Cascade Aerospace - where it was sprayed in an RCAF-mimicking 2-tone grey scheme which cleverly integrated a dolphin theme on the fuselage. This paint job was only completed the evening before the aircraft's display flight at the Abbotsford International Air Show.

[2] From 9,100 m (30,000 feet) above Visby (on Gotland), GlobalEye could monitor Russian surface ships in Baltiysk harbour and air traffic over all of Kaliningrad Oblast. At 10,000 m (35,000 feet) above Stockholm, the Leningrad Naval Base at Saint Petersburg and nearby Levashovo AB could be surveilled.

[3] The 'loaner' CE-260A Sentinelles were assigned to 420 (Snowy Owl) Squadron RCAF which was reformed for the purpose. No 420 operated as a lodger unit alongside 74:e specialflygskvadron - the Flygvapnet's GlobalEye-equipped unit - at Malmen AB (ESCF) at Malmslätt, Linköping, in south central Sweden. There, 420's Sentinelle operated as part of BaltPat (Baltic Patrol Force), an aerial compenent of BALTS.

[apophenia]

'Medium MPA' - the First Interim CMMA Contest - Part 5

The maritime patrol component of Canada's Interim CMMA (iCMMA) Project to replace the RCAF's aging-out CP-140M Aurora fleet came in two parts. The first component (aka 'iCMMA-2') would be the 'medium' airframe MPA type  - now heavily-weight in favour of a Bombardier Global 6000 base due to AEW 'iCMMA-1' having been satisfied by the Saab GlobalEye. This 'iCMMA-2' was considered a 'medium MPA' but would emphasise sovereignty patrol over the ASW role as well as taking over most of the CP-140s' ISR duties. Any 'medium MPA' would be restricted in capabilities (as compared with the larger in-service CP-140M or its planned 'iCMMA-3' replacement. But the Saab GlobalEye procurement had made the 'iCMMA-2' component the low-hanging fruit.

Although the chosen platform for 'iCMMA-2' was a foregone conclusion, the industrial mix was unexpected. A modelling exercise performed by the National Research Council (NRC) - with the assistance of the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) - had suggested that the best results could be had by combining the features of the two anticipated submissions. Those were the front-running Saab Swordfish and the domestic PAL Aerospace P-6 MPA proposal. As a result of the NRC/DRDC studies, NDHQ requested that the rival groups - Team Swordfish and Team Global Patrol - to work together on a joint submission.

"When you're with me, baby, the skies'll be blue"

Under the new scheme, Team Swordfish - led by Saab AB and Bombardier Aviation - would be lead contractor and systems integrator while Team Global Patrol - led by PAL Aerospace and De Havilland Canada - would be responsible for the design and construction of the ventral 'pannier'. Although this alliance eliminated much of the open competition from the 'iCMMA-2' contest, based on technical merit gauged by DND, Public Services and Procurement Canada was prepared to give a waiver on competition. The result was a Swordfish/P-6 MPA hybrid jointly submitted for 'iCMMA-2' by Saab and PAL. This submission was accepted and entered RCAF service as the Bombardier CP-260B Baffin.

In effect, the CP-260B Baffin was essentially a Saab Swordfish fitted with PAL's longer ventral 'pannier' which incorporating both search radar radome and a small weapons bay. Less noticeable was that, under DND instruction, the platform shifted from new-production Global 6500 airframes to refurbished Global 6000s. The latter were trade-ins to Bombardier which were stripped and rationalised before conversion to full CP-260B Baffin standards. The first Baffin 'B' production conversions entered service with 415 Long Range Patrol Force Development Squadron at CFB Greenwood, NS.

Bottom: Saab CE-260A Sentinelle AEW/SIGINT aircraft of No 420 (Snowy Owl) Squadron RCAF, Malmen AB, Sweden. [Inset] 420's Snowy Owl emblem as emblazoned on the CE-260A's winglet.

Top: Bombardier CP-260B Baffin 'medium MPA' assigned to the 415 Long Range Patrol Force Development Squadron for service trials at CFB Greenwood. Note the Saab 15 Spear anti-ship missile hung from the underwing pylon. [1]

(To be continued ...)

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[1] In Swedish service, these missiles are known as the RBS 15 Mk.IV Gungnir. Gungnir, the spear of the god Óðinn in Norse mythology, was known to always strike its target.

[apophenia]

"Le client n'a jamais tort" Provides an Opportunity

Air Canada subsidiary Rouge specialised in low-cost tourist flights to US destinations - Fort Lauderdale; Miami; Phoenix, Palm Springs, San Diego, etc. So, when the Canadian market for market for cross-border leisure travellers crumped, Rouge found itself in serious economic difficulty. Air Canada decided to retire all 18 x Airbus A319-100 series aircraft assigned to its Rouge subsidiary. The Rouge fleet would then standardise on the larger A320s and A321s. Canadian North made inquiries (with the object of replacing its B737 fleet) but funding issues scuppered any chance of a deal. Feelers were then put out to Rouge rival Westjet but with a fleet dominated by Boeing 737 NGs, Calgary-based Westjet had no interest in picking up these Air Canada 'left-overs'. [1]

Reverting to its earlier 'flag-carrier' behaviour, Air Canada appealed to the Government of Canada (GoC) in Ottawa for a bail-out. After examining the potential resale market, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada recommended against trying to find a bulk buyer for 18 x Rouge A319s. Instead, the lowest-hour airframes would be placed for sale first. All eight of these aircraft found buyers in Europe fairly quickly. With little prospect of finding a good return on the older A319s, it was then decided that the GoC would take over the entire Rouge A319 fleet - in a deal similar to the decades old purchase which led to Airbus A310s entering Canadian military service as the CC-150 Polaris. The terms of this new deal committed Air Canada to provide the GoC with A319 heavy MRO services at a steep discount. [2]

Having assumed ownership of 10 x Airbus A319-100 airliners, new roles were sought for these aircraft. One was assigned to Field Aviation of Mississauga, ON, for trial purposes. Another pair were delivered to the RCAF as Airbus CC-319A Arcturus with dual airlifter and crew trainer roles. During the summer months, the CT-319As would be operated almost exclusively in the North on resupply missions. But that was not the reason for naming these aircraft after a bright northern star. The previous bearer of that name had been the CP-140A Arcturus which also operated as crew trainers - but for the CP-140 Aurora fleet.

Northern Light or Poor-Man's Poseidon?

DND made cursory examinations of the Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft and the Airbus PATMAR concept for France's Aéronavale. The Japanese option was quickly eliminated both for its high cost and because of constitutional challenges with exporting military equipment. The French PATMAR had yet to reach the hardware stage but it was tailored for the brand-new Airbus A321XLR airframe. The unit price for the base model of the new Airbus A321XLR is CAD 150 million (USD 103.84M or € 99.95M). By comparison, the average CAD 20 million paid for ex-Rouge A319s seemed like a bargain. So, the new Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's question for Field Aviation was: Can those A319s be economically turned into replacements for the 'frozen' P-8A Poseidons?

After consultation with Airbus Industrie, Field reported that the planned PATMAR sensors and systems could not be readily accommodated by the shorter A319 airframe. And since the equipment fit for the planned A321 MPA derivative had yet to be finalised, Airbus was also reluctant to provide costs for those sensors and systems. Still, Airbus Industrie was willing to cooperate by sharing details of its now shelved A320 MPA plans. However, with the Canadian economy being hammered by US tariffs, even that warmed-over A320 MPA kit seemed beyond reach. Field Aviation needed a fresh approach.

"On the Field of Mars ..." - Ambling towards Arcturus

The solution proposed by Field Aviation was not complex but nor was it simple. In a nutshell, Field suggested the re-use of the recently upgraded sensors and systems from the CP-140M - the Aurora Incremental Modernisation Programme (AIMP). As refurbished A319 airframes because ready, each would receive AIMP equipment taken from a decommissioned CP-140M. This concept would be tested aboard Field's test-mule - ex-Rouge A319-113 msn 672 (formerly C-FYJH) - before beginning full 'production conversions' for service MPAs. DND accepted this proposal and Field received a contract to deliver 9 x Airbus CP-319B Arcturus MPA conversions.

As project lead of 'Team MPA319', Field Aviation partnered with Airbus Defence & Space Canada and KF Aerospace. The latter stripped out A319 cabin fittings and other airline-related accoutrements at their Hamilton, ON, facility. The former opened a new conversion plant at Kitchener/Waterloo Airport (YKF) in southern Ontario. There, A319-113 msn 672 (re-registered as C-GMMA) was incrementally modified by Airbus to test Field Aviation's MPA conversion concept.

(To be continued ...)

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[1] Westjet would come to regret that decision as imported Boeing spares became both more expensive and increasingly difficult to access.

[2] Air Canada staff would be responsible for basic airframe and engine maintenance. Any government-fitted equipment was to be dealt with by RCAF personnel detached from 14 Air Maintenance Squadron at CFB Greenwood.

[apophenia]

'Strategic MPA' - Outcome of the Second Interim CMMA Contest

Field Aviation's testbed A319 was first fitted with a shortened version of the ventral 'gondola' designed for the French Airbus A321 MPA. Then, C-GMMA was kitted out with CP-140M style maritime patrol and communications radomes. Only once aerodynamic tested was completed were actual AIMP radars and other sensors installed in the Airbus. As a test platform. A319-113 msn 672 performed sterling service in test-fitting equipment intended for the 'iCMMA-3' conversion programme.

The first fully military A319 MPA conversion entered RCAF service as the Airbus CP-319B Arcturus in 2026 and began a mix of operational patrols and familiarisation flights. Completion of further conversions proceeded at a leisurely pace ... but that was intentional. The transfer of upgraded AIMP systems from CP-140M Auroras took place on a one-at-a-time basis in order to maintain 18 x RCAF MPAs in service at any given time. With the arrival of CP-260A Baffin 'medium MPAs' in service, that pace could be quickened. Towards the end of 2028, the last active CP-140Ms were finally stood down. [1] By the Summer of 2029, all 9 x CP-319B Arcturus MPA conversions were in active service.

The last CP-319B conversions were of the two CC-319A Arcturus trainer/transports. As those final conversions began, the testbed A319 C-GMMA would finally enter RCAF service - as the sole CP-319C Arcturus. In this guise, A319-113 msn 672 took on the OCU role from the withdrawn CC-319As (but not their secondary transport role). Eventually another A319 was dry-leased as the CC-319D Arcturus to take over much of the flight crew training duties. Eventually, the CP-319C timed out and was retired. However, the CC-310D lasted until the CP-319B Arcturus fleet began to be replaced by new-build Airbus CP-320B Argus MPA/ISR aircraft later in the 2030s. [2]

(Fin)

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[1] As each CP-140M was retired and shown of its sensors, the airframe was stored at CFB Mountain View. Later, most of the demilitarised CP-140Ms would be converted into waterbombers by KF Aerospace, a division of Kelowna Flightcraft Ltd.

[2] The name Argus was chosen to honour the Canadian-made Canadair CP-107 MPA of the 1950s. In ancient Greek mythology, the many-eyed Argos Panoptes was meant to be the perfect guardian.

[upnorth]

Interesting stuff, I'll be following to see where you take it.

[Old Wombat]

Interesting stuff, I'll be following to see where you take it.

Yup!

But don't get too isolationist (yes, I know, agreements to bypass US involvement) & don't forget the Commonwealth of Nations! ... Well, some of it.

[GTX_Admin]

 

I wonder if future additions might include the following:

• New trainers - say M346s but re-engined to remove the US sourced F124s, just not sure with what though.  Possibly a new version of the Adour?
• New fighters - say Eurofighter Typhons or Saab Gripen E/Fs - again with the latter being re-engined to remove the F414s.  Say with EJ200

[The Big Gimper]

And maybe this as well:

Canada Seeking Multiple Types For Tactical Rotorcraft Need

It will be hard to replace the Chinook and Griffon.
Possible a new EU consortium could come with a clean designs for both.
Replace the CH-148 with a Made in Canada AW-101 variant.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AgustaWestland_AW101
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_EC725

[GTX_Admin]

Revive the Eurocopter HTH?

[apophenia]

Thanks for all your responses, folks!

... don't get too isolationist ... & don't forget the Commonwealth of Nations! ... Well, some of it.

For sure, Guy. Speaking of isolation, the RW Premier of British Columbia has a backup plan. Naturally, he is trying to maintain BC's good relations with WA and OR and trade connections (mainly electrical power) with CA. But AK (outside of Juneau) is strongly Red State - especially Fairbanks. The road connection is the Alaska Highway (ALCAN) which ends at Delta Junction, AK, 150 km SE of Fairbanks (and 100 km SE of Eielson AFB).

The thing is, the Canadian-owned section of the Alaska Highway (BC Hwy 97) begins at Dawson Creek. That gives Premier Eby the option of placing toll-booths at the 'Mile 0 City' starting point (without effecting the BC/WA 49th parallel border crossing points). Economically, WA won't get too upset about such a move - the only AK alternative supply route is by ferry from Seattle.

Commonwealth of Nations: Yeah, as you say: "some of it!" Right now, Cdn relations with Modi's India are at rock bottom and South Africa has alligned its loyalties with BRICS while denying RU war crimes. As I mentioned in my story, the UK's 'second state visit' invite to Trump was a blow. That fawning may have begun with Starmer but the letter was sign by the King of Canada. In that, Charles III has done no favours for support of the Monarchy in Canada.

The GoC has been trying to expand trade with Europe for decades. And now seems an ideal moment to flaunt Canada's ability to supply Europe with the energy and raw materials to create steel and aluminum for European rearmament. Expansion of trade with the Antipodes also makes great sense ... although that will largely be determined by how Oz and NZ deal with the US.

[apophenia]

I wonder if future additions might include the following:

• New trainers - say M346s but re-engined to remove the US sourced F124s, just not sure with what though.  Possibly a new version of the Adour?
• New fighters - say Eurofighter Typhons or Saab Gripen E/Fs - again with the latter being re-engined to remove the F414s.  Say with EJ200

Yes, new RCAF trainers and fighters get quite tricky ... especially fighters (since DND has previously rejected Gripens and Typhoons. The choice of trainers will be of most interest to me but I doubt that it will be the M-346. The issue is trade relations with Italy.

In the past few years, Italy has been dumping food products in the Canadian market. (And we consumers have benefited from cheaper, higher-quality goods - yum!) But this dumping has also increased our trade deficit with Italy, a nation which has refused to ratify CETA (the Canada-EU free trade deal) because of ... food (ipocriti e bastardi)!

