G'day gents!
I'm currently in collaboration with some very talented and gifted forum members in putting together an
'Alternative History' story, for which they are/have done some amazing profiles! But more of this very soon
I've been going through my hard drives and stubbled across one of my earlier collaborations with
'Maverick'(aka John from another forum, from which this forum was derived
Sadly I haven't heard from or seen
'Maverick's work for so so long, but I don't think he'll mind this trip down memory lane
So here we go.......
The Convair C-99 Peacelifter To the detriment of the U.S Army and to the USAF, the bull-headed and feared commander of the all mighty and powerful Strategic Air Command (SAC) – General Curtis Le May, had fought and won his battle to have the truly massive and promising Consolidated XC-99 strategic transport aircraft program cancelled in November 1949.
LeMay’s primary reason for his stringent opposition to the XC-99 program had been his perception that the C-99 would be a direct competitor, both in terms of budget and production of his ambitious building program of Strategic Air Command’s primary delivery system of the United States Nuclear arsenal – SAC’s ‘Big Stick’ – the massive, powerful and long reaching Consolidated B-36 Peacemaker strategic bomber.
Convair had cleverly engineered and promoted the XC-99 to the USAF on the grounds of its very high percentage of commonality of both parts and manufacturing techniques and jigs with its B-36 bomber cousin, from which it was developed from, as a good cost and maintenance opportunity.
But in the eyes of SAC alarm bells rang!
The sharing of production and delays in the B-36, due to a transport aircraft, no matter how big or capable, could not and would not be expectable, let alone tolerated by LeMay!
But as the world gasped in amazement at the XC-99, as it took to the air, they were not aware that it had already been relegated to the history books, with the programs cancellation – well so the Air Force thought!
For two things were to happen in the XC-99 programs favour.
One would be well known, the other would be relegated to a filing cabinet marked ‘Top Secret’, and would not see the light of day for another 40-years.
The first thing that would happen in the XC-99’s favour would be in June 1950, with a surprise invasion of South Korea, by a Soviet backed and equipped North Korea would drag the United States into a war it was ill prepared, let alone equipped to fight.
For by 1948, the U.S Army had fallen in size to a mere 700,000, compared to the Soviets estimated 5.7 million, making up 175-Divisions.
Compounding this obvious dilemma was that the United States political and military had convinced itself, that any future war would be fought with nuclear weapons, which would make it short and swift.
But the Korean War would be a very nasty and embarrassing slap of reality in the face of the United States as a superpower.
It had been very clear to friend and foe alike that the American’s had neglected conventional war fighting in both terms of numbers, training and equipment.
For the United States had failed to capitalize on all the combat experience of the hard learnt lessons of conventional warfare of the recently concluded Second World War, not more than five-years earlier.
The second thing to occur in the XC-99’s favour would be the appointment of a Dwight. D. Eisenhower, as the President of the United States in 1953. His administration had campaigned rationalization and emphasized on a balanced military budget.
With this rationalization of the military and its budget, Eisenhower set forward a comprehensive review of the United States Military, and it’s fighting capability.
This ‘Top Secret’ review was to be done and reviewed before the approval and implementation of the new NSC-162/2 (National Security Council Memorandum – 162/2) Planning Document.
This review titled -
‘The United States Military and its War Fighting Capacity and Deficiencies’,
It was closely followed by Eisenhower, who was not just the run of the mill president. For he had little need or reliance for ‘military advisors’, as had presidents before him, what with both the rank and title of ‘Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force’ (SHAEF), and later ‘General of the Army’ he had held previously to his presidency.
Eisenhower had very quickly learnt the critical importance and magnitude of logistics of men, material, fuels and ammunition. He also comprehended and appreciated air power in modern warfare.
In his capacity as Military Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone, Eisenhower had had first hand experience of the application, contribution and achievements of air power, with his involvement in the Berlin Crisis and the cities life saving airlift, which would become to be known as the Berlin Airlift.
The ‘The United States Military and its War Fighting Capacity and Deficiencies’ report highlighted in an entire chapter - The short comings of the Berlin Airlift, which the rest of the world was not aware of.
The report stated that the deficiencies of the USAF (and its allies), during the Berlin Crisis, strongly pointing out that the USAF had dropped the ball with its priorities and responsibility it had put towards its more often than not overlooked and yet importance of its transport/cargo aircraft capacity and capability.
It concluded that the USAF had near totally neglected the transport/cargo life line of the United States Army at the cost of its infatuation of building its strategic bomber force, under the leadership and strong arm tactics of the Strategic Air Command (SAC).
