Browsing through Shipbucket, I found this catching my eyes:
Click HERE!
Reminds me of what Wikipedia says of the Spruance class destroyers...... it is claimed that they could have served into 2019 if updated again and maintained, and that USS Cushing was listed for grant transfer to Turkey before ultimately being allocated to be a target hulk.
If the transfer took place, however, would Turkey have accepted the ship as is? Or would at least some modifications be carried out to, for example, expand the AAW utility of that Mk.41 launcher?
When the four Kidd class DDGs were proposed for transfer to the RAN in the late 90s (there were offered to Australia first, then Greece, before Taiwan bought them)the assumption was at least three of the four would be progressively upgraded to permit them to serve well into the 2010s if not the 2020s as replacements for the retiring Perth (CFA)Class DDGs. All had already received extensive NTU (New Threat Upgrades) while with the USN making them the most capable non AEGIS combatants in service at the time, improving and refurbishing all ships systems, including accommodation and auxiliaries, as well as significantly more powerful and useful than the very best that could be hoped to be achieved with the ultimately very troubles RAN FFGUP (FFG Upgrade) program. The ships, as is could have replaced both the both the DDGs and FFGs, not received any additional upgrades or modernisations and still resulted in a significantly more powerful, flexible and capable RAN, at substantially lower cost, through until the ships could be replaced with AWD in the late 2010s early 2020s, so poorly executed was the FFGUP.
In fact what was being discussed was a rolling upgrade of the ships if acquired. Initially three would enter service as a direct replacement for the three existing DDGs while the fourth would begin an extensive upgrade instead of the, now unnecessary FFGUP. Mk-26 GMLSs would be replaced with strike length Mk-41 VLS, ESSM would likely be integrated along with the SM-2 the ships already used and VLASROC and Tomahawk would have been possibilities. Automation would also have been increased to reduce crewing, i.e. pneumatic starters on GT Generators replaced with electric, improving reliability and reducing maintenance. The ships were large enough, with sufficient modularity to permit multiple successive upgrades, for instance the ships could easily have received a scaled up area air defence version of the ANZAC ASMD upgrade, i.e. larger longer range CEASCAN radars and CEAMOUNT directors (Dragon kit with Shapeways CEAFAR mast and Mk-41 VLS).
Unfortunately the Australian government was wary of ex USN equipment following the poor standard of a pair of Newport LSTs bought in the 90s, completely missing the fact that the initially surveyed and selected ships had been fine but because of delays in processing the acquisition they went to other navies and the pair the, considerable less experienced, follow up team selected were in nowhere near as good a condition and required very substantial rectification work before they were even considered seaworthy post delivery. The government was also concerned that manning issues would force the retirement of the eldest pair of the RANs six FFGs to free up sufficient crew for the much larger Kidds, resulting in the RAN reducing major surface combatant numbers even further below the still officially planned 17. The other major issue was the fear in some quarters that four such capable ships would see a down grading of plans to acquire three new AEGIS destroyers (assumed at that point to be US or locally licence built Flight IIA Arleigh Burke class destroyers) as well as to upgrade the ANZAC class patrol frigates with AEGIS and SPY-1F through the ANZAC WIP (Warfighting Improvement Program). There was also the industrial side of things where people were becoming increasingly concerned that buying ex USN ships would result in a local shipbuilding blackhole and loss of the skills so expensively (and successfully) built up through the 80s and 90s.
The irony is all of these legitimate concerns ended up occurring without the acquisition of the Kidds for various reasons relating to government policy, economics (an extended boom unbalancing the economy and the labour market), poor planning, lack of vision, faulty and failed procurement, illogical cuts followed by strange procurement choices, cancellation and replacement of projects with inappropriate (cheap but incapable) alternatives. Failure to promptly replace the Perths with anything at all saw a reduction in the number of hulls and hence sea going billets, further compounding a cost cutting inspired gutting of the RANs engineering capability. Technical issues saw a cost and schedule blowout on the FFGUP which was reduced from all six ships to only four, further cutting hull numbers and compounded by the fact that the ships never achieved the intended level of capability and were unavailable for years longer than planned. The procurement of a replacement for the AWDs became a convoluted politically inspired process to reshape defence procurement and project management that didn't even kick off until some years after the urgent need for the ships was demonstrated by operations in East Timor and stated in the delayed Defence White Paper. So long was the project delayed that the new destroyers became the replacement for the FFGs, not the DDGs, meaning a reduction in actual fleet size from 14 to 12 major combatants and an eventual planned 11, instead of the long required (since the retirement of the carrier Melbourne) 17. The convoluted process that should have seen three CFA/Perth class DDGs replaced with three Flight IIA Burke AEGIS destroyers (or three Kidd class DDGs as an interim) in the late 90s, early 2000s will see three DDGs and six FFGs replaced with three AEGIS FFGs two decades later.
Fitting AEGIS and SPY-1F to the ANZACs proved impractical and combined with the issues with FFGUP saw a massive reduction in both numbers and capability from the retirement of the Perths that continues today. The decision to neither build Arleigh Burkes or stretch ANZACs (from my understanding would have been similar in size and capability to the South Korean KDXII) as well as to cancel the missile corvettes intended to replace the fleets in shore patrol boats as well as to convert a commercial tanker into a fleet oiler (that never met capability requirements) and to upgrade/double hull the existing AOR overseas, instead of building the long required two new ships ensured that there would be a ship building blackhole and the loss of strategic capability that would literally cost billions to rebuild.
In an ideal world Australia would have acquired and progressively upgraded all four Kidd Class DDGs in the late 90s. Three would be hot transfers using the Perth Class crews and the fourth would have served as the prototype for an upgrade for the rest of the class. Only the newest pair of FFGs would be upgraded, where possible using systems common the upgraded Kidds, while the older ships would continue in service as is until replaced post 2010. Shipbuilding would be kept going through this time by local construction of patrol boat replacing helicopter equipped missile corvettes (the proposed Transfield OPC), two new AORs, two or three helicopter carriers or LHDs and possibly up to several small LPDs. ANZAC WIP would not even start with the ship remaining as patrol frigates due to the Kidds and two upgraded and four standard FFGs being available. As the corvette program winds up the first new AWD would be completed to begin replacing the FFGs with the Kidds finally being replaced around 2020 by something really interesting, possibly a DDG-1000 based AWD or cruiser, or a JMSDF helicopter escort (Hyuga/Izumo)