Canada has a trade deficit with South Korea as well. But we also have an incentive to maintain good relations because of pending LNG deliveries (especially now that Trump is toying with an LNG export 'deal' from AK). Anyway, that definitely puts the KAI T-50 near the top of any FFLIT candidate list. And non-US T-50 engine alternatives already exist in the form of the Eurojet EJ200.

If an EJ200-powered T-50 was chosen for FFLIT, that informs the fighter contest. DND has said that the Eurofighter is excessively expensive but Saab has never shown any serious interest in the EJ200 for its Gripen. Of course, Sweden must also now renegotiate its relationship with the US. So, the powerplant type for future Flyvapnet Gripens won't be entirely in Saab's hands.

[apophenia]

And maybe this as well:

Canada Seeking Multiple Types For Tactical Rotorcraft Need

It will be hard to replace the Chinook and Griffon.
Possible a new EU consortium could come with a clean designs for both.
Replace the CH-148 with a Made in Canada AW-101 variant.

• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AgustaWestland_AW101
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_EC725

Carl: Love your idea for made-in-Canada AW101s ... or, at least, final assembly in Canada. Here, there is an opportunity to switch to RTM322 powerplants. I can see a Merlin-like CH-149B Petrel replacing CH-148s and CH-149C Chimos taking over some of the CH-147Fs' roles. Then, later, a new CH-149S Cormorant to replace the original CT7-powered Model 511/CH-149s.

For a direct CH-146 replacement, I would favour a locally-made Airbus H175. The H175 is a bit bigger than the Griffon but still PT6-powered (albeit PT6C-67E versus TwinPak). Average unit cost for civil H175s is only 40% that of an EC725. I would propose that savings be applied to an H135M light utility buy (since base model H135/EC135 trainers are already scheduled to be built at Fort Erie).

That leaves a potential replacement for the other CH-147F roles. Frankly I have no answers for that ... although I do love the idea of a Skycrane-type development from the AW101 

[apophenia]

Springing off from Reply #13 ... this is actually an old one - the KAI CT-250A Golden Eagle satifying the RCAF's Future Fighter Lead-In Training (FFLIT) programme.

Image CT-250A Golden Eagle of 420 Fighter Lead-In Training Squadron, 15 Wing Moose Jaw. Standard finish for CT-250As is all-over Light Grey (FS 36375) with Medium Grey (FS 35237) for lo-viz markings. A 'Keith Ferris' false canopy is painted on the underside. Note the 3CFFTS badge onthe upper fin.

In this variation on the theme, the CT-250A loaners are followed by full-service, Eurojet EJ200-powered CT-250Cs as lead-in trainers for the RCAF's F-35 replacement, the Eurofighter CF-288 Typhoon.

[Update: Consensus seems to be that the KAI T-50 would have too many ITAR-related US components. So, image deleted to save bandwidth.]

[upnorth]

I like the Kai CT-250. However, I think the fact the Lockheed-Martin is directly involved in the program would preclude any Canadian procurement of the type without American interference even if you do find a way to replace the engine and other American tech in it.

I understnad the points you made about Italy in a previous post, though I would have imagined the Leonardo M-346 as more likely than the T-50 as I think it has less American content in it to replace. I think the biggest job would be to replace the engines, I think a later model Adour would do the job for that.

Considering that the EU is openly on Canada's side on the trade war matter, perhaps that could sway Italy to ratify CETA.

[Litvyak]

Regarding the longer-term on fighters - joining the Tempest programme, perhaps?

[GTX_Admin]

I like the Kai CT-250. However, I think the fact the Lockheed-Martin is directly involved in the program would preclude any Canadian procurement of the type without American interference even if you do find a way to replace the engine and other American tech in it.

I understnad the points you made about Italy in a previous post, though I would have imagined the Leonardo M-346 as more likely than the T-50 as I think it has less American content in it to replace. I think the biggest job would be to replace the engines, I think a later model Adour would do the job for that.

I tend to agree but it is your story Stephen

[apophenia]

Regarding the longer-term on fighters - joining the Tempest programme, perhaps?

Indeed. And perhaps also joining Saab's uncrewed FCAS concept to accompany it (assuming that Saab uncouples from Boeing and dumped the F414).

...I think the fact the Lockheed-Martin is directly involved in the program would preclude any Canadian procurement of the type without American interference...

You are probably right, 'north. And that does push the storyline (IMO) uncomfortably close to the M-346.

Are there other candidate airframes? To Greg's point, I've been taking liberties but I'd still like the story to be at least semi-plausible. But I'm obviously not familiar enough with how much US aerospace industry mycelia is entangled inside non-US airframes.

I do note that the Luftwaffe will be doing pilot training with No.2 FTS at RAAF Pearce. Maybe that example is a way forward for Canada and northern European allies? Of course, those RAAF Hawk 127s will need replacing someday too ... sigh.

I suppose the lesson is that none of this will be easy. I presume that disengaging from yesterday's hegemon never is.

[upnorth]

...I think the fact the Lockheed-Martin is directly involved in the program would preclude any Canadian procurement of the type without American interference...

You are probably right, 'north. And that does push the storyline (IMO) uncomfortably close to the M-346.

Are there other candidate airframes? To Greg's point, I've been taking liberties but I'd still like the story to be at least semi-plausible. But I'm obviously not familiar enough with how much US aerospace industry mycelia is entangled inside non-US airframes.

I don't want to sway you too much, as it is your story, but the only two candidates I can think of off the top of my head are the Aero L-159 ALCA from the Czech Republic or the AIDC T-5 Brave Eagle from Taiwan.

Both aircraft are powered by versions of the F124 engine, like the M-346. As such, I imagine a later model Adour could work as a replacement. Beyond that, I think any other American content is avionics related and replacement could be found or created by the Canadian aviation industry.

While there is American content in both aircraft, I think they are both enough domestic product that America might not be able to interfere if Canada wanted to buy one or the other.

I'm not immediately aware of any conditions in Canadian-Czech trade relations that would preclude the sale of the L-159, but I don't know at all about Canada-Taiwan trade conditions regarding military gear.

[GTX_Admin]

But I'm obviously not familiar enough with how much US aerospace industry mycelia is entangled inside non-US airframes.

For a quick reference try Airframers.net.  Here is an example for the M-346:  https://www.airframer.com/aircraft_detail.html?model=M-346#2

Re engines, it also comes down to dimensions, weight, thrust sfc etc.  for example the EJ200 and/or M88 make plausible substitutes for the F404 while the EJ200 does also for the F414.

I do note that the Luftwaffe will be doing pilot training with No.2 FTS at RAAF Pearce. Maybe that example is a way forward for Canada and northern European allies? Of course, those RAAF Hawk 127s will need replacing someday too ... sigh.

Early 2030s at this stage

[apophenia]

Thanks guys! For terseness, I'll clump together my assessments of the FLIT field (purely from a 2025 CA perspective)

Aero L-159 ALCA upsides: Availability (especially if stored L-159A upgrades* are on the cards)
Aero L-159 ALCA downsides: Existing engine; Aero's Hungarian majority ownership [1]
- * Presenting the option of interim L-159As later replaced by more tailored 'L-159Cs'
- Q: Could the P&WC PW307A be readily squeezed into an existing L-159 airframe? [2]

AIDC T-5 upsides: Twin-engined; RCAF composite airframe experience opportunity
AIDC T-5 downsides: F124 engines (albeit ITEC-made); US components unknown

Boeing-Saab T-7 upsides: Widely considered by allies (and erstwhile/former allies)
Boeing-Saab T-7 downsides: Non-starter (all US systems); perpetual programme delays

HAL HLFT-42 upsides: None obvious
HAL HLFT-42 downsides: Still vapourware; probable RU engine; CA/IN relations currently in toilet

Kawasaki T-4 upsides: JASDF currently looking for replacement; non-US (IHI F3) engines
Kawasaki T-4 downsides: Dealing with JA constitution; current CA trade deficit with JA

Leonardo M-346 upsides: None obvious (perhaps twin-engines & commonality with Poland?)
Leonardo M-346 downsides: CA/IT trade deficits; Meloni's ties to Trump; prior Yak associations

TAI Hürjet upsides: None obvious (perhaps, perennially low-value of the Turkish lira?)
TAI Hürjet downsides: F404 engine; tailored to F-16 lead-in; rogue Turkish foreign policy

Conclusions? Nothing firm and confusion still reigns supreme.

I quite like the idea of a PW307-powered AIDC T-5 ... but maybe just as an Eagle rather than 'Brave Eagle'. [3] The wild card there is the true degree of US entanglement (beyond Eaton Corp., I mean).

I must admit, I'd half-forgotten about the Kawasaki T-4. If the JASDF is serious about replacing them, there may be an opportunity (remember we're talking whif procurement here, not the nightmarish PSPC/DND reality). Going waaay out on a limb, how about after Trump turns the T-7A into a non-starter for the JASDF, JA and CA work together on developing a follow-on, next-gen T-4 variant?

__________________________________

[1] That HSC Aerojet Zrt. majority share could be an issue for the next GoC - assuming that a Carney-led Cabinet would have Ukraine-supporting Freeland returning to high-level ministries (anyway, leadership results should be in later today).

[2] F124 : 28.20 kN (6,300 lbf); L 2590 mm (102.1"); Diam. 91.4 cm (36 in); Dry 521.6 kg (1,050 lb)
PW307A: 28.48 kN (6,402 lbf); L 2062 mm (81.2 in); Diam, 97 cm (38.2 in); Dry 450 kg (990 lb)

[3] OT but I've always found it hilarious that US tourists come to British Columbia to see bald eagles. We have zillions of 'em here. They are fun to watch soaring or salmon-fishing but America's national birds are really squabbling carrion-eaters with voices like a squeaky hinge.

[apophenia]

Can't do much about the CA trade deficit but Japan ...

No, neither can we   

To be fair, the Japanese (business and government) are excellent negotiators. If the JASDF are retiring the T-4s, we may be able to make a deal but it won't be a bargain.

[apophenia]

I thought I'd offer a whif policy direction summary to go with the military procurement stuff...
____________________________________

Mentioned already was Canada's 'pausing' of involvement in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). With President Trump normalising relations with Putin's Russia, any continuation of NORAD became utterly pointless. The final step was for Canada to withdraw even essential CAF personnel from the formally binational NORAD military command structure. In theory, Treaty-dictated Canadian military personnel were meant to eventually return to Colorado Springs but that never happened

Canadian involvement in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was also suspended. Notice was also given to end Canadian participation in the Defence Production Sharing Agreement but, in reality, DPSA was dead the moment that he Trump administration applied tariffs to Canadian steel and aluminum.

Clamp-Down at the Canadian Borders

Part of Trump's demands on Ottawa was that it increase security on the Canada-US borders. It quickly became apparent that such demands were red herrings and the Trump Administration had no intention of straight dealing with Canada. As a result, big changes were put in place along the borders ... just not the sort of advantageous changes that the Trump team had been anticipating.

Canada's Preclearance Act, 2016 ( SC 2017, c. 27) was rescinded. This signalled an end to the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air Transport Preclearance between the GoC and Washinton, DC. As a result, all US Customs and Border Protection preclearance facilities in Canada were closed. US-based Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) personnel were ordered home immediately. An exclusion order was draughted allowing up to 60 days before USCBP officers based in Canada had to leave the country.

The NEXUS trusted travelers programme was put on hold (with Canadian NEXUS passholders issued wih application processing fee rebates). This 'hold' first came into effect for 9 x international airport (since travel to the US had already greatly diminished). This was followed by NEXUS services at 396 x marine reporting centres and concluding with 20 x NEXUS land crossings.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts preclearance operations at eight airports in Canada, allowing air travelers to complete immigration, customs, and agriculture procedures before boarding their flights to the United States. The 2015 Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine, and Air Transport Preclearance Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada, which entered into force in August 2019, provides the legal framework and reciprocal authorities necessary for each country’s preclearance officers to carry out security, facilitation, and inspection processes in the other country.

Also effected by a clamp-down at the borders were committees and routine meetings including the cessation of the Cross Border Crime Forum, the North American Drug Dialogue (addressing the opioid crisis), and the more general High-Level Policy Review Group. A rare survivor in these programme cuts was 'Ship Rider', aka the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) however Canada now chose to define 'shared waterways' in its strictest possible meaning. .

Alliances, Alignments, and Arctic Antagonism

Much of the planning behind the 23 Feb 2021 Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership went out the window with the election of Donald Trump. [1] The new administration had no intention of honouring US climate change amelioration promised. Nor did the new Cabinet in Ottawa see any future security in further expanding cooperation on continental defence, particularly "in the Artic". [2] As a result, Ottawa saw no future in the existing U.S.-Canada Arctic Dialogue let alone a need to follow through on plans to expand those invariably fruitless talks. The broader commitments of that Roadmap were also left in tatters.

NATO, of course, was effectively over. It no longer mattered what intentions US foreign policy had for NATO, neither Europe nor Canada viewed Washington as a reliable partner anyway. Canada had already joined BALTS (the Baltic Agreement on Logistics and Tactical Support) as a 'partner force' outside of NATO. Plans remained to join JEF [3] and Ottawa was hopeful that the nascent NEDA (Northern European Defence Alliance) would soon gel as a regional NATO replacement. [4]

Canada also withdrew from or reduced its presence in multinational organisations with permitted the Russian Federation or Belarus to remain as members. This meant a reduced presence at the United Nations. In the general assembly, Canada renounced any future consideration as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council as part of a motion to disband the UNSC (ultimately vetoed by the UNSC 'Permanent 5'). Canada also withdrew from observer status at the UN Human Rights Council - preferring to direct the bulk of its future UN support funding towards the International Criminal Court.

A complete withdrawal was made from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (and its Development Assistance Committee) - specifically because the OECD continued to allow the Russian Federation and Belarus to be members. Canada also withdrew in protest from the Organisation of American States - citing multiple US violations of OAS Article 3. Canada remained in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum but joined with Mexico in condemning current US protectionism as an attack upon the free-trade principles of APEC. Canada had also threatened to withdraw from the World Trade Organisation. In the end, however, Canada simply removed itself from the WTO's unbalanced GPA (Agreement on Government Procurement).

The question of how US President Trump might behave on the world stage during the 50th anniversary of the G7 was neatly dodged. As chair, Canada was in a position to announce that the June 2025 summit in Kananaskis would be a meeting of a new G8 - comprised of Australia, Canada, France and Germany (representing the EU), Norway, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. [5] Just as Canada had not been invited to the final meeting of the original G6 in 1975, the US would not be invited to this first meeting of this new G8. Donald Trump would have to find another podium to pontificate from.