This was not just a focus on the types of transport aircraft employed by the USAF, with it emphasizing that SAC was absorbing almost every human asset around them like an expanding black whole, taking the cream of pilots, navigators and flight engineers, at the expense and detriment of every other structure and organizations within the Air Force – the likes of Military Air Transport Service (MATS). Because of this poaching, the likes of MATS had suffered greatly and detrimentally.
The Report identified that the Air Forces ‘Military Air Transport Service’ had been forced to contend with worn out; load and range limited transport aircraft, with many aircraft in its inventory dating back to pre-WWII linage – such as the venerable Douglas C-47, Curtiss C-46 and the larger and more capable Douglas C-54 Skymaster.
To MATS credit they had began to introduce more modern and more specialized transport/cargo aircraft designs – the likes of the Fairchild C-82 Packet and the larger and more capable Douglas C-74 Globemaster design.
But even though the C-82 offered great improvements in loading and unloading capability, like the C-47 and C-46 it was intended to replace was still in the tactical range of range and payload.
The recommendations of the Report was for a much larger, higher load capacity design with a true intercontinental range, with the ability to carry both troops, cargo, equipment and vehicles of the U.S Army to key theatres of operations in Western Europe and Asia.
It was a sensible cost effective move to have this required aircraft not to burden the existing and hard pressed airborne tanker fleet of the air force, or give course to require the purchase of further tanker platforms, so as to support this mission.
It would require to be a purpose designed and built design, which would incorporate strengthened floor, loading ramps, ease of loading and unloading, rough field performance, roll-on-roll off capability to ease and speed loading and unloading, and the incorporation of inflight refuelling receptor as an operation back-up.
This requirement would eventuate into the Request For Proposal (RFP), which would become the Douglas XC-132 strategic, heavy lift transport design. But this promising and capable design was thought to be at least a decade away!
One aircraft that did stand out as a contender, which could be put into production and service at an envisaged reasonable cost was a lone aircraft type, which only one had ever been built.
This aircraft was the mighty Consolidated XC-99.
It was some what ironic that the service that did not want it or need it, was more than willing to utilize this giants vast carrying capacity and true intercontinental range, during the Korean War.
With its ability to carry 100,000 lb (45,359 kg) of cargo or 400 fully equipped troops or 335 litter patients on its double cargo decks, with a range of 8,000 miles (13,000 km).
With this report, President Eisenhower was to implement many changes (for good and worse!) with in the United States military.
One of these initiatives was the requesting of his ‘Technical Advisor’ to carry out a feasibility study of a potential modernized C-99 to fill the needs and role of the US military, until the advent of the new purpose designed and built Strategic Transport Aircraft (the Douglas XC-132) could be ready.
To the surprise and appreciation of all, the President’s ‘Technical Advisor’ job was made easy, when Convair (Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft) advised and showed him the already organized technical drawings, technical data, performance estimates and manufactures models of the more specialized, capable and far more efficient ‘Production Standard’ C-99B design, which emphasised the efficient clam-type nose and tail door arrangement and loading ramps.
Conviar management and head engineers explaining that it was always intended to produce this more capable model of the C-99, had the Air Force given them the go ahead at the time of the original XC-99 trials.
Just as important at this meeting was Convair’s clear indication and commitment, that if production of the C-99B was to be given the go ahead, the company estimated that the first production model could be in production in little over six months of contract.
Added to this was Convair’s willingness to substantially reduce the price per aircraft, if they were ordered in batches of twenty at a time – predominantly this was possible because of the compatibility of the parts (60%), production techniques and jigs on the production line, as that of the existing B-36 bomber.
(Convair’s primary motivation for this offer was to maximise its chances of extended B-36 production, and to put it in a better position for its more advanced swept-wing, jet-powered B-36G (later YB-60) program, which it hoped would follow directly behind the B-36 production!)
The cost saving element favoured well with Eisenhower, as did the force-multiplier aspect of such a capable intercontinental transport aircraft, with the U.S Army.
An order and the go ahead was given to Convair two weeks after the meeting between Convair and the President’s ‘Technical Advisor’
Convair was so confident in their ability to produce the ‘Production Standard’ C-99B, that it stated that it did not see any reason for the added cost and time of having to prototype it – with more than enough data and information and experience gained in the prototype XC-99.
At the same time, as a backup and a sign of the importance that the administration put on the needs of such an airlift capability a contract was signed with Douglas for its proposed improvement of its C-74 Globemaster design, the much larger and more capable C-124 Globemaster II.
Ten months later the first YC-99B was being flight tested in conjunction with the 172rd Military Airlift Group in1954.
