The RAAF were horrified at the content and direction of the 1957 Defence White Paper released in the UK as they feared, rightly or wrongly, that the Australian Government may be temped to follow the same path and attempt to replace manned aircraft with guided missiles. Their fear was that once guided weapons became the norm a new "purple" service may be created to control and operate them effectively leaving the RAAF as nothing more than a uniformed air freight service. Even if the RAAF could gain control of all guided weapons where would that leave their reason for existing, flying aircraft?
Being a pragmatic service, with superb staff skills the RAAF decided to protect themselves in the most effective way they could see, they dumped the cornerstones of strategic strike and strategic air defence and concentrated on making tactical airpower in support of the other services and civilian authorities as effective and indispensable as possible. Their thinking was that these strategic missile forces would be hideously expensive and would likely end up being controlled by the US in the greater scheme of things so it would be better to create a series of pivotal niches for themselves. Training, Airpower subject matter experts, aviation procurement, safety and concept development. They also took the courageous but necessary step of integrating RAN and Army pilots into these tactical capabilities and providing the other services and civilian authorities operational control of the assets most critical to them.
The RAAF proceeded to create a flexible frame work where they provided the majority of aviation training where they could indoctrinate impressionable young naval and army officers into the concepts of airpower and also created an air staff college to groom more senior officers. Instead concentrating airpower they dispersed it as much as possible and made sure through an early form of joint force that the "voice of the customer" was seen to be heard.
Infantry battalions found themselves assigned their very own composite support sqn including Mustangs, Vampires and C-47s, where some of the pilots were army officers (or occasionally RAN) and they got to know and work with them. Similarly the RAN found that the RAAF Neptunes had started working much more closely with the fleet and the RAAF was very forth coming in letting RAN and army pilots fly even their newest combat aircraft. Instead of opposing army and RAN plans the RAAF backed them and offered suggestions to improve options available.
The RAAF was one of the driving forces behind the RAN increasing the size and capability of its carrier capability from one modernised Majestic Class Carrier to an eventual five vessels, including Hermes, Victorious and Eagle as well as ex USN Essex. It was the RAAF that championed the acquisition of the Skyhawk for RAN FAA but also for themselves as a CAS platform for army support where the RAAF were coded to fly from RAN carriers in support of the army as required. A similar arrangement was used for a joint Crusader force and the joint maritime force using Orions, Neptunes and Trackers.
The real work was in the mass introduction of helicopters into Australian service with the RAAF coordinating the procurement and operation many types across many overlapping roles and most impressively the creation of a national SAR capability. With the RAAF on board the RAN never hesitated to specify helicopters for their new ships, the army expected and were provided with aviation support at battle group level.
The greatest impact was when Sandys assumptions were proven to have been wrong the other services backed the RAAF to obtain a ADGE system and interceptors (F-106) as well as a strategic strike capability.
The result of the RAAFs forward thinking was a much earlier move to jointness within the ADF and a united front on strategic defence policy and in turn a much larger and more capable ADF that was more efficiently run.
I have suggested some aircraft types but the whole Idea behind this is the RAAF, acting for self preservation, develops a much more equitable and sensible big picture procurement system that advances the requirements of the whole ADF and civilian authorities that are reliant on airpower and or aviation support.