_______________________________________________________

[1] Revealingly, the official White House page on the Roadmap is currently showing File 404.
-- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/23/roadmap-for-a-renewed-u-s-canada-partnership/

[2] And yes, "Artic" [sic] is a direct quote from a surviving US government source:
-- https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/canada-roadmap-renewed-us-canada-partnership

[3] Plans to join the UK-led JEF (the Joint Expeditionary Force) had been put on hold while British PM Starmer attempted to reform a 'special relationship' with the US. Once rebuffed by Washington, the British government was able to fully and more firmly commit to European security.

[4] NEDA was forming around the nucleus of a Scandinavian pact - NFA (the Nordisk forsvarsalliance, Nordisk forsvarsallianse, or Nordiska försvarsalliansen).

[5] Canada also renounced its membership in the G20.

[apophenia]

Going back a bit, I've deleted the KAI T-50 image in Reply #15 (just to save on bandwidth).

Here, as an alternative, I attach the Kawasaki CT-244 Goshawk ... named for the Northern Goshawk (Accipiter gentilis atricapillus), a species of diurnal raptor found throughout Canada south of the treeline. [1]

If anyone has knowledge of major ITAR-controlled US components in the Kawasaki T-4, I like to hear about them.

_________________________________________________

[1] In the past, I have whiffed Kawasaki Kestrel for alliteration. Unfortunately, the bird found in subarctic Canada is the American Kestrel (Falco sparverius) so that name was a hard 'no'.

[upnorth]

Have you put any thought into army vehicles?

Canada currently had Leopard MBTs, so that's not a problem.

However, the lighter armour stuff all has strong American connections.

The Bison, Coyote, and LAV 6.0 all come from General Dynamics Land Systems.

The TAPV comes from Textron.

[apophenia]

So rename it "Canadian Kestrel". I mean, if one can rename a gulf...

True. Pas de problème renaming the bird as the Canadian Kestrel renaming ... ICZN binomial nomenclature may be fixed but common names can be anything that locals use, want, or prefer. And the genus/species name F. sparverius presents no difficulties.

Likewise, the Trumpeters are free to be hissed at by the America Goose ... but they'll still be Branta canadensis 

[apophenia]

Have you put any thought into army vehicles? ...

I do have one or two mild opinions on CA vehicles 

The Canadian Army has never given priority to maintaining its Leopard 2 fleet. Nor do we have any convenient way to transport them to Europe. So, unless we're planning to fight the US Army close to Wainwright (before Danielle Smith officially changes sides, I mean), the tanks are of little use on this side of the Atlantic. So keep the Leos currently at Camp Ādaži in Latvia and ship the rest to Sweden for training and active storage. Any unserviceable units should be upgraded to a common strv 123A standard.

AFAIK, all Bison and Coyotes not destined for gate-guardian or scrap have already been delivered (or promised) to Ukraine. Right now would be the perfect time to announce that all TAPVs (and spares) are also being re-directed to Kyiv (and pointedly without asking US permission). I know that TAPV is a roll-over prone Textron turd but I'm sure that the ZSU could find some use for them until the parts run out. As for TAPV replacement, for an 'out there' option, see attached.

BTW, another obvious Kyiv donation would be the new GM Defense Light Tactical Vehicles. The ZSU has found clever uses for a range of smaller, ad hoc dune-buggies. I'm sure that they could find some run-about use for the LTVs as well.

And then there is GDLS-C's ACSV programme. I see all LAV 6.0-based vehicles as enormous, ill-protected targets. Put a 'national security' stop-work order on GDLS-C and, if they don't go away mad, nationalise their London facility. In the short-term, a UOR should be issued to get sufficient loaned strf 9040Cs to equip the MNB-LVA. Then license the CV90 MkIV and build them at the 'new' London Arsenal. Strategic sealift could be done through the Port of Hamilton when icefree and Port Saint John in the Winter. [1]

____________________________________________

[1] To facilitate this, I would cancel the planned (AOR 521) HMCS Preserver - why give more CAD to Dennis Washington to pass on to Trump? The saved JSS funds I would give to Chantier Davie to create a freighter conversion to RO/RO vehicle carrier akin to a scaled-down USN T-AKR type - ie: cranes and a stern ramp for vehicle loading.

[upnorth]

French submarines for the Canadian navy, perhaps:
https://youtu.be/lKSKWI40fI0?si=XEUHgqkjXlSHKt4u

[apophenia]

French submarines for the Canadian navy, perhaps:
https://youtu.be/lKSKWI40fI0?si=XEUHgqkjXlSHKt4u

Sure, in whif-world, we could see potential French AIP boats in RCN service. And there is a host of other plausible options for the Directorate of Naval Requirements to ponder. Let's go through those:

- ES = S-80 Plus: AIP adaptation; but Navantia has experienced weight-control issues.

- FR = Shortfin Barracuda - the AIP variant of France's Suffren class nuke boat.

- JP = 29SS Taigei class: Included for completeness (Japan has already declined submission).

- NO/DE = Typ 212CD: Pitched to Canada by Boris Pistorius (but he is now yesterday's man).

- ROK = KSS-III: With potential overseas build (unlikely under NSS but easy access to CFB Esquimalt).

- SE = A26 Blekinge class: A reminder the RCN needs to update its probable deployments file.

How to rank those? I'll go in order of increasing likelihood of acceptance:

6 - 29SS Taigei class: Not actually an AIP type (unlike its []iSoryu[/i] class predecessor).

5 - S-80 Plus: AIP adaptation; but Navantia has experienced weight-control issues.

4 - A26 Blekinge class: NDHQ has ego issues buying anything from smaller countries.
-- Note: Other than Ops & Ex with the USN; Canada's only current deployment is the Baltic.

3 - KSS-III: Totally unfamiliar supplier (whose greatest advantage is rapid production time).
-- Note: Seaspan has ROK yard connections but cannot even meet its existing schedules.

2 - Typ 212CD: Promising but Canada probably missed the boat for NO/DE cooperation.

1 - Shortfin Barracuda: Canada has an option of coat-tailling on Dutch Orka order.

Buying Orka-type boats would connect DND/PSPC with Damen with whom they have established relationships. Still, the irony is that Canada would be buying AIP submarines from a country which does not even recognise our claims to the NWP. (And I'd put money on it having been an interloping French boat whose conning tower got a .303-inch sized dent in its conning tower courtesy of the Canadian Rangers!)

The Dreaded Real World

On the RW side, two key questions emerge on the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. The first is: How serious is the GoC about fulfilling this CPSP 'requirement'? The second is: How does a CAD 100 Billion SSK purchase fit into current Canadian fiscal realities? [1]

On Question 1, note that the RCN has been actively lobbying for Victoria class replacements since at least April 2023. But it took until mid-Sept 2024 for the GoC to issue an RFI (mistakenly called an RfP on the GoC website). That RFI called for "heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles[,] and long-range precision land attack missiles". And, of course, all of the preferred weapons on that list have since been torpedoed by Trump (sorry, couldn't resist). [2]

-- https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender-opportunities/tender-notice/ws4772162365-doc4779172331

On Question 2, even prior to Trump's tariff offensive, Canada had a USD 0.70 dollar (it is now USD 0.69). Obviously the full economic effects of those tariffs have yet to be felt. Indeed, a better comparison might the CAD-EUR exchange rates - the CAD was worth €0.6695 on 31 Dec but only €0.6386 on 14 March 2025.

Carney's placeholder government is being referring to as a 'wartime Cabinet'. That pretty much sums up the current mood of most of the Canadian population. However, no amount of bellicose 'elbows up' attitude is going to reinflate that sagging economy. So, that means that we need to focus on military procurement priorities which genuinely bolster Canadian foreign policy goals (including increased trade with European partners). Personally, I fail to see how any of the RCN's current procurement priorities - including SSKs - serve any but US foreign policy goals. However, that said, I am more than prepared to entertain opposing viewpoints.

____________________________________________

[1] Even in April 2023, RCN lobbyist acknowledged that their implausibly-low CAD 60 Billion estimates would likely end up being CAD 100 Billion.

[2] On a rather OT rant, I'd say that the name Canadian Patrol Submarine Project reveals the lack of gravitas within Canadian military procurement. In current practice, we progress from 'Project' - which involves anything from a random whim expressed within the Puzzle Palace all the way through to orders issued. Then it becomes a 'Program' which, in turn, extends from its Definition phase all the way through to final disposal. A bureaucracy incapable of ordering its terminology more clearly is unlikely to excel at its labours 

[Litvyak]

Personally, I fail to see how any of the RCN's current procurement priorities - including SSKs - serve any but US foreign policy goals. However, that said, I am more than prepared to entertain opposing viewpoints.

SSK with air-independent propulsion would allow us to patrol our Arctic waters properly. Since the US insists those are international waters, how does giving us that patrol ability serve US FP goals? Just delete the land-attack capability and Stan's the Man.

[apophenia]

SSK with air-independent propulsion would allow us to patrol our Arctic waters properly. Since the US insists those are international waters, how does giving us that patrol ability serve US FP goals? Just delete the land-attack capability and Stan's the Man.

You are right. An AIP SSK would allow Canada to patrol our Arctic waters. But so too would a larger fleet (ie: more than 12 x CPSP) of XLUUVs - a technology area that Canada already has design and development experience with.

However, to assert those sovereignty claims, we need to be willing to thwart foreign incursions. Out of convenience, we tend to focus on US civilian or Coast Guard incursions through the NWP. And that helps further the US civilian FON narrative. In reality,  the unapproved foreign presence in Canadian Arctic waters has mainly comprised of US Navy submarines on FONOPs.

Even if our traditional alliances are at an end, to effectively challenge the relevant US FP goal, Ottawa needs to be willing to loose SSKs on trespassers. Obviously, no CPSP captain will ever get a go-ahead for torpedoing a transgressing Virginia class in Parry Channel. (A glance at AOPS armament reveals how loath Ottawa has been to appear assertive - let alone aggressive - in Canadian Arctic waters.)

Will this now change? We may hope so ...
____________________________________

BTW, I will be coming back around to naval planning and construction soon but, next, I will be returning to more immediate policy options and opportunities.

[Litvyak]

Well, I think within the bounds of the relations that have hitherto existed between the US and Canada, a reluctance to be assertive is understandable. Now though, not so much. Let's hope those in charge feel the same way, and start becoming assertive.

Just had a thought on this, too: how plausible would it be to deploy anchored sonobuoys at the entrances to the passage?

(Though if it were up to me - so probably a good thing it isn't! - I'd just mine the entrances and state that publicly that they're mined, do not attempt to trespass in our territorial waters...)

[apophenia]

Well, I think within the bounds of the relations that have hitherto existed between the US and Canada, a reluctance to be assertive is understandable. Now though, not so much. Let's hope those in charge feel the same way, and start becoming assertive...

Agreed. Comparing personal anecdoteage with political actions is dodgy but my experience is that big, dumb bullies are usually best countered with subtle resistance. Usually that just flummoxes them and they forget what they were het up about. (The danger, of course, is that they become confused ... always perilous with frustration anger following.)

(Though if it were up to me - so probably a good thing it isn't! - I'd just mine the entrances and state that publicly that they're mined, do not attempt to trespass in our territorial waters...)

Probably a good thing for me, too! But having resisted my initial temptation to just mine NWP entrances, I'd announced that a DND de-mining exercise in the NWP had gone horribly awry.  The GoC is doing everything it can to rectify the situation but first we must put a new, ice-resistant mine-countermeasures ship design through the NSS process (stayed tuned, work should be complete in 30 years or less!).

... Just had a thought on this, too: how plausible would it be to deploy anchored sonobuoys at the entrances to the passage?

Totally plausible - its been done! Indeed, a low-cost underwater acoustic array was the main driver behind DRDC's Northern Watch project.
-- https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc383/p814252_A1b.pdf

Also, here is a link to HI Sutton's article on the Solus-XR, a Canadian-designed/built XLUUV intended for Arctic use.
-- http://www.hisutton.com/Canada-Cellula-Solus-XR-News.html

[GTX_Admin]

Go the XLUUV option!!!

[GTX_Admin]

new RCAF trainers and fighters get quite tricky ... especially fighters (since DND has previously rejected Gripens and Typhoons.

Though with new geopolitical situation and new threats a re-evaluation might be warranted.  A Typhoon would be a great addition.

[apophenia]

Go the XLUUV option!!!

Yeah, along with those Northern Watch acoustic arrays, a few dozen XLUUVs at either end of the NWP should do the trick 

The beauty of building Canadian XLUUVs is that Cellula has done most of the work already and production would be so much faster. Not all of the work would stay in Burnaby, of course. I would imaging the GoC buying build rights from Cellula and spreading XLUUV production to the Great Lakes and East Coast as well.

Crewing might get tricky, though. If only we had a surplus of young people who like to play video games in their parents' basements ... 

[apophenia]

Though with new geopolitical situation and new threats a re-evaluation might be warranted.  A Typhoon would be a great addition.

I'm developing a really 'out there' scenario for future fighters (but it will also involve Europe so I'll probably keep that thread separate from this storyline).

That new geopolitical situation and its threats dictate a major policy rethink. Our domestic emphasis has been minimal satisfaction of our US masters in NORAD. Which leads us to questions ...

- Q1: Will NORAD even exist in the near future?

To avoid that query turning into a paralysing policy 'doom loop', I'll just answer with a probable 'No'. So no further need to play the dancing dog to placate 'the cousins'.

- Q2: What then will be the aerial threat to Canada in the High Arctic?

NORAD's raison d'être was to intercept Soviet bombers attacking the US across the North Pole. But if Trump and Vlad are now besties (or, at least, The Donald thinks that they are), hasn't that Russkie threat now disappeared?

- Q3: If NORAD does wink out of existence, does Canada still need northern interceptors?

If our relationship with the US evaporates entirely (as seems to be happening quicker than could have previously been imagined), a few generations of cross-Polar threat suddenly turns into an intra-Arctic threat. Canada will be at risk (at least of incursions) from JB Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson AFB in Alaska and/or Thule/Pituffik on Greenland. That would suggest that, if we want to be in the interceptor business, we need patrol aircraft based at soon-to-be CFB Iqaluit and at CFB Yellowknife.

As is probably obvious, the above follows typical DND procurement patterns = always replace what you have with a direct analogue which, paradoxically, must also be bigger, better, and preferably 'gold-plated'. In recent decades, the complaint has been an unwillingness to spend enough. But that will now abruptly change into an inability to even fund much of what we need.

Here, I'll insert some RW by quoting Gustavo Indar: "Nearly 80% of Canada's exports go to the US, but those make up just 13% of total American imports. Meanwhile, more than 60% of Canada’s imports come from the US, yet they account for only 17% of American exports."