It did not take long for the high demands and wants of the C-99B’s capability to be noticed in the Air Force.
The Air Force in response requested a second batch of the C-99’s
But like all new aircraft, its wants and needs could be identified with experience and service.
The Air Force approached Convair, with its want for better and shorter ‘Maximum Take Off’ (MTO) performance, and a beefed up landing gear.
Once again, Convair found and proposed an easy fix solution – they proposed a cost effective fix of incorporating the same arrangement as that of the Air Forces B-36D’s with two suspended pairs of General Electric J47-19 turbojet engines from each outer wing. These jets would give greater thrust on take off, and then being shut down after achieving optimum height to conserve fuel.
The USAF ordered sixty of these improved variants of the C-99B, which were given the official designation of C-99D
At the same time of the C-99D’s being awarded contract for production, Convair with the failure of their B-60 design to be selected as SAC’s next generation strategic bomber to that of the more advanced Boeing B-52 design, were desperate to keep its primary production line open and running, with the hope that its promising MX-1626 design proposed to meet SAC’s SAB-51 (Supersonic Aircraft Bomber) and SAR-51 (Supersonic Aircraft Reconnaissance) program could be up and running
With this in mind Convair proposed a specialised airborne tanker / flight refuelling variant of its latest C-99D.
Convair being intimately involved in the next generation of strategic bombers, with its failed B-60 design bid knew well the advancement in technology and aerodynamics its winning rival Boeing had to contend with in putting its advanced B-52 into both production and operational service. This meant that the hard pressed, yet limited range B-47 Stratojet bomber would have to soldier on with being the primary stick of SAC.
Convair salesmen cleverly emphasised this fact to SAC’s high command, and offered a cost effective means on how to improve the B-47’s range and striking power in the form of their force multiplier – the KC-99D Peacefueller.
But like that of the original prototype XC-99, which had been brought and paid for by USAF funds, the USAF elected to keep the one and only KC-99D in operational service, where it would be utilised by the USAF’s Tactical Air Command (TAC) to ferry its tactical fighter bomber back and forth to Europe and America, where its three-point refuelling capability and its massive transferable fuel load could support a ferry deployment of an entire squadron one-way!
SAC high command was impressed – especially with the cost estimates that Convair brought with them. Added to this was Convair’s clever premonition of the KC-99D as an all-in-one support aircraft with a single KC-99D being able to support a flight of four B-47’s to their targets in the Soviet Union. For the KC-99D was not just a tanker, it would also carry spare engines, tyres, RATO’s, EPU’s and even spare nuclear bombs if need be to forward deployment bases in the likes of Turkey, Italy and Britain.
Convair’s KC-99D’s massive wing span allowed for two B-47 bombers to be refuelled simultaneously using wing-tip mounted retractable hose and drum systems, whilst (in theory!) a third B-47 could have been refuelled with the tail mounted Boeing flying boom system.
One prototype was requested and built for SAC to test the concept of this promising all-in-one support platform. But after exhausting tests the USAF decided that the cost and effort of fitting probe-type receptors and the associated re-plumbing of their fuel systems would be a logistical and operational burden. Added to this was the fact that the new and promising Boeing B-52 was accelerating in testing and trials ahead of schedule, so as allowing it to enter service earlier than anticipated, SAC’s interest in the KC-99D wanned.
With the service introduction of the C-99D, the US government offered the British government (the RAF!) some of its earlier C-99B’s under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), so as to help Britain with its strategic obligations
The RAF gladly took on charge twelve former USAF C-99B’s.
The RAF flight and ground crews were trained in the United States.
These early C-99B’s would serve the British well, supporting the British nuclear weapons tests in Australia, to the Malaysian/Borneo crisis and other numerous NATO commitments.
Sadly it would only be due to the difficulty of sourcing spare parts and maintaining the long out of production radial engines and the signs of fatigue in the wing boxes and the landing gear, which forced the RAF to reluctantly withdraw these giants from service.
With their withdrawal, the RAF would not recoup such a versatile lift capability until the purchase of its Boeing C-17A’s decades later.
Convair’s last reprieve in its utilisation of its B-36/C-99 family came at the mercy of the cancellation of the then promising and desired program ‘SS-402L’ ‘Heavy Airlift Transport’ the Douglas XC-132.
This program had meet its demise with the failure of the US aerospace engine industries to develop a powerful efficient and reliable turboshaft engine.
The USAF was desperate for a new built strategic transport aircraft, yet the fall out with Congress meant that it was going to have to wait for a time to both develop and field such an aircraft.