IOW, the degree of trade imbalance means that we cannot duke this out or wait for things to get better. Instead, will we invent a totally new economy for ourselves, citizens need to accept an immediate reduction of the overall Canadian economy. And that will mean cuts that hurt. Perhaps, more importantly, it means cuts that still protect that which makes our society unlike that of America's. So, realistically, we are probably looking at CF-18s until they fall out of the sky to ensure that the social programmes which distinguish us from Americans can continue.

[apophenia]

Next installment ...

________________________________________

Arms Production - Bellicosity Balanced by Self-Sabotage

Just prior to the election of US President Donald Trump, there was a ribbon-cutting ceremony at the new IMT Precision Production Facility in Ingersoll, ON. Designed to produce 15,000 155 mm shell bodies per month, the plant was officially opened on 02 Oct 2024. IMT Group CEO, Cheryl Hacking, reminded those present that IMT facilities dated back to the 'bomb girls' of WW1. Also in attendance was MGen. J.T. Reim - US Army XO for Armaments and Ammunition - who quoted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by way of "a reminder that what we do matters not just for one nation, but for millions across the globe".

But such bonhomie did not long survive the inauguration of POTUS 47. The new president made clear that he would follow through on his electioneering threats to force Ukraine into 'peace' negotiations. Then Trump and his VP ambushed Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the oval office before cut off military aid to Ukraine. In the meantime, tariffs had been announced on Canadian aluminum and steel products. If IMT's Cheryl Hacking suffered a few sleepless nights, that would be completely understandable.

Nevertheless, a contract had been signed between the US Army and the GoC's contracting agency - the Canadian Commercial Corporation. So, while all the politicking was going on, in Ingersoll, they got on with the job at hand of producing 15,000 M795 HE shell casings per month. Plans were for the M795s to be joined by the US Army's go-to M1128 base-burn shells by the Summer of 2025. Meanwhile, Québec-based GD-OTS Canada had been contracted to produce the 'energetics' with which to fill these shell casings.

The Canadian Commercial Corporation contract stood but the CCC had been under the distinct impression that such artillery shell production was linked to supplying Ukrainian needs - initially through 'backfilling' for the US Army albeit but, eventually, through direct supply to the ZSU. Obviously, that could no longer be relied upon. It seemed that the author of Trump: The Art of the Deal had no respect for deals which didn't directly bolster his own ego or whims. Any lingering doubts about that vanished when Donald Trump tore up his own 2018 USMCA free trade treaty and applied 25% tariffs to Canadian steel imports.

"Opportunities multiply as they are seized." — Sun Tzu

The 'war-time footing' of newly-installed Prime Minister Mark Carney's Cabinet had a lot on its collective plate. However, all of those tariffed steel products coming out of Ingersoll proven too tempting to resist. An Order in Council by the King's Privy Council for Canada was made in the name of the Governor General. This OIC prohibited the export of any strategically-important steel products to which unfair tariffs had been applied. As Minister of International Trade as well as President of the King's Privy Council for Canada, Dominic LeBlanc was in a position to both issue and approve an Order in Council made in the name of the Governor General. Once this OIC was signed by GG Mary Simon on behalf of King Charles III, it became illegal for IMT Precision to export its tariffed steel shell casings to the United States. And, as artillery shell components were controlled items under Canadian law, their legal ownership was transferred to the GoC.

Another GoC target was Algoma Steel of Sault Ste Marie, ON, which had produced shells during WW2. After layoffs were announced, Algoma's American CEO - Michael D. Garcia (a graduate of West Point) - he made the mistake of declaring his optimism about getting "government support" while predicting that the "steel trade would return to normal". Even if the first was not an unwelcome corporate handout beg, Garcia's second statement revealed an executive completely out of touch with his industry's current predicament.

The GoC offered the Algoma Steel board of directors funding to set up a new shell production line at Sault Ste Marie. But that offer came with a condition - the current CEO was to be replaced by a Canadian. As an interim, former CEO and current Director, Michael McQuade, would resume his leadership role. Both the Algoma board and Industry Canada planners were fully aware that the Sault Ste Marie facility remained in financial peril but a contract for 155 mm shell casings could not but help make up for some lost revenues.

Insensitive but not Insensate - Finding Hole Fillers

While IMT Precision was creating 155 mm shell bodies in Ontario, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems - Canada was producing the explosive fillings for those shells in Québec. That Repentigny-based firm wasn't the problem. Rather, at issue, was GD-OTS Canada being wholly-owned by US conglomorate General Dynamics Corporation. And GD were not interested in any negotiations with the GoC which might endanger their supplier relationship with the US Army. So, GD-OTS Canada's answer to Ottawa's request for shell 'energetics' was a hard 'No'.

This reaction by GD-OTS had been anticipated. Moves were begun to nationalise all GD-OTS facilities in Québec, but that would take time. The interim plan was to export empty shell cases for filling in Europe. Discussions with Ukrainian authorities revealed that there was no spare capacity in that war-ravaged country. Bulgaria was identified as the NATO ally with the most underused capacity. And yet talks with Bulgarian government-owned ammunition producers proved fruitless. With politics obviously playing a part in those failed Bulgarian negotiations, Canada turned to the Polish firm of Jakusz Sp. z.o.o. of Koscierzyna.

With an agreement in place, empty shell casings were sent from Ingersoll by rail to sea ports - with an 85 km CP Rail trip to the port of Hamilton between April and November or a full 1,550 km to Saint John, NB when Hamilton was frozen-in between December and March. The shell casings were then offloaded at the port of Gdynia in Poland for a 60 km trip to the Jakusz facility where these casings were filled.

In a relatively short time, lack of Canadian orders or export possibilities forced General Dynamics to close down their GD-OTS subsidiary. The invariable law suits followed but the Supreme Court of Canada found against the plaintiffs (saying that, in refusing work offered by the GoC, GD had become a victim of its own actions). In the aftermath, all GD-OTS facilities in Québec came under the control of the GoC - most importantly, the energetic materials plant at Salaberry-de-Valleyfield. The latter was quickly reorganised as DIL-Valleyfield - being a component of the newly revived Crown Corporation, Defence Industries Limited.

___________________________________________________________

[Litvyak]

Canada will be at risk (at least of incursions) from JB Elmendorf-Richardson and Eielson AFB in Alaska and/or Thule/Pituffik on Greenland. That would suggest that, if we want to be in the interceptor business, we need patrol aircraft based at soon-to-be CFB Iqaluit and at CFB Yellowknife.

You know, it's "funny", when I wrote about the Panhandle tensions with incursions back and forth over Juneau and Dease Lake, that led up to and ended in the very short "Accidental War", that I was maybe being a bit far-fetched... and now here we are looking at it as a plausible scenario.

IOW, the degree of trade imbalance means that we cannot duke this out or wait for things to get better. Instead, will we invent a totally new economy for ourselves, citizens need to accept an immediate reduction of the overall Canadian economy. And that will mean cuts that hurt. Perhaps, more importantly, it means cuts that still protect that which makes our society unlike that of America's. So, realistically, we are probably looking at CF-18s until they fall out of the sky to ensure that the social programmes which distinguish us from Americans can continue.

Conversely, couldn't we just go back to doing things how we used to before the 1970s, and just spend the money into existence like they did for the St Lawrence Seaway? Under the current (post 1974) model of government borrowing money at interest from private banks, the Seaway would be an impossible project, yet we did it back then with little to no impact on the (small and stable!) national debt. We could do it. TD, BMO, RBC et al might not be best pleased about it, but since they've been allowed to create money on their own (which nominally only the BoC is allowed to do, ergo they've been breaking the law), they can quickly learn to live with it. Of course this can only work with domestic projects, but there's still plenty we can do on our own, and there's a lot of infrustructure we need to build or improve...

[Old Wombat]

Just a bit of RW fun;

Australia's 'biggest defence export' was meant to go to the US first, but Canada snuck past Donald Trump

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-03-19/canada-snuck-past-trump-buy-jorn-defence-radar/105069292

 

[Litvyak]

Next installment ...

I do like where this is going. :) Although I'm sure that by now you're well aware that I'm fully in favour of at least some degree of state control/ownership of strategically vital industries...

[apophenia]

Just a bit of RW fun;

Australia's 'biggest defence export' was meant to go to the US first, but Canada snuck past Donald Trump

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-03-19/canada-snuck-past-trump-buy-jorn-defence-radar/105069292

Great stuff, Guy! This OHR deal is all over the news here ... but no-one has yet picked up that DOGE-stuffed-it-up angle. Love it! 

[apophenia]

Xen: If you haven't already, have a glance at the 2024 voting patterns around Juneau versus, say, Fairbanks and environs. Suddenly our shared BC panhandle irredentism doesn't look so improbable 

Big Banks: Yup, Canada has been in the thrall of Bay Street for far too long. Ironically, it may take a PM with serious banking experience to get TD, BMO, and, especially RBC back into line. (Talking to an RBC investment advisor, we were reliably informed to not worry - she assured us that the country would fail before RBC did. Hubris and a bit of humour in there ... but rather chilling, nonetheless.)

Anyway, endlessly pondering on whether we can 'afford' infrastructure mtx is what got us where we are. At present, Carney's emphasis seems to be on breaking down barriers between provinces. If he can swing (most of?) the Premiers around to that, it is probably the quickest reducer of needless waste (of time and money). If such barriers can be eliminated, I'm confident that the money will be found.

In the meantime, as I said, Canadians have to brace ourselves for a smaller and much more challenging economy. Many will hate that the easy days are over. Personally, I am looking forward to the prevailing me-first attitude being eclipsed by a more nationalist approach. We're already seeing it emerge which is thrilling to say the least!

I do like where this is going. :) Although I'm sure that by now you're well aware that I'm fully in favour of at least some degree of state control/ownership of strategically vital industries...

Absolutely. Let's call the efficiency-through-privatisation-of-arsenals approach an utterly failed experiment - like most of its contemporaries (eg: synth-pop; the K-Car; reality TV programmes; Maggie's excessive hair-spray technique, ... etc.)

[Litvyak]

Xen: If you haven't already, have a glance at the 2024 voting patterns around Juneau versus, say, Fairbanks and environs. Suddenly our shared BC panhandle irredentism doesn't look so improbable 

Big Banks: Yup, Canada has been in the thrall of Bay Street for far too long. Ironically, it may take a PM with serious banking experience to get TD, BMO, and, especially RBC back into line. (Talking to an RBC investment advisor, we were reliably informed to not worry - she assured us that the country would fail before RBC did. Hubris and a bit of humour in there ... but rather chilling, nonetheless.)

Anyway, endlessly pondering on whether we can 'afford' infrastructure mtx is what got us where we are. At present, Carney's emphasis seems to be on breaking down barriers between provinces. If he can swing (most of?) the Premiers around to that, it is probably the quickest reducer of needless waste (of time and money). If such barriers can be eliminated, I'm confident that the money will be found.

In the meantime, as I said, Canadians have to brace ourselves for a smaller and much more challenging economy. Many will hate that the easy days are over. Personally, I am looking forward to the prevailing me-first attitude being eclipsed by a more nationalist approach. We're already seeing it emerge which is thrilling to say the least!

I do like where this is going. :) Although I'm sure that by now you're well aware that I'm fully in favour of at least some degree of state control/ownership of strategically vital industries...

Absolutely. Let's call the efficiency-through-privatisation-of-arsenals approach an utterly failed experiment - like most of its contemporaries (eg: synth-pop; the K-Car; reality TV programmes; Maggie's excessive hair-spray technique, ... etc.)

I'm almost in complete agreement with you - except that I do love synthpop!

[Sport25ing]

Well, one of the consequences is that Portugal cancelled their future order of F-35 (and possibly might also cancell an possible request for M2 Bradley) - so, I might imagine he might due something like the Canadians and buy Grippens, and possibly CV90's.

[GTX_Admin]

Well, one of the consequences is that Portugal cancelled their future order of F-35 (and possibly might also cancell an possible request for M2 Bradley) - so, I might imagine he might due something like the Canadians and buy Grippens, and possibly CV90's.

Slight technicalities:

• They hadn't officially ordered any F-35s to date
• The reporting is not confirmed.

[Sport25ing]

True

[apophenia]

I'm almost in complete agreement with you - except that I do love synthpop!

You are dead to me 

Slight technicalities:

• They hadn't officially ordered any F-35s to date
• The reporting is not confirmed.

Yeah, Nuno Melo did say that the F-35 was now eliminated from the list of FAP contenders. But he is the outgoing Portuguese defence minister. So, time will tell ...

Never the less, that Melo announcement did seem to embolden the new Carney Cabinet into 'reviewing' our 'CF-35' purchase. That was probably coming anyway ... but Melo probably helped push it up in Ottawa's to-do list.

[Litvyak]

I'm almost in complete agreement with you - except that I do love synthpop!

You are dead to me 

Just can't get enough?

[apophenia]

Just can't get enough?

I was the one who used the term but I must admit that I find synthpop tricky to define. (I see a lot of bands lumped into that category that I would nerdily classify as New Wave.)

I suspect that the synthpop 'question' is mainly a generational divide. For the more crotchety of us, Moogs and ARPs were part of our youth but so too was the zenith of analogue guitar effects. Music changed completely when synthesisers went digital in the early '80s.

[Litvyak]

Just can't get enough?

I was the one who used the term but I must admit that I find synthpop tricky to define. (I see a lot of bands lumped into that category that I would nerdily classify as New Wave.)

I suspect that the synthpop 'question' is mainly a generational divide. For the more crotchety of us, Moogs and ARPs were part of our youth but so too was the zenith of analogue guitar effects. Music changed completely when synthesisers went digital in the early '80s.

In that case we may not be that far apart... maybe. I'm a big fan of analogue synths, even owned a few including a couple Soviet ones. I love New Wave, Neue Deutsche Welle, Jarre, Kraftwerk, etc. But I was also a mid-late 90s  raverchild, so I love Detroit techno, grime, acid house, DnB/jungle, etc; having drifted from there to the goth/industrial scene, I also love darkwave, futurepop, etc etc etc - at the same time as I hate much of the commercial 'manufactured' dance music that was released from the late 90s on. So yeah I agree "synthpop" is hard to define (and "electronica" is just so broad as to be devoid of meaning).

[upnorth]

Is there any variety of synth pop that can be applied for ECM or EW missions?

What genre would be good for jamming Russian recce aircraft coming in over the pole?

[Litvyak]

Is there any variety of synth pop that can be applied for ECM or EW missions?

What genre would be good for jamming Russian recce aircraft coming in over the pole?

Not synthpop, but art noise, powernoise, industrial - early Laibach, Winterkälte, Throbbing Gristle... of course, Lou Reed's Metal Machine Music is also an option.

[The Big Gimper]

Is there any variety of synth pop that can be applied for ECM or EW missions?

What genre would be good for jamming Russian recce aircraft coming in over the pole?