The USAF approached Convair to see if it could prolong the life of its hard pressed C-99D fleet for another decade or so till the new design could be ready (These studies led to the "CX-4" design concept, then the ‘CX-X’ design, which would eventually lead in April 1964 to the "Heavy Logistics System" (CX-HLS) program)
Convair now in full swing development and production preparation for its winning SAB-51 (Supersonic Aircraft Bomber) and SAR-51 (Supersonic Aircraft Reconnaissance) design the B-58 Hustler, was pretty committed.
Convair wanted to impress the USAF high command so as to have its B-58 and its future variant looked on favourably, so when this request was received, the designers and engineers at Convair went one step further.
For like Boeing had impressed and won over the US government and the USAF with their proposition for the dirt cheap production of their KC-137 Stratotanker, in exchange for further orders of a new variant of the B-52.
Convair proposed an advanced new built all-jet powered variant of the C-99, which the company called the C-99G.
The proposed C-99G would utilise the R&D of the company’s unsuccessful YB-60 strategic bomber.
The C-99G would use the aerodynamic and performance improved swept wing and eight- turbojet configuration of their bomber design.
And because the C-99G would use the already proven and existing C-99D fuselage, matted to the already tested and proven (and most importantly paid for R&D!) YB-60 wing/engine configuration, then if the USAF/SAC was willing to develop and purchase an additional one hundred B-58C Hustler’s, Convair would be willing to produce forty of these proposed C-99G’s for the cost of their materials only + 10 per cent!
The USAF and SAC new a good deal when they sore it!
The deal was signed, and the C-99G was put into production with a high priority (which unbeknown to the USAF would be a god send with the Vietnam War looming!)
With the introduction of the C-99G into service all remaining C-99B’s and C-99D’s were phased out of service, with the exception of one squadron which was saved at the last moment due to the commitments of the ever logistically consuming Vietnam War, although this would become a Air Force Reserve squadron.
Although newer and more modern designs like the Douglas C-133 and the Lockheed C-141 began to enter service to complement the likes of the Douglas C-124 Globemaster II’s in supporting the long haul logistic burden of the Vietnam, non came close to the C-99G’s volumes capacity and weight lift capability.
The mighty C-99G would serve with gratitude and distinction in the long and drawn out Vietnam War, until it was replaced with little pomp or ceremony by the more modern and advanced giant the Boeing C-5 Galaxy (and not the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy!!).
But at Convair and with the crews that both flew and maintained the mammoth C-99 series it was both known and appreciated that it was due to this worlds first true intercontinental transport aircraft, which gave the USAF the knowledge and courage to go one step forward in developing the requirements which would become the "Heavy Logistics System" (CX-HLS), and the Boeing C-5 Galaxy.
The C-99D and G would be remembered mostly for its contribution in the Vietnam War, were it was both loved and loathed by the American servicemen and women alike. For in many cases it would be the C-99G/D which would bring them to Vietnam, while also being their ticket home – wether it be in a seat, a litter or in worse case in a body bag!
In 1970 the remaining twelve C-99D’s of the final squadron (a Air Force Reserve squadron) and eight C-99G’s were to receive one final modification literally before their destruction. It has been said that the United States took this expensive and well publicised conversion to clearly demonstrate and send a message to the Soviet’s that although effected by its withdrawal from the 10-years of war in Vietnam, the United States was more than capable and willing to meet any sabre rattling.
They were specially modified to become remote piloted target drones, so as to simulate Soviet Tu-95 ‘Bear’s’ (The QC-99D’s) and M-4 ‘Bison’ (QC-99G) bombers penetrating North American aerospace and Carrier Battle Group’s
This gave both NORAD and the US Navy valuable live tracking and live firing training and experience.
NORAD utilized the C-99G’s strategic range to carry out simulated attacks from all points of the compass, without warning – testing NORAD’s C3, fighter/interceptors and their SAM batteries, which included the then under development MIM-104 Patriot SAM system.
On 22 November 1973, as part of this political and military resolve, as well as trying to convince Congress of the valued need and capability of its Grumman F-14 Tomcat program a live-fire exercise was held with a Tomcat prototype flying CAP.
Firing its complement of six AIM-54 Phoenix missiles in 38 seconds, against three attacking QC-99D’s and six Ryan BQM-34E FIREBEE II high speed drones launched from the inbound QC-99D’s to simulate AS-5 ‘Kelt’ ASM’s.
The F-14 was able to score three direct hits on the QC-99D’s and two of the FIREBEE II drones with its Phoenix missiles at a distance of 166 km.
M.A.D & Maverick