I really like Carbon Based Lifeforms (CBL) from Sweden.

Here is a sample:: Carbon Based Lifeforms - Live at Ozora Stage 2022::  https://youtu.be/yIQbReH2n0Q?si=3SPfhDStS5AoHSXO
Can't beat beer and cigarettes' 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_Based_Lifeforms

[robunos]

That is VERY reminiscent of Tangerine Dream (without the Hendrix) . . . I like it !

cheers,
Robin.

[apophenia]

The next installment ...
_______________________________________

That's Not What Was Meant by 'Its the Navy's Turn'!

When the Carney Cabinet began their review of 'frozen' Canadian military procurements, most observers were braced for major cuts to the Royal Canadian Navy's ambitious programmes. Some were awkward and expensive to cut - eg: the shuttering of the RCN's Aegis Combat System Integration Centre. The ACSIC was located within the Moorestown, NJ, Combat Systems Engineering Development Site (CSEDS) jointed staffed by the US Navy and Lockheed Martin. [1] Active Canadian personnel had already been recalled from Moorestown but there were still 'kill fees' and compensations to be paid.

Another, more modest RCN-related cut proved a personal embarassment to MND Bill Blair. Only in Dec 2024 had Blair overseen the creation a new Naval Reserve presence in Whitehorse, YT. Cabinet reviewers did not see zero value in a Naval Reserves formation in the Yukon. However, with underfunded and badly-equipped NavRes units situated much closer to 'tidewater', defending the wisdom of this new formation proved more challenge than the erstwhile MND was up for. [2]

Meanwhile, one Cabinet study group had began from the top of the pile. The object was to first identify embryonic naval procurement plans yet to have achieved programme status. Then, that file sub-category was re-filtered by any sense of unambiguous priority or urgency, Finally, a winnowing process was begun to separate out proposed projects which were considered non-urgent and could be easily delayed (until a more stable economic equilibrium was achieved in Canada) or readily cancelled. Near the top of the list for the latter category came the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.

CPSP - "... suffocating its crew and floundering at sea"

The somewhat mistitled Canadian Patrol Submarine 'Project' was still in its early conceptual phase. A Request for Information had been issued in September 2024 and DND was still processing responses to that RfI. The CPSP boats were intended to replace in-service Victoria class SSKs. And that was the first red flag. It had taken a decade to get the Victoria class fully manned and to achieve FOC status. And that was for conventional diesel-electric boats. The planned CPSPs were to be much more capable and sophisticated AIP boats. A repeat of maintenance challenges and shortages of fully-trained submariners was anticipated.

The conceptual CPSP boat was to be crewed no more than 40 submariners. By comparison, the Victoria class has a complement of 53. So, on a one-to-one basis, crewing should be less of an issue. Except that the CPSP expected to introduce up to 12 x new AIP submarines into RCN service by 2037. So the crewing issue remained. Of rather more concern to the non-SMEs of the Cabinet study group was that, at CAD 100 billion, the outside estimates of CPSP costs far exceeded DND's more optimistic estimate of CAD 60 billion for "up to 12" new boats. IOW, at least 480 crew members would be needed for 12 x CPSP - four times as many submariners as currently serve in the RCN. [3]

With neither budgets nor crewing numbers adding up, the CAD-60-100 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project was moved to the top of the study group's 'cancel' list. Even worse for the CPSP was that no serious case could be made for submarines furthering Canadian foreign policy goals. After a full Cabinet session review of the conclusions presented, the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project was declared dead. A motion was passed to express appreciation to those firms which had made submissions to the CPSP Request for Information.  However, no further work would be approved on the now-stillborn Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.

"Ever feel like you're breathing underwater ...?"

The Directorate of Naval Requirements scrambled to find a replacement for the four Victoria class SSKs which would age-out in the 2030s. But no obvious replacement option appeared. The world of the submariner is an expensive place. A partial answer came from Defence Research & Development Canada - or, more specifically, the Atlantic Research Centre based at Dartmouth, NS. DRDC's existing Northern Watch Array consisted of two 48-channel hydrophone arrays deployed in the Barrow Strait starting from Gascoyne Inlet Camp on Devon Island. [4] DRDC-ARC proposed a rapid expansion of the Northern Watch Array concept. In other words, a complete alternative ... rather than a submarine replacement.

An expansion of the Northern Watch Array fit perfectly within the purview of a newly-established special operating agency - the Defence Energy and Infrastucture SOA (or DEI). This SOA was within DND but its budget was completely separate. Intended to work hand-in-glove with the Crown Corporation, Defence Construction Canada, DEI's scope was more limited - being restricted to providing DND with needed infrastructure and the ability to power it. This was to be accomplished with maximum efficiency. As such, DEI was allowed to draw seconded talent from DCC, DRDC, other government departments, as well as Canadian academe. As a result, teams could be quickly assembled and, under its SOA terms, DEI projects automatically became top priorities for supporting agencies like the Canadian Coast Guard, the RCAF, Infrastructure Canada, etc.

With a quickly expanded Northern Watch Array programme as DEI's own top priority, the agency created four distinct project groups - NWA-Gp1 was responsible for onsight testing and troubleshooting. NWA-Gp1 began operations at the Gascoyne Inlet Camp checking the original array which was now redesignated as Northern Watch Array - Northwest (NWA-NW). Once checks were complete, NWA-Gp1 moved on to the two new announced Northern Watch Array installation sites - ultimately the responsibilities of NWA-Gp2 and NWA-Gp3.

"An Array of Angels ..." - Expanding the Northern Watch Brief

Conceptually, the second installation - NWA-SW - was the same as those of the now-rebranded NWA-NW in Barrow Strait. However, technologically, the NWA-SW hydrophone system was more advanced (courtesy of the National Research Council). NWA-Gp2 - the NWA-SW support group - formed a lodger unit within CHARS (the Canadian High Arctic Research Station) at Cambridge Bay on the SE coast of Victoria Island. The NWA-SW arrays themselves extended into Dease Strait at the western narrows of Queen Maud Gulf.

Installation of the third Northern Watch Array - NWA-SE - followed immediately upon the completion of NWA-SW's Dease Strait arrays. CFS Qikiqtaq near Gjoa Haven on the southeastern tip of King William Island was established specifically to accommodate NWA-Gp3, NWA-SE's support personnel. The NWA-SE hydrophones were technologically identical to those of the NWA-SW. The placement of the arrays differed in that they extend all the way across the 64 km of shallow Simpson Strait separating King William Island from the Adelaide Peninsula on mainland.

Obviously, the two new Northern Watch Array expansion sites had been chosen for their access to narrow choke points in the Northwest Passage. A second criteria had been reasonable proximity to population centres - albeit tiny Nunavut hamlets. Both Gjoa Haven and Cambridge Bay have small but useful harbours. However, more importantly, it gave first DEI and then the Canadian Armed Forces access to airports. Both Cambridge Bay Airport (YCB) and Gjoa Haven Airport (YHK) are modest, gravel fields. Much of the support flying was done by 440 Squadron's CC-138 Twin Otters out of CFS Yellowknife. [5] But large RCAF CC-177s have operated from YCB multiple times while YHK is more than able to accommodate CC-130 Hercules transports.

A fourth component of the Northern Watch Array - NWA-NE - is still being considered. In theory, this array - stretching NNE into Baffin Bay would provide advance warning of westward incursions into Lancaster Sound. However, a satisfactory case had yet to be made to the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement that the proposed NWA-NE added sufficient capabilities to warrant the expense. For the moment, DPAMD members remained convinced that RCAF NorPat and ASW/AshW patrols from CFB Iqaluit provided adequate warning when backed by RCN sovereignty patrols between the thaw and freeze-up. [6]

_____________________________________________

[1] Closing the 6-month-old ACSIC was highly revealing of the fate of the Aegis Combat System in future RCN service. However, the Cabinet reviewers were not yet ready to make a pronouncement on the fate of the Canadian Surface Combatant ptogramme (aka the future River class destroyer). However, the ACSIC close-down was enough to prompt the resignation of RAdm D.A. Charlebois, the Director General Future Ship Capability.

[2] It could not be ignored that land-locked Whitehorse was 970 km (as the crow flew) from the Arctic Ocean or a 16-hour drive to Prince Rupert on the Pacific coast. Neither movement seemed to add to much in the way of 'readiness' as claimed by the MND.

[3] Of course, that simple figure of 480 submariners makes no allowances for the required relief crews, personnel leaves, routine transfers, etc.

[4] GIC is not a dedicated DND facility. Rather it has been a working Arctic research camp for decades.

[5] It would be no exaggeration to say that the expanded Northern Watch Array programme was directly responsible for the growth of 440 Squadron. Until 2025, the unit operated only four 'Twotters' - now redesignated CC-138As. These 'legacy' aircraft were then joined by six newly-built CC-138B Twin Otters - readily distinguished by their longer noses.

[6] In the Western Arctic, similar aerial patrols had begun from a revived Canadian Forces Station Inuvik (the original CFS Inuvik SIGINT facility having been closed back in 1986) and/or CFS Yellowknife. The RCN operates patrols from docks at Tuktoyaktuk.
_____________________________________________

[GTX_Admin]

Any chance of a CANZUK Union showing in this?

[apophenia]

Any chance of a CANZUK Union showing in this?

That would always be possible. RW, CA effectively has free trade agreements with AU and NZ (through the CPTPP) and the UK (through the Trade Continuity Agreement). The difficulty for CA is the relatively low volume of those exports. In 2023, CA exported $3.2B to AU; $468M to NZ; and $18B to the UK for a total of $21.668B.

By contrast, CA exports to the US were 20 times that - totalling $418.6B in 2023. That represents half of our total exports for that year. So, having dug ourselves a dangerously deep hole, CA now has plenty of trade-diversification work to do!

Much depends upon how that CA to AU/NZ/AK export trade now develops. At the moment, the policy momentum seems to be behind Canada applying to become an associate member of the EU. But, CA has faced endless delays in EU ratification of CETA. In truth, northern Europe has suddenly warmed to CA because it desperately needs military and diplomatic support right now. (And who would have regarded Canada as a military asset three months ago!)  But southern Europe, feeling no direct threat from Putin, doesn't share northern Europe's urgency. So, I won't be holding my breath on EU membership of even a limited form.

[apophenia]

The next installment ...
__________________________________

"All our knowledge begins with the senses" - Project Nunataq

An expanded Northern Watch Array was but one programme within the larger Project Nunataq. [1] The first component to be announcement by the Mark Carney government was the purchase from Australia of their Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) for use in the Canadian Arctic. Eventually, this 'CANJORN' purchase firmed up as the Northern Over-the-horizon Radar Network (NORN) project. As with the mythical Norns, [2] there were to be three elements to NORN - west, east, and central for complete coverage with substantial overlap by the three systems with their ranges of 1,000-to-3,000 km.

The first over-the-horizon radar array to be installed was NORN-West located on the Arctic Coastal Plain east of the McKenzie River. This array could scan from Temp AB on Kotelny Island in the Russian Arctic and out to the middle of the Kara Sea or around to the USAF air bases at Eielson and Elmendorf. The second array was NORN-East located on the northern plain of otherwise uninhabited Bylot Island. This array could scan roughly from CFS Alert (roughly 1,000 km north of Bylot) all the way to Sredny Ostrov airfield on the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago in the Russian high Arctic. Because of the nature of OTH radar, a second, shorter-range array was needed to cover ranges of less than 1,000 km.

Initially, part of that 1,000 km radar gap was filled by in-service Canadian Forces AN/TPS-77 tactical radars. From Bylot, these available sets could reach out only 470 km. However, that was sufficient for these interim sets to 'see' the 435 km across Baffin Bay to the US-controlled Pituffik SB on Greenland. Alas, the AN/TPS-77 was a Lockheed Martin product which was going to make support awkward to say the least. Ultimately, a longer-range 'intermediate' radar was required but existing European options - like the Thales GM400 Alpha or Leonardo RAT-31DL offered improved ranges only by tens of kilometres. [3]

Northern Watch - More Than Just Microphones

In initial reporting on the expanded Northern Watch Array, the more easily-baffled of Canadian journalists puzzled over why a supposedly unmanned acoustic arrays required onsite staff. Investigative journalists probably could have work out the answer. But the true nature of the full Project Nunataq would not be publicly revealed for some time. The simple answer was that, in the current political environment, unmanned Arctic facilities could no longer be considered secure.

Physical security for NWA sites was now being provided as rotating forces of Arctic Rangers. [4] Each facility is surrounded by a polar bear perimeter fence - which acts more as a deterrent for curious bears than any form of barrier. More aggressive bears who breech the wire are moved on with flares, bear bangers and, when needed, bean-bag rounds. Charging bears are stopped with lethal force. A threat of the latter is also made to potential human interlopers - with fence warning signage in English, French, Inuktitut syllabics, and Russian.

By Ranger standards, these security details are extremely well-equipped. Although Inuit members often have an excellent sense of bears in proximity, standard gear includes NVGs for use in any poor vision conditions - darkness, ice fog, white-outs, etc. 'Security shacks' are also equipped with elevated IR E/O turrets for early warnings. Once a 'no duff' signal is given, all patrolling Rangers don NVGs and the bear hunt is on. If hostile human intruders are encountered, shoot-to-kill is pre-authorised. [5] Of course, the microphone arrays of NWA sites are not the only assets being protected.

"And he told us of his life; in the land of submarines"

The submerged microphone arrays were also given underwater protection. When word of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles monitoring the RWA systems first leaked, it was naturally assumed that they would be closely related to the vehicles which had laid the arrays in the first place. Those Cellula Guardian AUV (formerly known as Solus-XR) also begat a purely military XLAUV which DND had expressed interest in - this was the Cellula SeaWolf funded by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). But none of these would be directly related to the RWA's publicly-revealed protector.

Cellula Robotics evolved its reduced-scale SeaLion LAUV specifically for the RCN but in partnership with the RAN. [6] SeaLion is effectively a half-scale SeaWolf although with a rather more svelte outline. Like SeaWolf, SeaLion is fuel-cell powered but the latter puts emphasis on speed over range. The SeaLion is also a dedicated sensor-carrier rather than having floodable payload bays. Although considered autonomous, SeaLion also has a number of human-operated systems. This includes a semi-retractable grappling arm which can be used to retrieve errant hydrophones for repair and reuse.

Launch and retrieval of SeaLions from their 'kennels' is also human-assisted. This choice was made, in part, to simply automated return of malfunctioning SeaLions. In developing that system, it was recognised that a vast amount of programming was required to time automated soft-docking within those 'kennel' enclosure. By comparison, halting the slow-moving SeaLion my hand was simple. And the maintenance personnel had to be on site to repair or reset the malfunctioning SeaLion in any case.

Few other details have been released about the SeaLion LAUV monitors other than that the entire system having been designed to be transported in a single 20-foot ISO container. Even less information has been released about the more active member of the NWA protection team. This second AUV type is known to be armed in some way but neither the nature of that armament nor the size of the vehicle has been released. With heavy investments made in 6 metre 'kennels' for the SeaLions, it would seem likely that the 'protectors' are similarly sized. However, there is no way to confirm that.

There has also been much guesswork over the exact role of these armed AUVs. Some have speculated that these are LAUVs armed with some form of detachable charge or even small torpedos. Other suggest that these are the under-ice equivalent of Ukrainian SeaBaby suicide drones. IOW, when alerted by patrolling SeaLions of interlopers, these armed AUVs would be loosed on one-way interception missions. Either option seems fraught with danger in the fragile environment of Arctic waters. Bizarre as it seems, this is the world we find outselves in - where allies for over a century turn hostile and buddy up to traditional, on-going enemies.

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[1] A nunataq (anglicised as nunatak) is a (usually) granitic ridge protruding from an ice field.

[2] In Norse mythology, the Nornr were three giantesses (Jotuns) who govern destiny. As such, the NORN acronym seems a propos. However, at the time of writing, the third NORN array remains firmly in its planning phase.

[3] A leading candidate replacement radar for DND was the Elta EL/M-2080SA - a derivative of the Israeli Green Pine Block-C set (with their cooling systems modified for Arctic conditions). Finding funding for this project was a challenge in part because of Ottawa's reluctance to buy weapon systems from the current Israeli government.

[4] The Arctic Rangers are an elite subset of the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group but paid as Class-C Reserves. As Class-C reservists, Arctic Rangers are expected to serve - active and training - for up to 50 days per year.

[5] Fortunately, human intruders are invariably local kids out on a dare. Repeat offenders may find themselves in serious legal trouble. But, usually, a few sessions with hamlet elders gets the message across.

[6] The ADF was being cautious about Anduril Australia's American owners (particularly co-founder and arch Trump supporter, Palmer Luckey). Canada's Cellula SeaWolf made an obvious potential replacement for the Anduril Ghost Shark. The smaller Cellula SeaLion was seen as useful for a range of lower-endurance missions.

[apophenia]

The next installment (moving on to major warships; illustrations next time) ...
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Meandering Towards the Canadian Surface Combatants

For the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement (DPAMD) [1], the RCN's Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme came under intense scrutiny. The Committee found that the Director of Naval Requirements was unable to answer convincingly as to how these 15 x planned destroyers were to further Canadian foreign policy goals. Indeed, with tasks performed as components of US Navy Task Forces winnowed from the list, it became very difficult for the DNR to specify specific roles for these future River class destroyers. Nor, with the cessation of RCN cooperation with the USN, could a rationalisation be provided for the CSC's hugely expensive and US-controlled AEGIS radar system.

The contracting and sub-contracting of the CSC programme also presented a big target for DPAMD. Although the destroyers were to be built mainly at ISI Halifax, design control and selection of CSC sub-contractors was the domain of US-owned Lockheed Martin Canada (LMC). With a recent CAD 8 billion contract signed to finally get CSC construction underway, Cabinet had begun to get cold feet.

Back in January 2015 - a decade into the official Canadian Surface Combatant project, CSC acquisition costs - ie: construction and outfitting of the 15 x new destroyers - was estimated at CAD 26 billion (2025 CAD 33.8B). So, 3 x CSC should cost 6.76B (in 2025 CAD). But, by late 2024, the cost of building the first three CSC hulls had reached CAD 22.2B. Estimates for the entire CSC build were as high as CAD 80B but, including infrastructure improvements, costs could reach an eye-watering CAD 871.7 billion.

Programmes as big as the Canadian Surface Combatant procurement invariably take on a life of their own. Indeed, they can become 'The Living Dead'. But viewed from outside of the NDHQ 'Puzzle Palace', the process can be difficult to understand. With such phenomena, it often helps to take an historical overview of the entire programme.

Fuster-Cluck - 'Right hand, this is left hand, ack'

Canada's old Iroquois class air defence destroyers were expected to retire in 2005. Maritime Staff's original replacement plan was CADRE (the Command & Control and Air-Defence Capability Replacement project). CADRE combined Area Air Defence with a much-coveted Command and Control capability (although planners never seemed to ask whether those two roles might come into conflict at sea). There were two main pushes for CADRE. One was fixated on the US Navy's DD(X) concept - which finally emerged as the troubled Zumwalt class destroyer. [2] The other was based on a stretched-hull development of the then-new Halifax class frigate as proposed by Saint John Shipbuilding. The second batch Halifax were always intended to have longer hulls and that formed the basis of the Saint John 'Province' class submission. [3]

Normally, a definition phase as dragged out as that of CADRE is a problem in itself. However, in this case, the real problem was that NDHQ planners seemed lack even a basic understanding of the Canadian procurement system of the day. In the previous decade, only a single DND capital expenditure had been properly endorsed by the Minister for National Defence before submission to Treasury Board for approval. As a result, beyond its growing admin cost, CADRE could never be properly budgeted and the planning wheels just continued to spin.

Meanwhile, a budgetary rival had appeared in Maritime Staff planning. Those proposing a Canadian strategic sealift capability had successfully argued that the Command and Control role could be better incorporated into the large hull of their sealift proposal - the Multi-Role Support Vessel - which was meant to transport Canadian soldiers and equipment to Norway in the event of conflict. By 1999, a much-enlarged sealifter (Project M 2673) had been rebranded as the awkwardly-named Afloat Logistic Support Capability (ALSC). As naval planners obsessed over measuring lane metres, ALSC morphed into the Joint Support Ship (JSS) - a term taken from a similar project for the Royal Netherlands Navy. [4]

Many into One - CADRE Becomes the Single Ship Transition

Both in parallel and in rivalry with CADRE was yet another NDHQ capital plan - the Single Ship Transition which was to provide immediate Iroquois replacements before moving on to build new patrol frigates. The namesake Halifax class frigate, FFH 330, had only just been commissioned in 1992. Still, it seemed prudent to include a future Halifax replacement in the Single Ship Transition project. The two separate roles in one hull type was to be accomplished through modularity. The new DDG and FFG would share hulls and propulsion systems with 'plug-and-play' sensors and weapons systems making up the differences between the two warship types. [5] Then came the 2006 Strategic Capability Investment Plan (SCIP)

The Strategic Capability Investment Plan was an attempt to clarify and simplify procurement procedures. One change was that amortisation for procurements could now be spread out over equipment and sub-components. So, for a warship, the hull and propulsion might be amortised over 25 years while software might only be for a single year. At a stroke, SCIP had simplified what had been an overly-complex headache in organising procurement line items. But that, of course, assumed that Maritime Staff could enumerate their claims of detailed advantages. Alas, it seemed that they could not.

A defining feature of the Single Ship Transition concept was making maximum use of modularity. In theory, a future frigate could be kitted out for a dedicated ASW mission without the extra of equipment intended for non-ASW operations. Upon completion of this mission, ASW gear could be removed or swapped out at dockside for added armament and sensors better-suited, for instance, to a fisheries patrol frigate. Praises for such modularity advantages were sung in contracted Defence Research and Development Canada reports. But even those DRDC researchers had to acknowledge that, in their favoured MEKO types, those much-vaunted advantages were never actually realised in active service.

In service, modular warship operators tended to unship modules only when that 'slot' was needed for an alternative role module. If other 'slots' were not required for that particular role, this unwarranted kit just came along for the ride. Since the nature of modularity already dictated a slight increase in built weight, this meant that such vessels were invariable larded up. The theory of modularity was fine. But the practice generally failed to account for service biases such as removal-will-take-too-long or keep-it-on-just-in-case. As a result, weighty modularity's only  benefit was a comparatively minor one - potentially quicker systems upgrades

"... despair is not being who you are!" – Søren Kierkegaard

An exception to the rule seemed to be one of the originators of the modular approach - the Danes. While Maritime Staff (and later the RCN) produced endless studies under different names, the Royal Danish Navy was commissioning ships which nigh on matched NDHQ's announced requirements. The first was the 2005 Absalon class - a modular hybrid of patrol frigate and 'flex deck' transport ship. In effect, the Absalons were a blend of CADRE and the enomous JSS (Joint Support Ship) transports which, as noted earlier, had scooped up CADRE's Command and Control role by then.

Most interestingly, the Absalons were designed to commercial DNV Ice Class C standards. That did not specifically match Maritime Staff's requirement for a hull able to handle first-year ice. Rather ICE-C allowed the Absalons to manoeuvre in the light ice conditions of the Baltic Sea or through localized drift ice around Greenland. But Absalon wasn't alone. In 2008, the frigates were joined by the first Knud Rasmussen class OPVs - smaller Standard Flex modular vessels but capable of breaking first year ice (up to 80 cm thick). Both types actually existed and were operating in Arctic waters on Canada's NE maritime boundary. But NDHQ planners showed not the slightest interest in either Danish warship class.

Next! - Rebranding as the Canadian Surface Combatant

With the advent of SCIP, the Single Ship Transition had transmogrified into the Canadian Surface Combatant. For the most part, it was a distinction without a difference. But a slow evolution (or metastasis?) was underway. In place of the Single Ship Transition's two ship types with common hulls, CSC became a single, larger type meant to be capable of fulfilling both destroyer and frigate roles in one ship. Once it reached the second decade of the 21st Century, CSC began to emerge as a air defence frigate. But the concept had grown large and heavy enough that the RCN felt justified in calling it a 'destroyer'. [6]

Despite all of that Canadian Surface Combatant 'growth', other requirements were being quietly shed. As Danish Knud Rasmussen class OPVs deployed into Baffin Bay, Maritime Staff dropped its own first year ice stipulation for the CSC. Suddenly, which ever warm-water littoral conditions the US Navy would be operating in became the dominate concern. The CPC would become just another cog in the US Navy's AEGIS Combat System - a reversion to interpreting the ultimate goal both alliances and Canadian foreign policy as pleasing our American masters. And then everything changed.

Canadian Surface Combatants in an Age of MAGA Ascending

With a Canadian economy lacerated by unfair US tarrifs, the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement was understandably focused on the sheer expense of the Canadian Surface Combatant programme. Whether that expense could be borne was simply a question of will. Whether such expenses should be borne was an entirely difference matter.

On the question of should the expense by borne, the DPAMD final report on the Canadian Surface Combatant programme came back with a two-pronged answer. The first was that the cost for the first three CSC hulls (in constant CAD) having more than tripled warranted an investigation all of its own. This was not the Committee kicking the question into the long grass. Rather, the DPAMD was claiming that Parliament deserved a detailed and itemised response to explain these rather staggering cost increases. And the Committee suggested that it was design contractor Lockheed Martin Canada who should be made responsible for providing those detailed answers.

Another recommendation of the DPAMD final report was that an official answer must be provided as to how the Canadian Surface Combatants furthered Canadian foreign policy goals. Since the Director of Naval Requirements - Capt(N) Drew Graham - had been unable to provide adequate answers, the question should be redirected to the Commander RCN and Chief of the Naval Staff, VAdm Angus Topshee. [7] In the meantime, the Canadian Surface Combatant programme would remain 'frozen' and the RCN's ACSIC (AEGIS Combat System Integration Centre) at Moorestown, NJ, would stay shuttered (and highly unlikely to ever be reopened).

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[1] As a reminder, DPAMD stands for the (Standing Committee on) Defence Procurement/(Comité permanent des) achats de matériel de défense within Hansard and other official GoC documents.

[2] With the disasterous over-reach of the US Navy's Zumwalt class destroyers, the lack of early movement on CADRE proved a blessing in disguise.

[3] Alas for CADRE, this would be no simple hull stretch. To find a parallel section, the existing hull design had to be spliced just forward of the funnel. But the VLS required for the Air Defence needed to be placed behind the main gun. So, first a new hull section needed to be inserted. Then, the entire forward superstructure needed to be shifted aft to make space for that below-deck VLS. And, even with all that, there were no guarantees that the stretched hull could balance the top-side weight of the new APAR array and its mast.

[4] The noticeable difference being that Zr.Ms. Karel Doorman actually got built and entered service as a JLOS (Joint Logistiek Ondersteuningsschip) ... although the Dutch often still refer to her as a 'JSS'.

[5] Or, as it was put in DRDC CR-2006-004 of Feb 2006: "The single surface combatant design will utilize a common hull form, engineering plant, common core equipment fit and will use open-concept engineering and modularity wherever feasible."

[6] There are precedents. The classe Horizon/classe Orizzonte is designated as a frégate by the French and a cacciatorpediniere (or destroyer for the Mediterranean) by the Italians.

[7] Note that this is a work of fiction based partially on 'real world' events and developments. The names of appropriate public figures have been used ... but within a fictionalised context.
___________________________________________

[apophenia]

Reviewing the RCN's Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept

One of the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's (DPAMD) earlier reviews of naval projects was of the RCN's nascent Canadian Multi-mission Corvette (CMA). Still at a purely conceptual level, the CMA was first examined as potential 'low-hanging fruit' for elimination. However, a conclusion on CMA was deferred until the imminent yet wildly-expensive Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme could be thoroughly assessed by the Committee (see Reply #61, above).

The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme had been 'frozen' while awaiting rationales from the Directorate of Naval Requirements (and the CNS) on mission types, alternative equipment selections, and furthering Canadian foreign policy goals. While the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement awaited those clarifications, it was decided to give the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette concept a more thorough evaluation. This CMA review would focus on potential mission types and basic design considerations. The latter was not intended to dictate choices but, rather, to grade design priorities by their relative value.

The DPAMD's initial overview of the notional Canadian Multi-mission Corvette concluded that constraints being imposed on any future CMA all but guaranteed a mediocre outcome. As a result, the first order of Committee business was to assess those constraints. In order of address, those constraints were: a restriction of overall length to no more than 105 m; a maximum (lightship) displacement of 1,000 tonnes; and an insistence upon modularity of equipment (especially weapon systems).

A-gaugin' and A-measurin' - Metrics for the CMA

The RCN's limit of a maximum length overall of 105 metres had to do with berthing restrictions at HMC Dockyard at CFB Halifax. At the time of review, HMC Dockyard had to accommodate up to 7 x Halifax class frigates; 6 x Kingston class MCDVs; a growing number of Harry DeWolf class AOPS; and 2 x Victoria class SSKs (when operational) of the RCN Atlantic Fleet. In the past, HMC Dockyard had also hosted visiting US Navy ship and would continue to receive warships of the Royal Navy and other European allies. If the 'frozen' Canadian Surface Combatant programme was ever 'thawed', HMC Dockyard would need to accommodate those proposed River class destroyers (as older Halifax class were decommissioned).

Based on the testimony from invited experts, it became apparent that there was no obvious work-round for existing berthing restrictions. However, on the upside, 100 m+ had been established as the ideal hull length to cope with the longer swells of the North Pacific. The latter had not been a major consideration in the Director of Naval Requirements notion specs for CMC, rather it was a fortuitous coincidence. However, since DNR had drawn up its notional CMC, securing Canada's Pacific Coast had become a much higher priority than the Halifax-centric RCN was used to.

The exceedingly low displacement stipulated for the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette sprang from the maximum cut-off weight allowed under Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy. This was necessary in the opinion of the DNR to avoid placing even more pressure on overworked NSS yards like Seaspan whose deliveries were already running years late. But if the ship weighed less than 1,000 tonnes, the CMC could be built by smaller, non-NSS shipyards. No solution for this problem could be found so long as yards like Irving Shipbuilding were tied up with Canadian Surface Combatants.

Modularity continued to evade easy conclusions. By definition, it increased flexibility ... but at a cost of increased construction weight. A tentative conclusion was that tendency of existing uses of modular ships (like MEKO) to not make full use of potential advantages had more to do with lax practice and poor operating rules than with anything inherent in the modular approach to design. As such, the DPAMD's preliminary take on modularity was that it should be encouraged but also backed up by firmer regulations on how and when modules were to be installed or to be unshipped.

"The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born ..."

A further conclusion was reached in the DPAMD overview of the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette concept. It was a recognition that the CMC would always be a mediocre design so long as this corvette was a secondary project for the RCN. In an attempt to uncover further options, the DRDC was tasked with preparing a comparison report on two alternative scenarios for CMC. In the first instance, 'CMC-1' would be a secondary class but one which incorporated as much weaponry and other equipment from the retiring Halifax class frigates as possible. The second scenario, 'CMC-2', envisioned a no-holds-barred approach in the event of the complete cancellation of the larger, more expensive Canadian Surface Combatant programme.

In the case of 'CMC-1', the only possible avenue for improvement was a dramatic increase in budget. In part, that budget would be used to convert potentially obsolete weapon systems from the Halifax class frigates to suit them to a modern, modular corvette. [1] In the case of 'CMC-2', a larger budget would allow the corvette design to be tailored around new and appropriately-proportioned weapon systems. In the end, the 'CMC-2' scenario gained credibility as the depth of the challenge was revealed in removing all American ITAR-controlled equipment from the base Type 26 hull for the Canadian Surface Combatants. Expensive as the destroyers would be, further design work would still be required to completely excise US gear.

Both 'CMC-1' and 'CMC-2' scenarios would be incorporated as part of the definition stage of the new CMCC or Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept. (In the newly-revised DND nomenclature, the chosen term revealed that - as a Concept - CMC was being investigated for its potential but had yet to be funded as an officially approved Project.) Under CMCC, the original 'CMC-1' scenario was examined in three studies (CMCC-S1a through '-S1c) but none of these options appeared to do much to bolster Canadian coastal defences. The 'economy' approach of CMCC-S1, it was concluded, would be pound wise but penny foolish.

The former 'CMC-2' scenario - now the CMCC-S2 series - focused on key characteristics (which increasingly favoured incorporating more stealth), weapon and sensor options (including modularity), as well as potential industrial benefits balanced against possible gridlock on Canadian ways. With stealth technologies rising in importance, base models shifted from MEKO to the Swedish Visby class corvette. The latter was clearly too small for Canadian needs but Saab Kockums AB had been exploring 'growth' developments of the Visby concept. These included a 88 metres long Multi-Mission Corvette and a 98 m hull dubbed FLEXpatrol. The latter fit quite closely within the physical size limitations built into the original CMC requirement.

Both of Saab Kockums' Visby growth types dispensed with the Swedish Navy ships' waterjet drive in favour of more traditional shafts and propellers. The Visbys' composite sandwich hull construction was also abandoned for reinforced steel hulls. Since only preliminary design work had been performed on the 98 m FLEXpatrol, the CMCC-S2 study group substituted the steel hull of the rival VARD 7 100. [2] This ad hoc combination allowed the group to produce a number of highly detailed studies. Over time, actual Visby superstructure 'blocks' were eliminated from the design studies in favour of original components. What emerged from the CMCC-S2e study was a stealth-emphasised superstructure on a more conventional hull.

Describing the CMCC-S2e study as having 'a conventional hull' is something of an overstatement. In fact, the VARD 7 100 hull design had to be considerably modified to incorporate a Visby-style exhaust system. Recognising that a warship's largest heat source was its engine exhaust, Saab Kockums had eliminated the Visbys' funnel. In its place, ~600°C exhaust gases - turbine or diesel - were injected into a diverted stream of cold sea water. By the time this mixture was ejected overboard, its temperature would be no more than 25°C (even during the Summer). [3]

The superstructure for the CMCC-S2e study was entirely new in design if not in materials. As for Visby, superstructure construction was of a composite sandwich composed of a core of Divinycell PVC foam clad in a carbon fibre-reinforced plastic laminate. In key locations, this composite structure was reinforced with a weld-aluminum framework but, even still, topside would be reduced by about half compared with a steel superstructure. Also like Visby, this superstructure surrendered bridge wings in the name of enhanced stealth (mooring would be assisted by remote cameras - normally hidden behind stealth cover doors).

(To be continued ...)
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[1] These conversions would be applied to the Bofors 57 mm Mk 3 main gun and the two 8-cell Mk 48 VLS for ESSM SAMs. The Mk 141 canisters for Harpoon SSMs carried by the Halifax class would not be part of this package. Nor would the obsolete Phalanx Mk 15 Mod 21 CIWS.

[2] Technically, the VARD 7 100 was another unknown quantity. However, the VARD 7 100 hull was simply a 'bobbed' VARD 7 110 - aka the proven US Coast Guard's Heritage Class - with its superstructure re-tailored to suit the original CMC LOI.

[3] Producing this study required a then-unusual collaboration between the CMCC-S2 study group at DND, the DRDC Atlantic Research Centre, Saab Kockums AB (of Karlskrona, Sweden), and VARD Marine Inc. (of Vancouver, BC). By agreement with its owners Fincantieri, VARD Marine Inc. was not to share details of this work with the larger VARD Group (including VARD Marine US Inc.).

[apophenia]

Kingston class MCDVs - Replacing the 'Red-Headed Stepchild'

While the Directorate of Naval Requirements struggled to define the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept, the clock was ticking on finding a replacement for the Royal Canadian Navy's fleet of Kingston class MCDVs (Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels). The Naval Reserve-manned Kingstons had always been unloved by the RCN. In 2010, half of the fleet was due to be tied up ... before the MCDV was discovered to be one of the only RCN vessels actually capable of operating in Arctic waters during the Summertime. Nonetheless, the 30-year-old MCDVs would be due for replacement by the 2030s.

It seemed inevitable that pursuing MCDV replacements would invariably rob resources from other naval procurement proposals. On the heels of the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept, the Directorate of Naval Requirements established another study group for a proposed Canadian Coastal Patrol Corvette (CCPC) for more inshore patrol operations. Two model ships types were being considered. The first was the all-composite Swedish Visby class. The second was the Combattante BR70 from France's CMN (Constructions Mécaniques de Normandie). The latter was more conventional - with its steel hull and aluminum superstructure - this made it potentially more useable in summer Arctic conditions.  Both ship types were over 70 metres in length with the Visby being slightly longer but also somewhat lighter.

Neither CDPV nor CCPC was making naval planners particularly happy. Invariably one project would be robbed to pay for the other. It was Saab Kockums consultants who suggested the compromise solution - conflate the CCPC study into the MCDV Replacement Project. With that option on the table, everything changed. Neither Visby nor Combattante BR70 were going to fit into MCDV berths. Instead, a new length overall of 56 metres or less was established. Since this compromise class were not intended for open ocean operations, this shorter hull length was considered perfectly adequate for use in Georgia Strait and coastal BC waters, the inshore Scotian Shelf and Grand Banks, as well as for the Great Lakes.

CCDC - The Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette Project

Although restricted in size, the new Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette (CCDC) would need to be more than a warmed over OPV. Nor could it be another medicority with an indifferent performer 'justified' by its training role. To justify its existence, this CCDC class must be well-armed enough to truly warrant the term 'corvette'. The trick would be to avoid trying to jam 'a quart into a pint pot'.

Informally, Saab Kockums proposed a modified Visby composite superstructure placed on a new, shorter steel hull. This served as a starting point model for the conjoined Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette (CCDC) study group. However, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's (DPAMD) were soon insisting upon issuing an Letters of Interest invitation to industry at large. With the convergence of corvettes and OPVs, it would be a crowed field.

Saab Kockums was in a position to make a detailed submission based on its informal offering. Based on cooperative work with the CCDC study group, Saab Kockums had also been able to refine this submission (knowing in advance to repurpose the helicopter deck for mission-specific container stowage with a much smaller UAS landing deck). CMN put forward a variant of its Combattante FS56, resembling a scaled-down BR70. VARD submitted a modernised version of its 7 055 patrol vessel. Others were the Damen 'Sea Axe' Stan Patrol 5509; BMT Canada with the BMT/Ares 55 m OPV; Seatech Poland's OPV-55; and ST Engineering's Fearless 55 (an update of Singapore's Fearless OPV).

Thinning the Field - Culling the Coastal Corvette Contenders

In assessing the three submissions, DNR staff quickly eliminated the true OPVs. The VARD 7 055 had received top marks when considered purely as a direct MCDV replacement. But as a coastal defence corvette it was found wanting - being rather limited in armaments options as well as being the slowest of the submissions. [1] Similar criticisms were leveled at the Seatech OPV-55 with its top speed of 25 knots. The Polish OPV-55 was also quite lightweight at only 524 tonnes full displacement which, it was feared, would seriously restrict armament options.

The BMT/Ares 55 OPV, with its varied mission kits, would probably have made an ideal direct replacement for the MCDVs. However, as with Poland's Seatech, DND had no prior experience with Ares Shipyard Inc. of Turkey. That, in itself, would not have been a deal breaker. Still, for all its mission flexibility, the BMT design was no faster than the pokey VARD 7 055. The ST Engineering Fearless 55 was a rather more imposing craft and it probably got short shift in its CCDC assessment ... which had rather less to do with the merits of the Fearless OPV and more to with Singapore's open support for the US position on the Northwest Passage as international waters.

This somewhat brutal candidate cull left only to the two earliest submissions still standing - the 'Mini Visby from Saab Kockums and the CMN Combattante FS56 from France. Both submissions would be reviewed in greater detail as the Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette Programme moved into its procurement phase. In the meantime, candidates were also being reviewed for the CCDC's 'big brother', the former-Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept now entering its Project phase.

CMCP - The Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Project

As the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Concept matured, Saab Kockums and Norway's VARD decided to formalise the relationship which had developed buring the modelling stage of the CMCC-S2e study. Neither the FLEXpatrol nor VARD 7 100 would be pursued. Instead the two firms would partner to build a hybrid of the two specifically for the next-stage Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Project.

From the gunwales down, the 'Kockums-VARD' submission was pure VARD 7 100 Vigilance. From the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's point of view, this both spread work around the industry while offering something of an insurance plan (this hull being capable of being made ice-resistant should the future range of planned operations be expanded). And, although, the base VARD 7 100 design was comparitively new, this hull type had a proven heritage which dated back decades.

From the DNR's perspective, other submissions for the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Project's Request for Proposals were mainly also-rans.

CMN presented a slightly lengthened variant of the new SeaGuard 96 from German Naval Yards Kiel GmbH. This 102 metre SeaGuard 100CA design had a longer helicopter deck rated for 15 tonne machines. It would displace just over 2,200 tonnes and have a top speed of 28+ knots. At 2,700 tonnes, ThyssenKrupp's broader-in-the-beam MEKO A-100 corvette would be slightly more stable in open ocean conditions but could manage only 25 knots. The MEKO design also had a smaller helicopter deck.

RMC of Rauma, Finland, proposed a modified Pohjanmaa class corvette with the hull shrunk to 105 m loa by reducing the size of the helicopter hangar and landing deck. The Pohjanmaa class were powered by the same LM2500 turbines used in RCN Halifax class frigates. That would have been a major advantage had those gas turbines not been American. RMC emphasized the near uniqueness of the  Pohjanmaa class' Ice Class 1A hull. However, although also tauted as an option by 'Kockums-VARD', ice-resistance had never been a priority for the CMCP. [2]

On behalf of Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding, Damen Services Canada submitted several proposals to satisfy the Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette requirement. Two of these submissions were members of the Sigma family - the 100 m Sigma 9814 with conventional propeller drive and a shortened Sigma 10514 hull with azipod-style drives (akin to Kingston class MCDVs). As a 'budget' alternative, Damen proposed a buy-back of Holland class OPVs from the Dutch navy for refurbishing and resale to the RCN. The latter proposal required accepting an overlong (108.4 m) hull or committing to a major reconstruction - wherein Damen would 'bob' the Holland class hull and install azipods.

Based on Canada's prior relationships with Damen, the DPAMD was most interested in the rebuilt Holland class option. As 'ocean-going patrol vessels', this was an appealing design but only four hulls were in Dutch service. Damen had also somewhat jumped the gun. The Koninklijke Marine was not scheduled to replace its 4 x Holland class OPVs until new Amphibious Transport Ships began to enter Dutch service sometime around 2032 - too late for CMCP. Including the built Holland class option was a misplay by Damen Services Canada in that it distracted attention away from the promising Damen Sigma options.

(To be continued ...)
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[1] With a top speed of 23 knots, the VARD 7 055 was actually quite a bit quicker than the Kingston class MCDV ... but that was still rather faint praise for the VARD submission.

[2] It is worth noting that, whereas the basic VARD 7 100 had a respectable top speed of 26 knots, the VARD 7 100 Ice variant's maximum speed in open ocean dropped to a woefully inadequate 17 knots.

[apophenia]

"Vettes before jets ..." - The Corvettes Cometh

The outcome of the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette programme (CMC) was never a foregone conclusion. But involvement in the study phase gave VARD Canada and Saab Kockums. So, it was no great surprise when their Canadian Corvette Consortium won the contract to produce the new CMCs. And, for once, its budget was secure. That had been assured by the outright cancellation of the expensive Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) programme and its projected River class destroyers. That final decision on the CSC followed a detailed assessment by the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement's (DPAMD). [1] Thus, CMC moved from presumed 'low-hanging fruit' for cancellation to assured production.

In a way, the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette programme inherited the River class name from the cancelled CSC destroyers. [2] But during WW2, the RCN had also operated 60 x Canadian-built River frigates - which had originally been called "twin-screw corvettes". Although rather bigger than corvettes of their day, these historical 'frigates' were actually slightly smaller than the new CMC corvettes. [3] Such class naming seemed appropriate but the actual ship names for the CMC corvettes would trace back to WW2 Tribal or River class destroyers. Other river names had no prior use by the RCN (or CAF).

A total of 18 x CMC River class corvettes would be commissioned. Built by Chantier Davie in Quebec and Irving Shipbuilding in Nova Scotia were 9 x 'CMC-East' (named for Central and Eastern Canadian rivers: HMCS Chaudière, Gatineau, Margaree, Naskaupi, Natashquan, Restigouche, St. Laurent, Saguenay, and Three Rivers. Built in the West by VanShips and VicShips (both formerly Seaspan) were 9 x 'CMC-West' (named for rivers in BC, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the North): HMCS Assiniboine, Athabaska, Coppermine, Fraser, Kootenay, Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan; Skeena, and Stikine.

The CMC River class corvettes were originally planned to serve along the coasts on which they were created. However, Naval Staff HQ decided to transfer 2 x VicShips-built River class corvettes to Maritime Forces Atlantic. For most of the year, HMCS Assiniboine and HMCS Qu'Appelle would be based at CFB Halifax. However, in the Summer months, these ships would be detailed to NRD 'stone frigates' - one to HMCS Cabot (St. John's, NL), the other to HMCS [/i]York[/i] (Toronto, ON).

"Could you spot him in a crowd? I don't thinks so ..."

The Canadian Coastal Defence Corvette programme eventually selected the Saab Kockums submission over the French CMN Combattante FS56 (which was judged to be far less stealthy). The result was a squatter 'Mini Visby' scaled to fit the former Kingston class berths at HMC Dockyard in Halifax. The CCDC - now named as the Bay class Coastal Defence Corvette - differed rather dramatically in profile from the Sweden corvette. This chunkier appearance was the result of a lengthened forward superstructure and the incorporation of an enclosed 'mission module' bay covering much of the afterdeck.

The Bay class corvette's stealthy 'mission module' enclosure (along with a retractable stern gantry) allowed these ships to cover all of the Kingston class MCDV's roles and more. Each enclosure could accommodate a specialist TEU (20-foot ISO container) to suit specific missions - from MCM (mine countermeasures) gear to decompression chambers for Combat and Clearance Divers. The extended forward superstructure accommodated a fully-retractable gun system - the originally-planned Bofors 57 mm gun being replaced in service with a lighter 35 mm Rheinmetall GDM-008 autocannon.

The Bay class corvettes received names from the 1950s Bay class (or Gaspé class) minesweepers. However, the first of class - HMCS Georgian - was actually names for a WW2 Bangor class minesweeper (J144). A total of 16 x Bay class corvettes were delivered - all named for significant Canadian bays. [4]

As with the CMC River class corvettes, some of the smaller Bay class corvettes were assigned to Great Lakes Naval Reserve Divisions in the warmer months. Four Bay class served out of 'stone frigate' HMCS Griffon (Thunder Bay, ON) and HMCS Cataraqui (Kingston, ON, with forays to HMCS Hunter at Windsor as well as HMCS York). Another pair of HMC Dockyard Bay class corvettes alternated between NRD 'stone frigates' HMCS Queen Charlotte (Charlottetown, PEI) and HMCS Radisson (Trois-Rivières, QC) during the Summer months.

Left River class CMC showing an Airbus CH-245 Auk Light Maritime Helicopter (LHM) on the landing deck.

Right Bay class CCDC with deck gun retracted and a Leonardo CU-276 Alouette Maritime UAS landing on the afterdeck pad.

__________________________________________


[1] At the time, the decision to cancel the BAE Type 26-based River class destroyers had been made easier by British PM Kier Starmer keeping the UK discretely on the sidelines of Donald Trump's annexation threats. In the event, no 'Special Relationship' ever emerged with the US. No real UK-Canada rift ever developed but, in the Spring of 2025, there seemed little reason for Canada to continue with the Type 26.

[2] The 14 x RCN WW2 River 'class' destroyers were actually comprised 6 x quite different British destroyer designs.

[3] The WW2 River frigates were 91.8 m long overall, closely comparing with the 101 m loa for the slightly lengthened CMC VARD 7 100 hull development.

[4] MM 720 named Georgian Bay, ON; '721 for Miramichi Bay, NB; '722 for Semiahmoo Bay, BC; '723 for Ungava Bay, NU; '724 for Franklin Bay, NT; '725 for Gaspé Bay, QC; '726 for Hudson Bay; '727 for Bonavista Bay, NL; '728 for Chedabucto Bay, NS); '729 for Malpeque Bay, PEI; '730 for Whitefish Bay, ON; '731 for Alliford Bay, BC; '732 for Chaleur Bay, QB/NB; '733 for Semiahmoo Bay, BC; '734 for Miramichi Bay, QC/NB; and '735 for Baffin Bay, NU.

[apophenia]

Operation Reassurance and Canadian Army Vehicles

Canada's deployment to lead NATO's Multinational Brigade Latvia (MNB-LVA) revealed some weaknesses in Canadian Army armoured vehicle types. There was great confidence in the 15 x upgraded Leopard 2A4M tanks which LdSH(RC) took to Riga in Nov 2023. However, combat experiences in Ukraine suggested that the LAV 6.0 was less than ideal as a frontline infantry fighting vehicle. Compared with Western tracked IFVs used in Ukraine, the 8x8 wheeled LAV 6.0 was less tractable and rather vulnerable due to its tall silhouette and comparatively light armour. Ukraine found donated LAV 6.0s useful in support roles but dared not employ them as IFVs.

To get around this problem, it was decided to procure tracked IFVs through an urgent operational requirement (UOR). To expedite matters, DND reinitiated a much earlier UOR meant for Afghanistan. The original Close Combat Vehicle project had been cancelled in late 2013. [1] However, a revived CCV-UOR would be a much smaller procurement meant exclusively for use in Latvia. Still, DND faced two main challenges. First was that true urgency dictated the adoption of existing, used vehicles. Second was that many of the now-surplus IFV types examined for the original CCV contest had already been donated to Ukraine.

As it happens, the one exception was regionally available and already deployed to Latvia in support of MNB-LVA. This was the Swedish Army's Stridsfordon 9040C - better known internationally as the CV9040C. Sweden refurbished and modernised its strf 9040C fleet in 2018-20 but, now, new-build strf 90 Mk IVs were planned. [2] However, after enquiries, Sweden offered the lease of 26 x strf 9040Cs for use by the Canadian Army in Latvia. Sweden was also prepared to offer strf 9040C crew training in Skåne.

Close Combat Vehicle Take 2 - the CV9040CA

In Canadian Army service, the Stridsfordon would be known as Cougar CCVs (or, less formally, as 'Cougar 40s'). As leased vehicles, almost no changes were made to the borrowed strf 9040Cs. However, to distinguish from strf 9040Cs in Swedish service, the Cougars were dubbed CV9040CAs - this being thought enough to distinguish English/French labelling and other relatively minor changes made to suit Canadian service.

Canadian gunners trained on the CV9040CA's 40 mm guns at the Swedish Armoured Troops School at Skövde in Västergötland. These guns required a completely different approach from the 25 mm M242 chain guns that Canadian gunners were accustomed to. However, the 'Boffins' - as the 40 mm guns were dubbed - were simple, reliable, and hard-hitting. The CV9040s other weapons - coaxial and flexible-mount machine guns were both Swedish Ksp/58s (which were virtually identical to CAF C6A1 GPMGs).

Since the strf 9040s had been designed specifically to operate alongside Swedens Leopard 2 tanks, they made perfect companions for the Lord Strathcona's Leo 2A4Ms. This did not escape the attention of the Standing Committee on Defence Procurement (DPAMD) which recommended that the Assistant Deputy Minister of Materiel revive the cancelled 2013 Close Combat Vehicle project. The ADM (Mat) viewed this 'rebirth' through the lens of the CCV-UOR purchase. In other words, the object was to procure a CV90-related vehicle for general Canadian Army use as quickly as possible.

Kusiner i Kanada - BAE & Scania in Canada

In consultation with BAE Systems Hägglunds, it was quickly concluded that Canada should adopt a derivative of the in-production CV90 MkIV variant with its higher-powered Scania turbodiesel V8 and an uprated gear box. [3] However, for the revived CCV project, input had also been sought from Defence Research and Development Canada. The ADM (DRDC) recommended against Hägglunds' D-series turret, favouring a remote-controlled weapons system (RCWS). This would allow the vehicle commander and gunner to be housed more safely within the hull.

Further to the DRDC recommendations was that DEW Engineering be contracted to suggest optimal add-on armour packages for the CCV. DEW's conclusion came as something of a surprise. Inquiries were made and the Polish firm of PGZ Obrum [4] was willing to license its modular ceramic-aramid armour shell (originally devised for Obrum's 2013 CV90-based PL01 fire-support concept vehicle). DEW recommended that, for maximum protection, a similar armour shell be applied to whatever turret type was eventually chosen for the CCV.

Since some of the CV90 MkIV's additional 2 tonne payload would be taken up by add-on armour, it was decided to compromise slightly on armament. Originally, Canadian Army favoured a 35 mm main gun. Since the US 35 mm Bushmaster III autocannon was now out of the running, the obvious choice was the Rheinmetall MK35F. This was a heavy weapon but had the marginal advantage of being able to share some 35 x 228 mm ammunition types with RCN shipboard guns and CIWS. The downside was sheer size of that ammunition which severley limited the number of rounds which could be carried. As a result, it was decided to adopt a smaller 30 mm gun for the CCV.

DND quickly evaluated a number of RCWS types. [5] In the end, a German KNDS turret was selected. This was effectively the turret for the Dutch Boxer RCT 30 vehicle but with added mounting points for a ceramic-aramid add-on armour shell. The main gun was a dual-feed Rheinmetall MK30-2/ABM autocannon firing 30 mm x 173 rounds. The coaxial machine gun was the new C6A4 from FN-Herstal. [6] The first turrets would be sourced from the parent company. However, with a new Canada-Germany agreement on strategic cooperation in place, KNDS Canada Inc. was established to build these turrets in Woodstock, ON, just over 20 km east of where Scania Canada would build engines for the CCVs. [7]

Canadian Cat - the Cougar CCV into Service

BAE Systems Canada began Cougar CCV production at a GoC-owned production plant (formerly GM's Oshawa Assembly). The resulting Cougar CCV was not the most heavily-armed of IFVs but it was certainly among the best-protected. While priority remained replacing LAV 6.0 Infantry Section Carriers in Canadian Army use as rapidly as possible, once BAE had production underway, attention turned to other potential Cougar variants. By and large, this would overlap with undelivered members of the LAV 6-based Armoured Combat Support Vehicle family. [8]

Image (left): A newly-delivered Cougar CCV replete in its seasonal Wi/Hi (Winter/Hiver) camouflage 'wrap' (except on rubber track covers and Trophy ADS sensors). Note that Cougar CCVs were delivered from the outset sporting Canadian Soucy CRT composite tracks.

The absolute top priority was replacing the leased CV9040CAs with MNB-LVA. Some LAV 6.0 ISCs had also been retained in Latvia for use as fire-support vehicles. These too would be replaced by Cougar CCVs. The remaining LAV 6.0s followed their stablemates as donations to Ukraine. There was an initial plan that the CV9040CAs would also go to Ukraine (after Sweden had agreed to sell all leased vehicles to Canada). However, Latvian Land Forces (SzS) had run into quality-control problems with their General Dynamics ASCOD purchase. As as interim fix, the withdrawn CV9040CAs would be donated to the SzS.

Image (right): A CV9040CA in Latvian Land Forces (SzS) service. This former Canadian Army vehicle can be readily identified by its distinctive rear bins (here exposed when its covering Barracuda IR camouflage mat was dislodged). Only a Latvia pennant flag on the antenna reveals this CV9040CA to be in SzS service.

Once the first Cougar CCV production run was complete, these IFCs were followed by Cougar CE (Combat Engineering); Cougar EV (Engineering Vehicle); and, Cougar MRV (Maintenance & Recovery Vehicle) types. Two competing schemes were examined to provide a harder-hitting fire-support vehicle to back up the Cougar CCV. The first mounted a Nexter turret for a 40 mm CTA International 40CTC gun. The second effectively re-invented the PL01 demonstrator which provided the Cougar with its armour package. This was the proposed Cougar DFS-120 CCV, an analogue of Hägglunds' MkIV-based CV90120-T Ghost. To date, DND has yet to move on either DFS option.

____________________________


[1] For this original CCV contest, Canada had evaluated a CV9035 Mark III provided by BAE Systems Hägglunds.

[2] The strf 90 Mk IVs will have upgraded drivetrains (including more powerful engines) and a new turret with a more modern autocannon.

[3] Scania's uprated DSI 16 diesel produces 1,000 hp (as compared with 810 hp for CV90 MkIIIs). The Perkins X300-6 automatic transmission has 4 x forward gears + 2 x reverse gears.

[4] 'PGZ Obrum' is a branding for Obrum Sp. z o.o. of Gliwice, Poland.

[5] Reviewed were the EVPÚ TURRA 30 and Slovenian Valhalla Nimrod (both armed with the Slovak  GTS-30/N); NVK Techimpex Spys-Syntez (armed with a Ukrainian ZTM-1/N); and the winning KNDS-Deutschland turret. Rejected were Poland's HSW RCTS-30 and Norway's Kongsberg Protector RT20 (which offered no alternative to Mk44). Neither the Rafael Samson 30 nor Australian EOS T2000 turrets were included due to their Israeli content (the T2000 being derived from Elbit Systems' MT30).

[6] The Belgian purchase was dictated by the failure of Colt Canada (although the Colt CZ Group SE was based in Prague, this Czech firm was still hamstrung by US trade practices due to its ownership of Hartford, CT-based Colt.) The FN C6A4 was considered an interim coaxial type and would eventually be eclipsed by the domestic C6A6 made by a revived Diemaco, Canada's new 'Small Arms Strategic Source'.

[7] The CA-DE TCSMP (Treaty for Cooperation on Strategic and Military Production or Kooperationsvertrag für strategische und militärische Produktion) covered agreements ranging from preferred customer status for Canadian ore and fossil fuels to access for German firms to Canadian smelting and production sites close to power supply sources.

[8] Production of the ACSV faltered with the demise of GDLS-C when General Dynamics relocated tooling and equipment from the London, ON, line to their new Stryker line in South Carolina.